



EVALUATION OF PROMOTION OF DEVELOPMENT AND
CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN THE CHITTAGONG HILL
TRACTS DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES (CHTDF)

Letter of Contract N°2013/327334/1

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

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The ET is very aware of the fact that the shortness of this evaluation would make a study and understanding of this complex programme impossible without the extensive briefings, meetings, clarifications, logistical support and accompaniment (in the CHT) , involving much time and effort by the many stakeholders involved in the CHTDF.

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On behalf of the team.

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Thank you all

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFSP	Agriculture and Food Security Project
AUEO	Assistant Upazilla Education Officer
AUSAID	Australian Agency for International Development (Now amalgamated into Australian Embassy)
AEO	Assistance Education Officer
ANC	Anti-Natal Clinic
ARI	Acute Respiratory Infection
BBG	Bangladesh Border Guards
BDT	Bangladesh Taka
BNP	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
CD	Confidence Building
CE	Community Empowerment
CEP	Community Empowerment Programme
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CHTDF	Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility
CHTRC	Chittagong Hill Tract Regional Council
CHSW	Community Health Services Worker
CHTWON	Chittagong Hill Tracts Women's Organizations Network
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSBA	Community Skilled Birth Attendants
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DC	District Commissioner
DFID	Department for International Development
DoA	Department of Agriculture
DoAE	Department of Agriculture Extension
DP	Development Partners
DPEO	District Primary Education Officer
DEE	District Education Expert

Dex	Directly Execution modalities
EFS	Education Field Supervisor
ET	Evaluation Team
EUD	European Union Delegation
FSF	Farmers Field Schools
FSF	Field School Facilitators
GIS	Geographic Information System
GSRC	Geographic Solutions Research Centre Ltd
HDC	Hill District Council
HDRC	Human Development Research Centre
HH	Household
HQ	Head Quarter
IFM	Integrated Farm Management
IRC	Information and Resource Centre
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Assistance
LNGO	Local Non-Government Organization
LOA	Letter of Agreement
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MG	Mother Groups
MLE	Multi Lingual Education
MIS	Management Information System
MP	Multiple Phosphate
MoCHTA	Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs
MoPME	Ministry of Primary & Mass Education
NGO	Non-Government Organization
Nex	National Execution Modalities
NORAD	Norwegian Aid Agency
NTFP	Non Timber Forest Products
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PA	Peace Accord
PCJSS	Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti

PDC	Para Development Committee
PDP	Para Development Plan.
PMR	Project Monitoring and Reporting
PNDG	Para Nari Development Group (Women group)
PNGO	Partner Non-Government Organization (working with CHTDF)
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
OHCHR	Commission for Human Rights
QIF	Quick Investment Funds
QPR	Quarterly Progress Report
RCM	Regional Coordination Meeting
RTI	Right to Information
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SC	Satellite Clinic
SCMC	Satellite Clinic Management Committee
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SMC	School Management Committee
SMT	Senior Management Team
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
ToR	Terms of Reference
TSP	Triple Super Phosphate
UDCC	Union Development Coordination Committee
UEO	Upazilla Education Officer
UNO	Upazila Nirbahi Officer
UPO	Upazilla Project Officer (LNGO Education)
IUNV	International United Nations Volunteer
WFP	World Food Programme (Of the United Nations)
WG	Women Group
UEO	Upazilla Education Officer
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UPDF	United People's Democratic Front
USAID	United States Assistance for International Development

DEFINITIONS

1. (Community) Empowerment

The term empowerment necessarily includes different facets of social, economic and political processes. The view of the ET is that empowerment is a prerequisite for sustainable development, 'pro-poor' growth and indeed peaceful co-existence.

The definitions on which this evaluation is based are as follows: 'the enhancement of assets and capabilities of diverse individuals and groups to function and engage, influence and hold accountable the institutions that affect them.'¹ And, 'the capacity of women and men to participate in, contribute to and benefit from growth processes in ways which recognise the value of their contributions, respect their dignity and make it possible to negotiate a fairer distribution of the benefits of growth. Socially empowered facilitates taking steps to change society so that a person's place is respected and recognised on the terms of that person not on terms dictated by others and politically empowered enables increasing equity of representation in political institutions and enhancing voice of the least vocal so that they can be fully engaged in making the decisions that affect them and the lives of others like them'².

2. Structured organizational Base (re emphasis on PNGs for Empowerment)

The advantage of a structured organizational base is generally regarded as having a greater propensity to embody principles of (social) 'inclusion' and valuable for sustaining inclusive strategies for enhanced empowerment and self-development of a community. It also provides a forum where utilisation of skills and knowledge generated through the project can be optimised even after the phasing out of CHTDF/NGO and as such potentially contributes to sustainability.

3. Peace

Johann Galtung's concept of peace distinguishes between 'negative peace', the absence of physical violence and a 'positive peace', describing a society without physical, structural and psychological violence based on positive relationships with a common understanding. The ET use this definition of positive peace.

4. Peace Building

The United Nations Agenda for Peace in 1992 laid the ground for the increasing use of the term '**peace-building**', defining it as a 'broad range of activities that are associated with capacity building, reconciliation and societal transformation. Peace-building activities identify and support structures and systems that intend to strengthen and solidify peace.'

5. Definition of Confidence Building

The ET used the term confidence building as equivalent to peace building.

6. Definition of Peace-building and Conflict Prevention Programmes/Projects

- Development agencies sometimes attribute their programmes in conflict zones per se as 'peace-building work'. Researchers argue that interventions can only be regarded as peace-building programmes, if they are based on specific peace-building and

¹ World Bank

² Conceptualising Empowerment. Eyben R, Kabeer N Cornwall A 2008 IDS Brighton UK.

conflict prevention methods. Others are following a broader understanding distinguishing peace-building and conflict prevention programmes and those of development by their goals and objectives. In this evaluation **the ET follow the latter definition: 'Peace-building or conflict prevention programmes or projects are interventions, whose primary purpose is to promote peace and prevent violent conflict.**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF) was designed to respond to the Peace Accord (PA) signed in December 1997. After more than 25 years of violent conflict it became possible to pursue a programme of socio- economic development. The core government institutions with responsibilities for managing and implementing development in the CHT are the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tract Affairs, (MoCHTA), the CHT Regional Council³ (CHT RC) and the Hill District Councils (HDCs). The CHTDF programme has been implemented for 10 years by UNDP who have worked with central and local government, CHT communities and NGOs to prevent new conflicts from emerging. Development was implemented by building the capacity of the permanent institutions so that they were enabled to implement a community empowering process for sustainable and self-reliant development. Initially there were four focal programme components - capacity building (institutional), confidence building through community empowerment and service delivery, health, education and economic development. The programme components were designed to provide support to the fledgling institutions with the responsibility to implement development in the CHT. Major parts of the Peace Accord (PA) have not been implemented and this has impacted on the CHTDF programme negatively with regard to impact and sustainability.

The Second Draft Final Report of the CHTDF is compiled under three Sections

Section I - Introduction of the Evaluation. The work in Bangladesh took place between 21st October to 22st November 2013 with a team of four consultants three of whom were fielded by the EC and one by DANIDA. The global objective of the evaluation is to *'...contribute to the promotion of sustainable economic development in the CHT based on effective cooperation between communities and government institutions in line with the CHT Peace Accord'* and the key objectives of the evaluation is to *'Assess the overall progress of the CHTDF', 'Identify gaps and lessons learned' and 'Recommend (considerations) for next generation donor interventions in the CHT.'*

Multiple methods were used to capture the extensive activities, comprehensive issues and concerns including document reviews, discussion with donors and contributors, meetings and follow-up discussion with all the key permanent institutions – at central, regional, district and local levels. Meetings were held with many communities, stakeholders, project staff, embassies, NGOs, international organizations and numerous focus group and individual discussions in the paras. The report follows the recommended order of the EU. During the mission the evaluation team shared initial findings from the field work observations in three separate workshop/meetings with, the Partners of CHTDF; a wider audience of potential and active Partners and with MoCHTA. The number of total person days allocated to the assignment was initially 100 later increased to 117 days to take account of the political disruptions and delays.

Section II The Report documents used for assessment of the components of the programme are, *Confidence building; Institutional capacity building; Community Empowerment and the Quick Impact Fund (QIF); Economic Development; Education; Health; Food Security and Cross cutting issues including Gender.* The eight separate programme components have been examined with regard to the

³ The CHT RC is Headed by one of the signatories of the PA

five measurements of development, **Programme Design/Relevance; Efficiency; Effectiveness; Impact and Sustainability.**

Programme Design and Relevance

All the activities for the CHTDF interventions were taken up in under developed areas of the CHT Region. It would be difficult to argue that any of these development interventions were not Relevant especially services that potentially provide more enhanced and more sustainable livelihoods, improved healthcare and access to education. The Relevance had been compromised to some extent by the very limited implementation of the Peace Accord by successive governments. There were some evident flaws in the Programme design. The Institutional capacity building design was relevant to 'newly formed' permanent institutions but insufficient advocacy emphasis. Secondly, Community Empowerment was designed without allowing sufficient time for the building of capacity (none financial livelihood capitals) to be in place before the introduction of the 'Quick impact Fund' (QiF). These standard investment grants were given to communities irrespective of the numbers of families and the consequent problems impacted negatively on sustainability. Providing educational opportunities and health care to those previously without access is obviously of great relevance although healthcare should have focussed more on preventative health strategies.

Efficiency

The implementation of the Peace Accord has varied over time according the different interpretations and positions of different governments and efficiency was substantially affected particularly in capacity building between 2005 and 2009 when a caretaker government was in power. Overall the capacity building programme has achieved the envisaged outputs from the allocated resources although delays occurred in the transfer of resources from the UNDP CHTDF resulting in efficiency losses. The establishment of 3257 Para Development Committees (PDC) and Para Nari Development Groups (PNDGs) triggered the release of grants to villages without capacity development or the implementation of empowerment processes and the efficiency of QiF was low overall. The contractual insecurities faced by implementing NGOs (PNGOs) meant that planning was limited and therefore prevented from being efficient. The market research carried out as part of economic development was inefficient and the majority of the promoted activities were unviable. 300 schools have been re-furnished or newly built providing facilities for over 20000 children. The efficiency in terms of the operation of the schools and community involvement is good but most are not integrated the government educational system. Healthcare has been provided in 15 Upazilas and curative services are efficiently delivered although essential preventative health measures such as access to clean drinking water and sanitation are widely unavailable which compromises the otherwise efficient gains of the health services. The introduction of PNDGs has improved the position of women in some communities and it is also evident that the efficiency of the Women's Groups is better of that than of mixed groups as in PDCs.

Effectiveness

CHTDF has been effective in advocacy, raising the awareness of a wide range of organizations and government on key issues for implementation of the PA – internationally as well as nationally. Effectiveness in the UNDP CHTDF is compromised by some UN agencies with long histories of working in the CHT –as well as some of the newer entrants – implementing programmes via their counterpart line agencies. This undermines the Peace Accord and means that the UN is not always using a conflict sensitive approach. The UNDP has recently established a UNCHT Task Force with a view to influencing this compromise.

Institutional Capacity Building has been promoted with CHT institutions with the aim of ‘.....increasing capacity to deliver services and support community development. The CHTDF has provided support for ‘Mandates and Rules,’ HRD and Logistical Support. However, whilst the delivery of activities is in line with proposed plans, the overall effectiveness of capacity building is less so.

If community empowerment means a limited increase in some household incomes and savings then some measures have been effective. However the fact that reportedly 37% of households were either excluded or dropped out of the PDCs means that equitable benefits and distribution from QiF has not been achieved and the programme has not been substantially effective. Community Empowerment necessarily embodies social and political assets as well as financial and in this respect the programme has not been effective at delivering empowerment to communities. Of the 3257 PDCs and the 1685 PNDGs started to potentially provide valuable community level institutional frame-works to be sustained and grow, it is estimated that approximately only 31% of PNCs and 60% of PNDGs are effectively functional. This effectiveness is likely to be further reduced following the phasing out of the PNGOs.

The training programmes under Economic Development that provided an opportunity for communities to introduce economic activities (such as beekeeping, mushroom growing and weaver –groups) have made a positive and effective contribution in some households and were effective. The lack of effective and adequate market research and/or inappropriate activities meant that many of the promoted projects were ineffective and failed.

Education. There is no doubt that the rehabilitation and building of 300 more schools with access to MLE providing educational opportunities to 200000+ children is very effective.

Health. Although CHTDF trained less birth attendants (CSBA) than planned (134) they have been able to deliver very effective services.

Agriculture – Food Security. The effectiveness of the agricultural and food security programme is complicated to measure. However much emphasis is placed on technical approaches, food security is not something that will be achieved by focusing simply on technical approaches .The need is to build effective and sustainable food systems, distribution mechanisms, address issues of malnutrition and access to food.

Gender. The formation of PNDGs has proved to be effective in the sense of the position of women being enhanced which has in turn benefitted families. Some women at community level have been trained effectively as peacemakers. Also a network of Chittagong Hill Tracts Women's Organizations Network CHTWON has been established and registered.

Impact

The overall political situation in Bangladesh has not been conducive to the implementation of the PA and major parts have yet to be implemented. This lack of progress by successive governments has had a negative impact on the CHTDF by limiting positive impacts on confidence building and most of the IP communities are still faced with challenging situations. Some progress with capacity building has been made, but tangible results with regard to the promotion of an environment conducive to development has been limited by the weak institutional framework of the MoCHTA and the unelected

CHT RC and the HDCs. This has also limited positive progress on transferred subjects from the UNDP CHTDF apart from education and health. A comprehensive community empowering process has not resulted and there is no substantial increase in the 'voice' of people. Community empowerment has been largely confined to delivering limited economic improvements and, in the areas where economic development projects have been applied, household incomes are recorded by the Household Survey as 8.2% higher. Some family incomes and savings have increased but a number of the poorer families have been excluded from the projects and any opportunities to improved livelihoods. Overall improvements in food security are difficult to verify in an evaluation of this nature but, in the programme areas, food deficits are said to have fallen from 2.8 months to 1.2 months which is a clear and positive, if somewhat limited, impact in the CHT as a whole. There has been a positive impact on the position of women through the advent of women's groups.

Sustainability

The design and relevance of the programme at community level was focussed on Quick Impact as a peace dividend and sustainability was somewhat side-lined. The sustainability of any community empowerment in terms of the PDCs will be evident over time once the withdrawal of CHTDF support in the form of Partner NGOs is realised.

Conclusions and Recommendations with regard to main focal areas. Peace and Confidence; Institutional Capacity Building; Community Empowerment Economic Development Education and Health.

Confidence and Capacity building. The key to confidence building is the full implementation of the PA and related laws, holding elections of the HDCs and strong enforcement of law and order in the CHT. The programme has strengthened its profile and strategy on policy dialogue for the PA especially since 2010. The integration of indigenous police, some progress with regard to the transfer to CHT institutions, moves towards consensus on the 13 points of the Land Commission Amendment and the Action Plan developed are examples of this. Progress on PA implementation is very slow and pressure and dialogue with the new government may improve prospects. The recommendation is to increase emphasis on this component and identify and target tangible sub-components such as the land issue. A further sub component on rule of law including a transitional justice mechanism to be added to complement the existing PA advocacy and the conceptual framework, conflict sensitivity and an expansion of advocacy activities is recommended..

Community Empowerment The Community empowerment strategy focussed almost entirely on delivering the QiF through the established PDCs at the expense of promoting a comprehensive empowering and enabling process incorporating all important social and political livelihood capitals. In the subsequent CHTDF programme, there is a need and opportunity to implement a comprehensive empowerment strategy and perhaps the revitalisation of the PDCs. It is recommended that this process should be started with an appreciative enquiry on a location specific community problem and conflict analysis based assessment. The Livelihoods for Social Inclusion concept and Livelihoods Framework are suggested as suitable tools to further consideration. It is important to recognise the potential value of this process and the potential contribution to the communities in recognising their role and responsibilities as the electorate to help build democratic frameworks to influence outcomes in favour of improved and more sustainable livelihoods.

Economic Development should be viewed as an integral part of the approach toward enhancing more sustainable livelihoods and not as an entity. It should be part of the response to a location specific– para level – problem and conflict analysis and the construction of a socio-economic development plan. NGOs should be employed on a proper partnership basis to facilitate the approach and deliver inputs once comprehensive and detailed assessments have been made.

Education is without doubt a very valuable component of the CHTDF providing the opportunity to more than 20000 children the opportunity to attend school. The challenge is how to sustain the schools in the longer term. The Education line department has officially transferred authority to the HDCs but the budgetary authority has not yet been transferred. There is clearly a need to focus on registration if the CHTDF schools are to survive.

Health The mobile satellite clinics have played an important role in delivering curative health care to many communities. Recently the Ministry (MoHFW) has agreed to cover the cost of the health workers CHSW and CSBA through MoCHTA. There is a case for amalgamating some of plethora of community based committees that have been established by CHTDF including health into community based organizations.

Section III. Options to consider on the Way Forward

3.1. Based on the evaluation, the progress made over the last 10 years and the ongoing obstacles faced, it is necessary for the Way Forward to recognise the changing context and political volatility that indicate that a flexibility and responsiveness needs to be inbuilt into a strategic framework.

Central to any programme structure is the aspect of ‘ownership’ and whilst recognising the inherent risks involved in government ownership – particularly where there is a lack of capacity to advance a reform/ development agenda – recommends for consideration an increased emphasis and focus on enabling MoCHTA, with the support of TA, to determine a demand led strategy and assume ownership – a prerequisite for sustainability.

3.2. Outlines the ‘Essentials’ for consideration in assessing the main parameters for a subsequent CHTDF. Peace/Confidence Building; Programme Ownership and Community Empowerment.

3.3. Options for Implementation briefly examines the UN One Agency Approach – ‘Delivery as One (DaO) that has been piloted over the last few years by the UN in a few countries. The ET recognises that the adoption of the DaO has limited implications for CHTDF’s future but that it would be unlikely to add value to the CHTDF especially in the short and medium term.

Three possible Options are recommended for further consideration.

Firstly, MoCHTA plus HDCs (CHT RC) supported by a TA.

Secondly, MoCHTA plus HDC (CHT RC) supported by TA and CHTDF.

Thirdly, Continuation of CHTDF.

The Options for consideration do not suggest a sudden cut off of one approach or the closure of CHTDF but rather a shift in ownership over time and with an extended transitional period going into the next programme.

The final part is also accompanied by a SWOT Analysis (Annex 2.)

Annexed to the Main Report are the ToRs; Listing of People/Organizations met; the Documents received and reviewed. Responses to the Comments made on First Draft Final Report; A Checklist developed by the ET for Interviews and Meetings, and a listing of the Stakeholders met at Central, Regional, District, Upazila and Union Levels as well as the PDCs, the PGDMs and communities as a whole.

1 SECTION I: INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

It is important to understand the historical context of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF) and the 1997 Peace Accord.

The Indigenous Peoples (IPs) of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) have been forced to defend their rights and very survival for at least the last 200 years. The colonisation of India by the British threatened the semi-independent state of Karpas Mahal (CHT) but after initial defeats of the British, in 1786 the first peace accord was signed and the district of the CHT created in 1860. The Circle administrative system was put in place by the British along with an IP police force in the 1870/80s. In 1900, the 'Act 1 of 1900' provided legal protection and land laws to the hill people. These were unique to the CHT, that is, not present in the State of Bengal as a whole.

With the ill-considered 1947 Partition of India by the British – India for Hindus and others and Pakistan (West and East) for Muslims - the CHT was lumped with the northern part of Bengal to become part of East Pakistan even though the CHT had less than 3% of Muslims. The West Pakistan administration aggressively tackled the supposed pro-Indian tendency of the IPs by dismantling the CHT police force and withdrawing the teaching of Chakma and Marma languages in schools. In 1961, the Kaptai hydroelectric dam was built creating a lake of some 600 sq. kms, displacing over 100,000 people, submerging 54000 acres of prime agricultural land including the town of Rangamati. Clearly this did nothing to create confidence amongst the IPs and added to insecurity and the potential for defensive strategies.

The 1971 war of Liberation split alliances in the CHT with the Rangamati Communist Party later to become the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) joining the liberation war whilst the Chakma and Bohmong chiefs supported Pakistan. With liberation came hopes of autonomy for the hill people but shortly after the war, the government forced the IPs to identify themselves as 'Bengalee' which caused huge resentment. Soon afterward the armed struggle by the Shanti Bahini began intensified between 1975- 1981 when the large scale demographic changes in the CHT were implemented and were rightly viewed as attempts to encroach the land and reduce the customary rights of IPs. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB) was established in 1976. Violent conflict, massacres and kidnappings continued until 1991 when the Awami League backed by the PCJSS won all three seats in the parliamentary elections and a Peace Committee was formed in 1992 to begin negotiations. The Awami League backed by PCJSS again won all three seats in the CHT in the 1996 elections and the current Peace Accord was signed in 1997.

The context and justification of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF) was to support and enable the full implementation of the 1997 CHT Peace Accord (PA) following the 25 years of armed conflict and political turmoil. The objective and purpose was based on the assumption the PA would be fully implemented and that the specific CHT institutions and communities would be able to plan, manage and support development for the improvement in living conditions with regard to

health, education etc. would engender stability, normalcy and increased confidence and capacity with the input of CHTDF. In spite of intense efforts by the CHTDF and others, the Peace Accord process is essentially stalled. Although violent conflict is not in evidence most of the time, communal tensions especially over land, continue and land-grabbing has increased, particularly with a cadastral survey mooted and the presence of settlers is changing demographic balance in the CHT. These factors mean that the original conflict over the regional autonomy of CHT as a tribal-inhabited region with special characteristics is on-going. It is imperative that the peace process be implemented fully if peace not civil unrest is to prevail.

With 75% of people in the CHT living below the poverty line and with an estimated 40% of people of working age either unemployed or underemployed, the Peace Accord potentially provided for greater regional autonomy and peace and opened up opportunities for sustainable development and more secure livelihoods. The system of governance in the CHT is complicated by the fact that there are three lines of governance, the traditional system, the specific institutions from the Peace Accord - the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tract Affairs (MoCHTA), Regional Council(CHTRC) and the Hill Districts Councils (HDCs)(3) and the Government of Bangladesh (GoB). The prevailing economic and political situation in the CHT is marked by a lack of marketable economic growth and the permanent official institutions designated in accordance with the Peace Accord (PA) – the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council (CHTRC) and the three Hill District Councils - are still operating without elections being held limiting the right of the Indigenous People to participate in self-governance.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility (CHTDF), (after a security assessment and a pilot project) was established over 10 years ago as a joint partnership with the central and local Government, CHT communities and NGOs and development partners to support the Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in CHT and the implementation of the CHT Peace Accord.

The strategy was to provide capacity building and confidence building to the institutional frame work mandated for implementation of the Peace Accord namely to the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs (MoCHTA), the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council and the three Hill District Councils of the CHT. The strategy recognised the need to build institutional capacity and confidence to take up their mandates and responsibilities for developing policy and planning, community outreach, technical support and development resource management – in essence to implement the CHT peace and development strategy.

The CHTDF was also designed to provide an initial stimulus to development in the CHT through the provision of goods and services and to provide educational and health services. To date it has been successful in mobilizing commitments of US\$ 160m for development initiatives from which approximately US\$141m has been expended. The programme has been implemented by UNDP.

However, in spite of efforts to encourage the full implementation of the PA, progress has been limited. Lack of political will is partly to blame but the inherent environmental and infrastructural challenges to implementation should not be underestimated. There are obvious and major differences in the CHT compared with other parts of Bangladesh. The CHT has more in common with its neighbours of North East India and Burma than with most of the rest of the plain lands and chore areas of Bangladesh. Notably the CHT is largely inhabited by 11 different indigenous peoples and the area is relatively sparsely populated. The topography is hilly, road communications are very limited outside of the district head-quarters with some paras being more than one days walk from the nearest district HQs or

even the nearest road transport facilities. The amount of land available for cultivation of paddy is minimal and most of the agriculture practised by the indigenous people is restricted to jum cultivation (Slash and Burn Farming) on steep slopes- not usually classified as suitable for agriculture.

The issue of land rights still has to be settled in accordance with the Peace Accord. Over recent years there has also been a big increase in the number of settlers – Bengali people from different parts of Bangladesh who practice agriculture and take over land - in CHT putting further pressure on resources particularly the ‘plain land’ suitable for paddy cultivations and sometimes with access to irrigation. The fundamental issue of citizenship (registration) is also responsible for holding back progress on implementation of essential land rights. In the 16 years since the PA was signed ‘peace’ in regard to armed conflict between armed factions fighting government forces has generally prevailed in but the GoB still deploys 25% of its army in the CHT and civilian rule is still not fully implemented. Forest areas in the CHT account for 25% of the total forest area in Bangladesh. A traditional system of governance was in place prior to the PA and the services and goods that were provided by GoB were extremely limited. Educational and health services provision outside of the district HQs were extremely limited prior to CHTDF interventions but now over 300 schools are functioning.

The global objective of CHTDF is ‘to give a firm grounding to the CHT Peace Accord through supporting the GoB and the institutions of the local communities of the CHT to pursue sustainable socio-economic development’

The purpose of CHTDF is ‘to strengthen capacities and empower the key CHT institutions and local communities to plan, manage or support self-reliant development activities, confidence building dialogues and other conflict reduction initiatives, and also to benefit from region wide priority development services such as health and education.’ Through a series of activities the expected results from CHTDF are,

- i.) The capacity of CHT Institutions to support grassroots and community development enhanced.
- ii.) Region wide cross-cutting priority development issues and services addressed
- iii.) A Community Empowerment process for self- reliant development to support small scale projects at para level institutionalised
- iv.) Confidence building measures to resolve long standing issues critical to development and peace in the CHT facilitated
- v.) Technical services for more effective development and confidence building work in the CHT made available and systematised.

1.2 Methodology

The specific objectives for this evaluation were to ‘.....assess CHTDF’s contributions to peace building and addressing development challenges in CHT (encompassing social, economic and political spheres) by focusing on CHTDF’s implementation of the joint project as well as its institutional effectiveness in creating an enabling environment for sustainable development and peace in the CHT’. It will assess key results, specifically outcomes. (Anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative- and will cover the support from all development partners involved with the project).’

The key objectives of the evaluation have been to

- i.) Assess the overall progress of the CHTDF
- ii.) Identify gaps and codify relevant lessons
- iii.) Recommend strategic direction for next generation of donor interventions in the CHT.

The CHTDF has been assessed with regard to the unique characteristics and differences of the CHT in the context of Bangladesh. The ToR for the ET stipulated that the assessment should indicate lessons learned and should make suggestions and recommendations for future programmes in the CHT. The Aide Memoire listed the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of CHTDF and these have been further analysed in order to provide options in this Final Draft Report.

The evaluation team used multiple methods to capture the extensive sets of activities, comprehensive issues and concerns. This included document reviews, consultative group and individual meetings with donors, MoCHTA, the CHTRC and the HDCs, Line agencies and Upazillas, (I) NGOs and other international agencies including several embassies as well as individual/group interviews with stakeholders, field visits and meetings with project staff and communities in the three CHT districts. Although the evaluation was qualitative with regard to direct collection of data, the ET has used the quantitative data from independent consulting firms and consultants from the various studies conducted on the CHTDF in our analysis.

The ET has validated the findings and data by cross checking evidence through different sources. The field visits (initially planned for a period of 14 days had to be shortened to 9 days to take account of the 4 day hartal 10-13th November) incorporated interviews, focus group discussions, project site observations and data checked and validated by sharing with stakeholders and implementing agencies.

Throughout the process of evaluation, the major activities of CHTDF including the performance of UNDP has been assessed with regard to relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, emphasizing sustainability and impact, both as separate components and together. The methodology has enabled the ET to assess progress and lessons learned to date from the implementation of CHTDF, identify the opportunities and challenges in accelerating the Peace Accord and to make recommendations for consideration by the next generation donor interventions in the CHT. The approach is consistent with the EU PCM participatory approach and has involved all CHTDF stakeholders

1.3 Limitations

The number of total person days allocated to the assignment was initially 100 later increased to 117 days. Nevertheless, to evaluate such a complex and major programme involving multiple donors and implemented by the UNDP that has been operational for more than 10 years represents a formidable challenge. The challenges were made even more difficult by the prevailing political situation in Bangladesh during the evaluation (October/November 2013) and the fact that 7 of the allotted days were hartals (national) strikes which meant restrictions on travel and making time consuming re-adjustments to the Work-plan. It was inevitable that some of the changes in the Work-plan had to be agreed retrospectively. In the light of the major disruptions superimposed on an ambitious ToR consideration should be given to the need for additional independent focus studies to contribute further to knowledge of the dynamics of the post (ongoing)-conflict situation prevailing in the CHT and this Report.

2 SECTION II: MAIN FINDINGS OF THE EVALUATION

Chapter-I: Design and Relevance

1.1 Confidence Building

In view of the slow progress of Peace Accord implementation hindering the development of the region and the resolution of ongoing violent land disputes, this component is highly relevant to the needs in the current post conflict situation.

The inclusion of confidence building in the design of CHTDF gives a clear strategic direction to conflict reducing initiatives and 'to resolve long standing issues critical to peace and enhancing prospects for development CHT'. However, the underlying 'theories of change' and definitions of confidence and peace-building should have been made explicit in the conceptual framework of the programme to allow a more focused strategy especially with regard to the different levels and dimensions of peace building. For example, PA implementation in the different aspects of community conflicts, related and non-related to PA implementation. Without this theoretical background the confidence building projects are implemented more in a summative way without a prioritization according to most relevant needs. A comprehensive conflict analysis should have been conducted prior to implementation or at least at the very beginning of the programme to enable appropriate design (see also chapter on effectiveness and the respective recommendations). A major shortcoming of the design is that the first systematic stakeholder analysis (based on the context analysis tool) was conducted only in 2012.

1.2 Capacity Development

Capacity building of specific CHT institutions is highly relevant to the functioning of institutional and governmental structures. It is of central importance for implementation of the PA and crucial also to the development of the whole CHT region. 'However, the focus on increasing the capacity of the CHT institutions to deliver services and community development meant the design of this component did not emphasize sufficiently the necessity to build advocacy capacities of these institutions. The necessity to strengthen the capacities of these institutions was clearly stated in the programme design as per programme log-frame: 'The purpose of CHTDF is to strengthen capacities and empower the key CHT institutions and local communities to plan, manage or support self-reliant development activities, confidence building dialogues and other conflict reduction initiatives, and also to benefit from region wide priority development services such as health and education.' Furthermore, the design considers the capacity building component on a results level. 'The capacity of CHT Institutions to support grassroots and community development enhanced.'

1.3 Community Empowerment + QiF

In 1998, just after signing the CHT Accord, UNDP fielded a three member 'Need Assessment Team' to determine the development needs of the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In 2002 a 'Joint GoB/UNDP Risk Assessment Mission' (RAM) assessed the overall security situation for donor-funded development intervention in the region. Following the RAM, UNDP piloted the '*Promotion of*

Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts’ in 2003 and this continued until 2005.

The CHTDF, in partnership with the local NGOs, formed 3,257 Para Development Committees (PDCs) and 1,685 Para Nari Development Groups (PNDGs) to raise the awareness of women on their rights and position in society. In the post conflict situation in the CHT’s region, Community Empowerment and QIF working through PDCs and PNDGs are relevant objectives.

Based on the overall objective the specific aim for community empowerment was *‘to achieve institutionalized Community Empowerment process for self-reliant development to support Para Community small projects across the CHT region.’*

The focus of the CHTDF re Technical Assistance Project Proposal (TAPP) included the following-

- Community Empowerment Process and Quick Impact Fund (QIF) Operations
- Community Management and Technical Capacities
- CHT ‘Best Practices’ for Small Project Development
- NGO/ Community Facilitators/ UN Volunteers (UNV) capacities
- Development Role of Traditional and Elected CHT Leaders

Community Empowerment was narrowly interpreted and focussed primarily on a concept to facilitate and support the promotion of economic opportunities mainly QiF.

The ET could find no evidence of the CHTDF definition of ‘Empowerment’ and widely accepted definitions have been used in this evaluation.⁴

- sense of self-worth of the involved communities, who are able to value their involvement in the entire process of the interventions
- access to opportunities and resources provided by public and private actors
- ability to influence the direction of social changes in order to realise a more just social and economic order at local, national and international level
- capability to determine choices and options
empowered to control over own lives at individual, social and political level

Community Empowerment (CE) was designed as the main pillar of the CHTDF interventions of UNDP-GoB joint venture and was intended to generate awareness and knowledge :-

To enable people to adopt better lifestyle practices in health, hygiene, sanitation, nutrition, education, income, coping strategies etc.

- To increase knowledge of and access to facilities from different government line departments, NGOs and other development partners, traditional leadership, public representatives and markets.
- To develop skills and build leadership among the communities.
- To remove the sense of powerlessness and dependency among the communities through building confidence.
- To improve the economic status of poor communities in order to contribute to the empowerment of these communities.

⁴ See also in this Report Acronyms, Abbreviations and Definitions for other definitions taken into account.



CE image 1:Example of a 'fruit tree analysis' for future development in next 10 years by PDC

(courtesy: PNGO)

24 steps were identified as the empowerment process of the involved communities. The steps included: 1) Formation of Committees (except RCC, NSC and PDCs); 2) Selection of Upazilas; 3) Selection of NGOs (National & International); 4) Agreement with NGOs; 5) Phasing of Unions' Participation; 6) Selection of Paras; 7) Para visit and Rapport building; 8) Formation of PDCs; 9) Orientation on management capacity; 10) Agreement with PDCs; 11) Profiling of stakeholder; 12) Orientation on Utilization of the Resource Directory; 13) Orientation on Community Empowerment Concepts; 14) Preparation of Community profile(s); 15) Project Selection; 16) Project Design and Formulation 17) Project Submission, Approval and Start Up; 18) Training; 19) Creating and Ensuring relevant linkages for technical support services; 20) Implementation Plan; 21) Exposure and Exchange visits & sharing of experiences (cross-fertilization); 22) Monitoring & reporting; 23) Evaluation and 24) Expansion/replication of the project. Except for

step 13 and part of step 21, the design of the empowerment process did not focus on the kind of community empowerment which might improve ideological and political skills, knowledge and capabilities of the communities. The steps of 'CE' were focused on the implementation of QIF.

A 'needs assessment' was conducted in the Para level during the commencement of the project activities in the communities and a baseline survey was conducted in 2009 providing the basis for determining social, political, cultural and economic progress. The last HH survey was conducted in 2012⁵.

The aim of CHTDF has been to involve multi-levels of stakeholders in the implementation process of the project including line agencies, elected leaders, traditional representatives, PDC representatives and others. This has been accomplished to varying degrees through the Upazilla Advisory Committee (UzAC) and Union Facilitation Committee (UnFC) meetings.

According to the programme implementing NGOs insufficient time was allowed to conduct participatory rural appraisal, analysis of social and individual problems on a location specific basis, enhancing knowledge and skills or developing a common social vision for improved and sustainable livelihoods) was allowed by UNDP . As a consequence the implementation of CE process was very limited. The provision of financial grants before the capacity, skills and knowledge of the communities were developed may have been given to help create a sense of betterment –peace dividend - but in fact the sequencing has created a number of difficulties because of lack of preparations. Also the capacity building of the NGO 'Community Facilitators' was primarily focused on orientation for the adoption and implementation of the QIF rather than on facilitating skills peace-building, uphold rights and enabling more sustainable livelihoods of the communities.

⁵ CHTDF interventions – a household survey in Bandarban, Khagrachari and Rangamati of Chittagong Hill Tracts, by Abul Barkat, Ph.D at al, (conducted in 2012 and published in September 2013).

Also the GoB Line departments provided inappropriate technical information for conditions in CHT. For example, technologies for marginal lands were generally absent from their advice services.

The lack of location specific and contextual analysis for the identification of appropriate small projects and the emphasis on quick impact for increasing financial assets did not provide the necessary basis for empowering processes to be developed.

1.4 Economic Development

The CHT was previously excluded from economic development activities and it was expected that signing the Peace Accord in 1997 would open up opportunities. There are a number of activities promoted by the CHTDF. These included,

- beekeeping, weaving
- cash crops, mushroom cultivation, agro-product-Banana, Pineapple, turmeric, ginger,
- linkages with markets especially for perishable products
- development of market chains and skill development to enhance employment
- forming linkages with financial support institutions,
- advice and counselling, establishment of networks and
- the development of niche market as per Technical Assistance Project Proposal (TPP)
- branding of CHT produce

The objective of the Economic Development component of the CHTDF had been to create an environment of investment for economic and social enterprises in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. It also planned to increase employment opportunities, inspire small enterprises, strengthen producer networks, improve product quality, extend business linkages and improve market access and infrastructure in the region. Training was provided on market assessment, linkage building and experience given of nearby market-places to gain practical knowledge and increase confidence to achieve better prices for their products. Although capacity building for gaining access to economic institutions and private sector development is highly relevant, positive outcomes were not evident in the ET field visits.

Finance was made available to people who had attended the training courses by the economic development opportunity of CHTDF. The component did not form part of the original CHTDF design and was grafted on with the intention of responding to un/under-employment opportunities. There was mixed success from the training delivered by PNGO Economic Development Field Officers and no specific agency follow up mandate up to ensure the utilisation of knowledge and skills gained from the training courses according to the PNGOs.

1.5 Education

Low literacy rates attributed to a general lack of educational facilities and opportunities was the norm in the CHT especially in hard to reach areas prior to CHTDF. Other contributors to the problem included limited access to schools ie within reachable location; lack of mother tongue language system; seasonal migration with family members for Jhum cultivation; lack knowledge on the value of education among parents and poverty are reasons for low literacy. Even where there were schools a lack of competent teachers was evident.

The fact that so many children were denied access to education in the CHT makes the CHTDF highly relevant and of great and much welcomed value. It has provided opportunities to disadvantaged children in hard to reach areas; 20,000 students gained access to schools; mother tongue based education (MLE) curriculum developed and operationalized; 337 people have been trained on child centred educational methodology; 120 new school established; 276 schools building renovate; SMC formed/reformed according to government guidelines and from the 300 SMCs formed 160 remain very active; occasional joint monitoring visits by the line department organized; initiative taken to adopting special provision for CHTDF supported schools in the nationalization process; awarding no objection certification by MoEF to schools established on forest land and so on. However, despite these achievements the non-alignment between the project and the line department remains a challenge.

Attribution with regard to approach and strategy in some other respects however remains unclear. For example, adult literacy is said to have increased by approx. 20% but CHTDF introduced adult literacy activities in only 30 schools.

With regard to programme design alignment with the educational department to ensure the full participation of district and Upazila education officials for the educational component met with limited success. Nor did the design ensure accountability of DPEO and UEO to the respective authorities especially to HDCs in terms planning, monitoring and budgeting. Consequently, the educational component was managed by the LOA staff of HDCs. Consideration of alignment in the design of components potentially enables a sense of ownership on the part of those who should be responsible.

The project's strategy of developing community organizations like Mothers' Groups and strengthening the School Management Committees is linked with the wider institution building undertaken by CHTDF. It was expected that 70 per cent of schools would continue activities through community contribution and continuous support of NGOs.⁶ However, school management committees arrange meetings but not always according to the guidelines and a significant number of SMCs are not capable or confident enough to run a school by themselves. The ET visited all three districts. In focus group discussions with SMC members most interviewees said that the school would close if support by donors was withdrawn. Community contributions are likely to be inadequate due to poverty and the lack of livelihood options in CHT. Integration into the State system rather than coexistence would be most likely to ensure sustainability of education.

400 SMC members, 2400 mothers and 4000 parents are involved in 300 project schools to encourage women to engage in the education process and field findings shows that the objectives of the committees and groups are clear to a significant proportion of the people involved which indicates that the processes used have been relevant. So orientation and training have been imparted but the replication of knowledge in practice remained lower than expected.

Undoubtedly the relevance of providing educational opportunities to children previously denied is of great value. However the design might have been made more relevant if further consideration had been given to ownership and responsibility. Ultimately relevance is to be judged on the success of subsequent activities and whether the educational gains are sustainable.

⁶ CHTDF Phase III log-frame attached as Annex-2, in CHTDF Evaluation Report 2009.

1.6 Health

Health services and facilities were extremely limited in CHT so a comprehensive health service system was needed to increase people's access to quality health care. The health project is highly relevant to the wider aims of CHTDF's confidence building and socio-economic development in particular.

CHTDF supports a basic healthcare system with community health workers and satellite clinics. A referral system between the different levels of health care, from CHSW to satellite clinics, to Upazila and then to district is in place. In addition, the programme aims to strengthen health management facilities at community, Upazila and district levels and to develop community participation in the management of health facilities.

Conceptual Relevance: In spite of the contextual difficulties, CHTDF has set up an appropriate and relevant health service with professional doctors and CHSWs working at the grassroots level and have made a significant contribution to the provision of health services in terms of short-term remedial services to remote communities. The remedial service is obviously of significant value to users but in the long-term the practice might ultimately be difficult to continue because of the cost implications and the limitations in government funding. The concern is that providing a curative service is expensive, and whilst the line agency might easily agree to the policy decision whilst funding sources from donors is assured when this has to be met funding has to be met by line agency budgets that might invoke a quite different response.

Health education is one of the responsibilities of CHSW, and education sessions are conducted by health promoters at mobile clinics. 240,330 health education sessions have been conducted between December 2008 to December 2013 which includes sanitation and personal hygiene. CHTDF/HDCs are also supporting and taking part in various national and international awareness campaigns.

CHTDF health service delivery is being implemented under the LoA with HDCs. Service provision has focused mainly on curative services with health education on public health issues such as water and sanitation. However, demand-driven access to clean drinking water has not materialised and the uptake/response for safe sanitation has also been low (14%)⁷ irrespective of the fact that CHTDF was 'mandated' or not to deliver include these two essentials access to clean water and sanitation in the health programme are regarded of such critical importance to good health that they should not be ignored.

Relevance of Approach: The health service delivery system is a non-aligned arrangement relevant to the specific needs of CHT with regard to the peace accord in the post conflict situation and the health department is an agreed transferred subject to HDC. From a long-term development perspective, a comprehensive health service that integrates preventative measures and incorporates health management within the prevailing service delivery by line departments would be appropriate. There is room for improvement in the management of both the HDC and government managed services. Under the LoA HDCs managed services need to be mainstreamed with other government health services and HDCs need to be engaged in management of other government services. At present they have no involvement in important decisions such as planning and budgeting'.

⁷ CEP monitoring data

The government has implemented health service programme across the county under SWAP including in CHT. But the CHTDF health service delivery such as mobile clinics, small scale cost recovery differ from the government system and has focused on service delivery rather than capacity strengthening of existing health service delivery and management systems. The line department of respective health Ministries have been implementing these activities including the CHT. Under SWAP, improving service provision includes service providing points like Upazila health System, Union Health and Family Welfare Centre (UHFWC), Community Clinics (CCS) and Secondary and Tertiary health care service is available in CHT which is run by DGH under the Ministry of health and family planning.

Improved access to health care contributes to peace building and it constitutes a significant dividend to a large number of rural people of CHT through the delivery of services. According to the HDC managed health data base Health seeking behaviour, attitudinal and behavioural changes and learned knowledge are said to have improved. Examples are provided such as 954 safe deliveries conducted in the community by skilled birth attendants in 2013 opposed to no such facilities in 2008.

With regard to health seeking behaviour, attitudinal and behavioural changes and learned knowledge, the difficulty in having reliable data for analysis is evident. For example, according to the HH Survey people with knowledge of STD/STI increased from 5.4% (2008) to 12.3% in 2012⁸. But according to HPNSDP in 2009 approximately 46% of the population has heard of HIV and 13% of women have complete information on HIV transmission⁹. People and use of family planning increased from 57.2% (2008) to 72.8% in 2012. Given that the national contraceptive prevalence rate in 2009 was 56.07% and in 2012 rose to 61%¹⁰ the Household Survey figures need to be treated with some caution. Since the ET was prevented from collecting data on such a scale it would be useful to consider comparative data on morbidity, MMR, IMR, occurrence of illness, water born diseases, patient outflow in the health institutions, institutional deliveries, CPR etc.

Whilst the services provided are very important and relevant in the CHT context, because it is output focused at the expense of capacity strengthening of the institutions, the relevance of the Programme had been limited.

1.7 Food Security

With over 50% of people in the CHT living below the poverty line and a recorded average food deficit of 3 months in a year, the potential relevance of this project started in 2009 would be hard to overstate. The Agriculture and Food Security Project (AFSP) of CHTDF aimed to 'Improve the living conditions of poor marginalized and small farmer households through enhanced, integrated and sustainable agricultural productivity.' The aim was to make extension services, planned through an 'Improved demand-driven, integrated and decentralized extension system' available to 10,000 households. The project aimed to make 'Crop production yields and returns increased' (15%) through the use of improved high yielding varieties (HYVs) of seeds and the extension of improved compost making techniques. The CHTDF has undertaken different initiatives in 20 Upazillas such as capacity development of Field School Facilitators and farmer trainers (FSF) at Farmer Field Schools (600) (FFS), organizing exposure visits for local officials and leaders to gain knowledge on upland

⁸ Household Survey 2013.

⁹ Tribal/Ethnic Health Population and Nutrition Plan for the Health, Population and Nutrition Sector Development Program (HPNSDP) 2011 to 2016), Page.10

¹⁰ <http://www.bbs.gov.bd/webtestapplication/userfiles/image/SY2010/Chapter-13.pdf>

management and providing training to extension officers on farm production and strategies for upland management.

The programme design lacked the benefit of any substantive report from an authoritative body ¹¹ and instead the strategy is based largely on technological 'fixes' that are not ultimately sustainable quite the reverse, of what is needed to build a democratic and sustainable food systems in the CHT.

1.8 Crosscutting issue-Gender

A gender cluster promoted gender equity and advancement of women rights as a twin track approach, considering gender as a cross cutting issue and as an intervention simultaneously. The introduction of PNDG was highly relevant – although not included or anticipated in the original design- has had a positive impact on the position of women. The PDCs were introduced during the inception of CHTDF aiming for one-third women members in the Executive Committee of PDC. After introduction of PNDG in the community, women have come into the front line of leadership and eventually secured positions in more than 50 percent PDCs¹²). The design of the PNDG component might also have considered the advent of loans to group members that is the incorporation of 'savings and credit'.

1.9 Conclusions – Relevance and Design

The UNDP CHTDF was clearly designed and relevant as a peace building/holding strategy in support of the 1997 Peace Accord, integrating capacity building for the newly formed MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDCs.

Relevance and programme design has been compromised because of the PA has only been implemented in part.

The programme also incorporated a Peace Dividend by way of a QiF delivered to communities in 20 of the 25 Upazilas through a programme of community empowerment and the formation of PDCs and PNDGs. Programme components have been added periodically throughout the life of the programme. However the design did not allow sufficiently for an empowerment process to be progressed within the communities nor did it ensure that the capacity building made provision for increased institutional capabilities to be actively incorporated into the CHTDF.

11 Support to Preparation of an Integrated Project for Environmental Friendly Agriculture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts MoCHTA & FAO March 2013.

12 CHTDF M&E database 2012

Chapter-II: EFFICIENCY

2.1 Confidence Building

There have been different levels of efficient implementation during the programme period: Activities were less concentrated throughout the phase of 2005-2009, as the project struggled especially at the national level with a shortage of staff. At the same time the political environment was less favourable to advocate for the Peace Accord when BNP ended its period in power in October 2006. It was followed by the Caretaker Government until January 2009 when the Awami League took power. As a consequence, the national level dialogue activities were implemented to a lower degree than planned, especially with regard to the outstanding Peace Accord implementation sub-components such as land issues, regional elections, police, forestry and rehabilitation of refugees and IDPs. A detailed strategic approach of the sub-sectors was also not developed.

The situation changed after 2009 with regard to staff recruitment as well as the political developments: A policy advisor was employed and the Awami League won the election in 2008 with an election manifesto promising the PA implementation as part of its future agenda. Although, the political pace of the Awami League in bringing the PA forward was slower than expected, the political space for dialogue was used by CHTDF and since 2011 the activities have gained momentum, the national dialogue has been intensified and a detailed policy strategy was formulated using the Institutional Context Analysis approach (2012).

It is difficult to assess the efficiency of this component in terms of cost effectiveness. The UN agencies have the unique position as facilitators with regard to the national level dialogue and alternative less expensive models of implementation by other institutions would be unlikely to have comparable effects.

The costs of study tours abroad were very high due to more than 100 participants during the project period, but there seemed to be no alternative to this specific initiative of direct information sharing with other countries about the issues of indigenous people and had a unique potential for knowledge building.

2.2 Capacity Development

Efficiency of Institutional Capacity Building: Overall the capacity building programme has achieved the envisaged outputs from the allocated resources. However, there have been some shortfalls in coordination and management, especially with regard to delayed fund delivery hindering timely implementation of project activities according to the HDCs. In addition, the view of respondents is that the UNDP regulations for funds disbursement are difficult to handle since 80% expenditure must be accounted for before the next fund request can be submitted. The respondents claimed that this caused cash flow shortages and for instance, the inability to pay staff salaries on time.

A detailed cost benefit analysis could not be conducted during the framework of this evaluation. However, according to the UNDP staff capacity development grants were cost efficient with low transactions costs.

2.3 Community Empowerment + QIF

Key community empowerment activities include formation of Para Development Plans (PDP), providing QIF Grants to communities, implementation of projects by communities, providing management training to PDC and PNDG members and raising awareness of communities on basic rights. Community-driven projects mainly focused on different types of Income Generating Activities (IGA). The IGA schemes undertaken by communities include a diverse range of projects like beef fattening, cow rearing and other livestock husbandry, poultry, fisheries, different horticulture and agricultural activities, rice banks. Very few of the communities have taken water and sanitation projects under the QIF funding.

Through the community empowerment intervention, about 100,730 households are covered under 3,257 PDCs and 6305 are women-headed households. The PNDG initiative has included about 524,720 women in its different programmes and events in total.

During the pilot phase communities were provided with BDT 300,000, which was later increased to BDT 400,000. According to key respondents interviewed a subsequent instruction was that at least 50% of the 400,000 should be available for women-led /managed schemes. The focal communities met by the ET said the amount provided to the PNDG is fully utilized for women-driven projects. The other 50% are to address community needs as a whole which is regarded as insufficient. Some active PDCs also received extra support such as BDT 140,000 for each of the 1,650 communities to establish rice banks and BDT 192,000 for each of the 690 farmer field schools. BDT 200,000 was provided to each of the 1,685 PNDGs in addition to the budget of PDCs.

A point to note is that the variation in the size of Paras - between 15-200 HHs –means that the standardized allocation some paras are being provided with 10+ times more ‘investment capital’ than others. Consequently, in some instances the amount -BDT 200,000 or 400,000 represents a relatively large sum to be administered by the PDCs whilst in others the sum is less meaningful. It is not clear why the idea of ‘per capita’ funding formula used in other ‘Peace Dividend’ approaches was not used in the case of CHTDF.

To conduct a comprehensive investigation of fund utilization or use pattern of resources is clearly beyond the scope of this evaluation but would be important to assess prior to implementation of future programmes.

However, efficiency in community benefits from the QIF ¹³ allocation is low. According to the programme implementing NGOs 46% of PDCs are active and able to utilize funds in an efficient and inclusive manner for community benefits. The Community Empowerment Process (CEP) Cluster has an even lower rate of 30%. According to the Gender and Confidence Building clusters of CHTDF UNDP, NGO executives and PDC and PNDG representatives, projects run by PNDGs have generally shown to be better in dealing with financial matters and 50% plus are likely to be efficient in achieving positive results from their activities apart from the rice banks.

¹³ The NGOs criteria for assessing activeness of PDC's uses eight indicators. They are i) Regular Activity ii) Have ownership on the PDC and its properties, iii) maintain regular records iv) Deposit savings regularly v) No major allegation of misuse of funds, vi) Transparent financial management, vii) Own substantive assets, viii) have adopted a sustainability plan. PDCs that fulfil these criteria are considered ‘efficient’ by the programme implementing NGOs.

The efficiency of PDCs in fund utilization and implementing community-based projects presents a varied picture in the respective PDCs and districts. The PDCs in Bandarban are better than Khagrachari and Rangamati where 37% of the 655 are considered efficient in managing monetary resources by the PNGOs, while Rangamati and Khagrachari PDCs respectively are 27% of 461 and 28% of 713. About 47% out of 1829 analysed PDCs required more support (about 5 to 7 years) to be confident in running their own PDCs according to PNGOs. More than half of the PDCs (54%) of the 713 PDCs in Khagrachari - required more support compared to 38% in Rangamati and 48% in Bandarban. Again according to the PNGOs there are about a quarter of all PDCs that have not gained positively from the interventions 15% in Bandarban, 21% in Khagrachari and 35% in Rangamati have already dissolved or abandoned their community interventions and reportedly it will be difficult to revive these PDC.

According to the Cluster report the current situation of the PDCs is as follows:


- Savings programme continuing (outside QIF grants) for all 3257 (functioning) PDCs.
- Currently 1400 PDCs have bank balances more than Tk. 50,000 – apart from PDC assets and individual HH benefits received from QIF grants.
- Most of the PDCs have assets and their average value is equivalent to QIF grants value.
- 1700+ PDCs have rice banks with increased rice stock and it is expected that more than 90% rice banks are expected to be sustainable over a long period of time.

These indicators demonstrate that positive group activity has been successfully encouraged. However, if the purpose of forming PDCs was to provide an organizational base to stimulate an empowering process then it may be the case that not all activity is positive. For example, 'ADB project working with 600 PDCs' does not necessarily confirm functionality in terms of PDC purpose but rather one of utilization by a contracting agent. Secondly, the poorest sectors of some communities were excluded from membership and others can no longer be considered members. This obviously questions the status of current 'membership' of those PDCs.

Similarly, the claim that all 3257 PDCs have savings may be correct but what is important is who has access and control over those savings? Rice banks undoubtedly have the potential to contribute to improved access to food at community level and are recognised as a valuable investment. However, not everyone has the capacity to generate surpluses and it is inevitable that surplus producers benefit disproportionately and have a controlling interest over sale and distribution.

With regard to QiF, according to the 'CHTDF Household Survey' in the 5 years since 2008 householder incomes have reportedly increased by 19.3%. However, to attribute this only to QiF would not necessarily be correct. There are likely to be a number of other factors both related to CHTDF and others and include agriculture/food security, bee keeping, mushroom growing and others mentioned at the HH survey report. Efficiency with regard to utilization of QiF is likely to be low because the collectively purchased resources were in many cases divided up between relatively few members of the communities. Whilst this may have meant efficiency gains for those individuals the issue of equity of benefits and thus the overall efficiency as a peace 'joiner' is questionable. It is also important to note that increase in HH incomes do not in any way indicate equity of benefits across the community and the probability is that a few people have benefitted disproportionately.

CE graph 2 : PDC Categories : by district¹⁴¹⁵



Involvement of HDCs at the Upazilla level also enabled the timely implementation at grassroots level. As Md. Yusuf Ali a Community Health Services Supervisor (CHSS) of Matiranga, District Khagrachari noted , ‘...it is easier for HDC staff to move anywhere in the CHT when it deems necessary, whereas it is often difficult for UNDP staff members as they need a security clearance visit remote areas.

The contracting of local NGOs for implementing activities at the grassroots is considered by the ET as very efficient. It has enabled CHTDF to reach areas that it

would not otherwise have been able to work in. However, the terms and conditions of the contracts were unreliable and created many difficulties especially for forward planning by the PNGOs. This made for a rather tense relationship and most NGO executives expressed dissatisfaction with regard to ‘partnership’ / ‘contractor’ status. Uncertainty on the continuation of contracts affected field level staff negatively which also impacted on the achievement of the project goals and objectives. The table 1 (Example of Duration of some PNGO contracts) shows the contract flows of the project. The table 1 (Duration of the contracts of some PNGO) shows the contract flows of the project-

CE table 1 : Example of the Duration of some PNGO contracts


Sl. No	Contract no.	Duration	Total months
1	1 st	1 May 2004 to 30 April 2005	12
2	2 nd	1 May 2005 to 30 April 2006	12
3	3 rd	1 May 2006 to 30 April 2007	12
4	4 th	1 May 2007 to 30 April 2008	12
5	5 th	May 2008 to May 2009	12
6	6 th	11 May 2008 to 10 July 2009	2
7	7 th	11 July 2009 to 10 January 2010	6
8	7 th	9 September to 10 January 2010	4
9	7 th	11 January to 10 February 2010	1
10	7 th	11 February 2010 to 10 March 2010	1
11	8 th	11 March 2010 to 10 March 2011	12
12	9 th	11 March 2011- 10 April 2011	1
13	9 th	3 May 2011 to 2 October 2011*	5
14	10 th	3 October 2011 to 2 October 2012	12
15	11 th	3 October 2012 to 30 September 2013	12

*11 April 2011 to 2 May 2011 total 22 days with no contract.

14 This information was collected and analyzed by the programme implementing NGOs in November 2013.

15 For future purpose to rate the PDCs a ‘Minimum Conditions and Performance Measurement, linking with the increased or decreased funding level to the PDC according to its scoring under MCPM might be usefully employed.

Reportedly multi-sectoral interventions of CHTDF have increased household income and food security. Longadu Upazilla Parishad Chairman Md. Tofajjal Hossen said that food production in the Upazilla has ‘increased remarkably’ although he could not provide any statistics. The CHTDF Annual Report 2012 cited that the supported agriculture farm households under 690 Farmers Field Schools increased their income by 63 percent from the 2008 baseline and the household level food deficits decreased from 2.7 months in 2008 to 1.2 months in 2012. However seasonal variations are common and precise attribution is difficult.



The ET noted from various sources that the PDCs and PNDGs were not given adequate time to analyse area-specific problems or develop their ‘community-driven’ small-scale projects. In specific meetings with the PNGOs in the Districts the ET were informed that more time was necessary for communities to assimilate the opportunities for organizational and economic development. They need to understand and assess the process of community empowerment such as the analysis of area-specific problems identification, skills and capacity enhancement, develop their ‘community-driven’ small-scale projects and development of sustainable strategies which would have made PDCs and PNDGs more sustainable. In many cases the Community Facilitators had to complete all community processes within a few days and in some cases within one day. NGO Executives informed the ET that in order to meet UNDP deadlines in some cases, community facilitators simply duplicated the project proposals of one PDC and used it for others.

2.4 Economic Development

Clearly there are major challenges to efficiency especially for seasonable and perishable products for those paras not linked by road or boat to markets. So although the activities were perhaps relevant, efficient implementation was not possible in some locations. Integrating actions for economic development is theoretically viable but how communities benefit depend largely on access to markets. Building and maintaining market linkages for promotion of products and providing technical support would enhance prospects for improved efficiency.

In 2008, the economic development component of CHTDF had engaged ICIMOD and three local NGOs in three hill districts. Activities in this intervention included introduction of Bio-briquettes among CHT communities, honey production through bee-keeping, home-based mushroom cultivation, ginger cultivation, Medicinal and Aromatic Plants (MAPs) and weaving activities created optimistic expectations among the CHT communities. Technologies on mushroom and bee-keeping activities have rapidly spread to other CHTDF supported communities all over the CHTs and are considered by the communities as profitable economic opportunities. These two activities are still being carried out by the CHTDF PDCs in all 3 districts.

Bio-briquettes production had limited or no marketing facilities - fire-wood is freely available in rural and semi-urban areas which indicated poor market research. Ginger cultivation and MAPs activities have also failed. No specific advice or technology was provided and MAP collection was time

consuming and had limited marketing facilities. The economic development activities were curtailed in 2009 and restarted in 2010 with the CEP activities under PNGO operations.

2.5 Education

The education programme was implemented by CHTDF in 'partnership' with NGOs and HDCs. Of the 240 schools that were established, 23 government primary schools and 37 registered non-government primary schools are primarily run by the government with support from CHTDF and are integrated into progress monitoring and reporting. Consequently no progress monitoring information about the majority of the 240 schools is held in the District Primary Education Department Office since those schools do not report to DPEO.

Since education is a 'transferred subject' to HDC the line department should be responsible to oversee all education but in the CHTDF established and supported schools this is not working satisfactorily. (CHTDF Education Annual Report 2012 and CHTDF Education Periodic database 2013).

Instead CHTDF supported schools report directly to HDC and therefore the Department of Education (DoE) at district level does not assume responsibility or ownership or integrate them into the district primary education system. The major obstacles to including schools in the nationalization framework as per the PA are at national policy level. Institutional capacity strengthening has not been conducted even though it is one of the key criteria for the sustainability of programme actions and achievements. Supervision, coordination and cooperation for integration of schools remain a challenge and the CHTDF schools remain outside mainstream education. From the 300 schools established/renovated under CHTDF, 233 have applied for nationalization but DoE refused all as the criteria was not met. Subsequently 5 schools were accepted in the second phase of nationalization and another 18 have been identified for inclusion for the third phase of nationalization. The criteria for nationalization of primary schools are followed irrespective area, but for CHT area there should have revised attainable criteria and this should be taken up by HDCs should with the ministry of Primary and Mass Education. If it is not possible to resolve through negotiation and advocacy a Taskforce¹⁶ should be formed to review the implementation process and rules for nationalization of schools necessary for the CHT to expedite the nationalization process.

According to the PA and existing laws of Bangladesh, the government has transferred 'functions' to the HDCs but not yet allocated the 'finance' for HDC managed schools within the 'nationalization' framework. Since education is a transferred department to HDCs, the DOE should be under the control of HDCs but this has not happened to date. As a result, non-aligned management of CHTDF schools with regard to the line department is still a challenge to the provision of education in CHT.

The government is a signatory of the PA laws, the special approach to CHT, including education led by CHT government institutions and according to the CHT specific criteria - but the DoE still controls all national funding and disqualifies schools that do not meet the national criteria i.e. number of students required, school ownership of land, attendance of students in PSC examination in 2012 which schools in the CHT cannot possibly comply with. Also because the Multilingual Education (MLE) educational materials were developed before the National Curriculum and the Textbook (NCTB) curriculum there is a difference in consistency.

¹⁶ Reference Clause A (kha)-3 of Peace Accord

The national education policy recognized the need for multilingual education in CHT and accordingly the CHTDF development MLE curriculum was produced in 11 languages although four of them have not yet been used. Out of 300 schools, the project introduced MLE in 132 schools although the MLE education curriculum of grade 2 and 3 has not yet been developed though it was an aim of the project. The MLE project, supported by regional language development committees, is a substantive contribution to confidence building in a community. It is used in pre-primary level but not yet joined to the mainstream curriculum.

Exposure visits (39) were organised for a total of 600 people. Although the visits contributed to the improvement of the education system to some extent, if a more structured learning approach to sharing experiences and ideas with an established successful format for recording ideas was used this would make replication of the lessons learned more effective.

Community involvement in school activities include saving programmes, community contributions to cleaning, boundary fencing as well as group seating arrangements to encourage easier and equal communication are activities carried out by the community. Coordination meetings at Upazila, district and cluster level are held regularly for planning, reviewing and coordinating the activities at different levels but the results of deliberations are not available. According to the DPEOs interviewed by the ET, the CHTDF – often referred to as ‘UNDP Schools’- do not make reports available and information flows in general are lacking. This is of concern because it indicates a lack of cooperation and coordination. This situation is clearly contrary to the spirit of the Peace Accord and laws of Bangladesh and is something to be aware of because schools are not fulfilling their commitments or being monitored in accordance with the line departments requirements.

According to CHTDF government line department official (DPEO and A/UEO) visits to CHTDF supported schools were as follows: 2009: 95 visits, 2010: 91 visits, 2011: 210 visits, 2012: 150 visits and 2013: 156 visits.¹⁷ These figures indicate that visits were not made to every school in any year since inception. The UEO at the Upazila level has a duty to visit community schools and visits by line department personnel to primary schools are normal practice. The distribution of free books is also mandatory. Also all schools that are permitted by the education department to conduct lessons are eligible to hold Primary Schools in Certificate examination for their students.

2.6 Health Efficiency

The health programme was planned to be implemented in 22 of the 25 Upazilas and provide services to 3,000,000 people and 60,000 pregnant mothers through mobile medical teams and CSBA. However, it covered only 15 Upazilas and treated 1,729,498 patients - about 57.5 percent of the target. The 25,241 pregnant mothers that ¹⁸received healthcare are about 42 percent of the target. It is not clear if the gap between target and achievements is due to over ambitious targeting or inefficient service provision.

In each month, more than 23000 people participate in health education sessions conducted by the CSHW but the results are ambiguous. It is reported that 954 safe deliveries were made by skilled birth attendants in 2013 and, although this does not necessarily demonstrate recent increased health

¹⁷ CHTDF Education Annual Report 2012 and CHTDF Education Periodic database 2013

¹⁸ CHTDF Project Review Report: February, 2013.

seeking behaviour since there were no facilities in 2008¹⁹, indicating that women valued the service. Of the survey respondents in 2009²⁰, 22% pregnant women visited competent physician for antenatal care which increased to 48% in 2013²¹. There was also an increase in the number one year old children visiting doctors from 14% in 2009 to 22% in 2013. Between 2008 and 2013 there was an increase awareness of STD/STI increased from 5.4% to 12.3%; use of family planning from 57.2% to 72.8%²² and hospital delivery in last pregnancy increased from 3.6% to 10.2%.

It is not evident to what extent the behavioural change is a result of the work of CHTDF but undoubtedly it has made a contribution. The fact that only 12.3% of people who had heard of STD/STI an increase from 5.4% after 4-5 years demonstrates neither effectiveness nor efficiency. It is also the case that other development agencies work on the same issues in the same locations and therefore attribution to CHTDF is not assured.

Public health, especially water and sanitation, is a key issue for health education because almost 60 percent of diseases in rural areas are waterborne. The CEP monitoring data shows that only 14 percent of households have safe sanitation yet access to clean drinking water and sanitation is essential to good health. In the absence of government action and given the enhanced savings of all the PDCs it might be reasonable to expect that aware communities would make efforts to initiate necessary corrective action and help provide these essentials for improved health but health education falls short in this regard. The CHTDF health programme covered both curative and prevention health services and CHSW arranged health education session to make people aware. According to CHTDF they did not assume a mandate for a large scale sectoral programme however, between December 2008 to December 2013, 240330 health education sessions were conducted. In spite of this effort the message on preventive health -safe water and sanitation- seem to have been relegated and this is viewed as a weakness of project design. This is especially so since in hard to reach areas like CHT where timely curative health service delivery is even less available preventive health care is at a premium and yet personal hygiene clearly have not influenced behavioural change in people and is deficient in this critically important area of good health.

Health is one of the 'transferred departments' but the full transfer of human resource management, financial management, planning and development work is uncertain. Establishing full control by the HDCs over the line department is a challenging proposition due to the necessary power and authority, legal framework and governance decisions involved. Line departments have their own system, governance and accountability with regard to budgets set by the national government. HDCs have the executive authority over the line department officials up a certain level. The Civil Surgeon is the senior manager at district level and accountable to the line department in terms of planning, budgeting, managing the MH&FP programme and reporting to the HDCs. The design and operational modalities of CHTDF health programme is not aligned with line department but managed by the HDCs. So although the line departments have a strong resource network, the CHTDF programme is prevented from making optimum use due to this non-alignment.

To integrate the health service delivery in the CHT within the public sector would necessitate moving a greater part of its administration into the Hill District Councils although it would remain funded by

¹⁹ HDC managed health database

²⁰ Baseline Household Survey 2009, HDRC, page 129-30

²¹ *ibid*

²² Household survey

CHTDF. The fact that the Ministry of Health has approved the budget for the salary of CHSWs through MoCHTA is the most positive improvement in CHTDF health programme.

2.7 Agriculture and Food Security

Agriculture and the food security component of CHTDF aims to improve living conditions of poor marginalized and small farmer households through enhanced, integrated and sustainable agricultural productivity in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The component has targeted 10,000 households to have extension services accessible to them. This will be achieved through improving a demand-driven, integrated and decentralized extension system and increasing yields and returns of crop production. CHTDF has undertaken different initiatives in 16 Upazillas. The Capacity development of Field School Facilitators (FSF) as Farmer Field School (FFS) facilitators and farmer trainers, organizing exposure visits for local officials and leaders to gain knowledge on upland management, providing training to extension officers on farm production disciplines and developing strategies for upland management.

Training, expert accompaniment and the provision of agricultural tools and equipment have been provided to farmers through FFS and both PSG and PNDG have benefitted from positive changes in their household income. Training has been provided on vegetable cultivation, poultry rearing, cattle rearing, ginger and turmeric production/processing. CHTDF report that 82.2% farmers under AFSP have taken up vegetable cultivation, 56% cattle rearing and 66% poultry rearing after attending training courses.

The percentage of trainees who have benefitted from training in non-conventional schemes such as horticulture, mushroom growing and bee keeping is rather low - 16%²³. 17.8% of farmers are involved in the processing of agro-products like turmeric, ginger, banana and pineapple and 19.8% in pig rearing. Pig rearing and processing of agro-products are very important to farmers of the CHT.

Prior to the Agriculture and Food Security Project, 20% farmers of the involved households used high yielding varieties of seeds and this has increased to 73% with increased marketable increases.

It is claimed that 85% farmers make/use compost fertilizer but this was not verified through the field visits of ET. Most of the compost pits demonstrated by respective communities and seen by the ET had been newly dug and did not contain any compostable materials except for dung (The bio-diversity of the CHT makes it ideal for very substantive and rich opportunities for compost making). Farmers were unable to describe the process of compost making or its use for optimising benefit for increased production.

2.8 Crosscutting issues -Gender

To a certain extent gender clusters have promoted gender equity and advanced women's rights considering gender as a cross cutting issue and a separate intervention simultaneously. The introduction of PNDG has had a positive and efficient impact on the position of women. The PDCs were introduced during the inception of CHTDF with the precondition that there should be one-third of

²³ Result Assessment Report of AFSP of CHTDF.p 36

women members in the Executive Committee of PDC. After the introduction of PNDG in the communities women have become leaders and eventually secured positions of 59%²⁴ of PDCs

2.9 Conclusions Efficiency

The lack of progress of the PA has had a negative impact on the efficiency of the CHTDF programme. The political situation and reported staff shortages between 2005 -2009 also accounted for some efficiency losses. The HDCs have experienced combinations of delays and cumbersome accounting procedures and this has sometimes slowed project progress. The absence of a comprehensive community empowerment strategy has meant efficiency losses at the para level. The community rapport with the NGOs has demonstrated efficiency gains tempered by inefficient 'partnerships' with UNDP. The efficiency of economic development was often compromised by inadequate market research and the parameters for value-addition. The inability of the CHTDF to share information with relevant line agencies meant that potential efficiency gains were not achieved.

²⁴ CHTDF M&E database 2012.

Chapter-III: Effectiveness

3.1 Confidence Building

Levels of efficiency have varied during implementation. There was less activity between 2005-2009, due largely to the political environment. The BNP followed by a Caretaker Government was in power until January 2009 when the Awami League was elected. As a consequence, national level dialogue activities were slowed, especially with regard to the outstanding Peace Accord implementation sub-components such as the land issues, regional elections, police, forestry and rehabilitation of refugees and IDPs. A detailed strategic approach of the sub-sectors was also not developed.

The situation changed after 2009 with regard to staff recruitment as well as the political developments: A policy advisor was employed and the Awami League won the election in 2008 with an election manifesto promising the PA implementation as part of its future agenda. Although, the political pace of the Awami League in bringing the PA forward was slower than expected, the political space for dialogue was used by CHTDF and since 2011 the activities have gained momentum, the national dialogue has been intensified and a detailed policy strategy was formulated using the Institutional Context Analysis approach (2012).

It is difficult to assess the efficiency of this component in terms of cost effectiveness. The UN agencies have the unique position as facilitators with regard to the national level dialogue and alternative less expensive models of implementation by other institutions may be unlikely to have comparable effects.

The costs of study tours abroad for around 100 participants was very high during the project period, but there seemed to be no alternative to the specific objective of direct information sharing with other countries about the issues of indigenous people and had a unique potential for knowledge building.

3.2 Capacity Development

Effectiveness of Institutional Capacity Building: The CHTDF Programme concept had a strong focus on capacity building on the CHT institutions. This is comprised of those institutions newly established according to the Peace Accord (MoCHTA, RC, 3 HDCs) as well as the three traditional circle chief institutions at district level and NGOs. In addition capacity building support targeted the Land Commission, the Refugee and IDP Task Force as essential to PA implementation. The component's specific objective is: 'CHT institutions have increased capacity to deliver services and support community development.'

The component emphasis is comprised mainly of three areas of intervention - the clarification of mandates and rules, improving of management capacities (by staff training and deployment as well as logistic support) and strengthening of development planning, monitoring and community outreach.

The main effective achievements on the output level can be summarized as follows:

Mandates, Rules and Regulations:

- A total of 7 participatory institutional capacity assessments have been conducted (3 HDCs, 3 circle offices and MoCHTA) and the respective organizational capacity development plans have been designed.
- All three Hill District Councils have developed annual development plans, which were submitted to MoCHTA.
- Planning and monitoring units were established at MoCHTA and Hill District Councils.
- The Regional Council has drafted a compendium of all CHT related acts and laws.
- Organograms and rules of business were developed for the Regional Council and the IDP Taskforce and approved by the GoB.
- A sector strategy and MDG plans were developed.
- Revenue collection systems at Hill District Councils have been reviewed and improved.
- Gender policies have been developed at all HDCs.
- A guideline on participatory planning has been drafted to ensure community participation in project planning and implementation (HDC level).
- A project implementation manual has been developed as a guideline for improved service delivery (HDCs).

Human Resource Development:

- Numerous staff trainings were conducted with 11 training modules (such as modern office management, leadership and human resource management, computer skills, financial management, proposal writing, advanced and basic English, good governance, human rights and gender, roles and responsibilities of traditional leaders, GIS certificate course, MDG mapping and realization, CHT rules and regulation, delegation of financial power, monitoring and evaluation). 750 participants benefited from the training.

Logistical Support and Equipment:

- Vehicles, computers, printers, scanners, cameras and photocopiers were provided to RC, HDCs and circle offices as well as to the Land Commission and the IDP Task Force.
- IT units were established at the three HDCs with internet access, email systems and own websites which is crucial for effective public information dissemination.
- Establishment of an Information Resource centre at RC with GIS in order to improve resource and poverty maps and improve development planning.

Although the output level of the capacity building activities is high, the question remains whether the target institutions could make use of the benefits in order to improve institutional performance. The communities in question stated that the performance and service delivery has slightly improved. This corresponds with the statements in the household survey. However, to what exact extent was difficult to verify.

There are some results on the outcome level indicating some progress in institutional capacity:

- With the logistic support of CHTDF, the Hill District Council in Khagrachari has successfully established a Computer Training Centre in 2010, which is used for regular IT training of the staff and also for ongoing public training courses.

- A quarterly newsletter has been published by HDCs to inform the population on ongoing interventions and other information. The Hill District Councils are maintaining their websites, which are used for public circulars, information sharing and tenders. This is a first step towards transparent and accountable service delivery.
- The utilization of email for daily correspondence has continuously increased and is ensuring more efficient communication with internal and external stakeholders.
- Part of the capacity building approach was to delegate tasks from CHTDF to the HDCs as 'training on the job': The HDCs have successfully managed large parts of the CHTDF health and education component.
- The staff training in writing proposals has shown some tangible results as all HDC have acquired additional funding from international donor agencies by submitting their own proposals (e.g. KHDC 128.000 USD from USAID and 122.961 USD from the Embassy of Japan).
- CHTDF has been instrumental in supporting HDCs in revenue collection and revenue collection could be increased at all three Councils between 2011 and 2012. (At Khagrachari by 18.72 %, Rangamati by 13.26 % and Banbardan by 10 %.)

These are encouraging positive results but there are still major challenges and set-backs that restrict the full use of capacity development inputs.


The overlapping of different mandates and coordination gaps between line departments and CHT institutions is delaying the development of organizations especially MoCHTA, RC and HDCs. The weak position of MoCHTA is due to the fact that it is not fully acknowledged by the other Line Ministries and deployed government employees form the majority of the staff. Financial resources have not been fully transferred to HDCs even though the work has been fully transferred. In addition several positions within the organogram are vacant so departments do not have full management capacity. One such example is that CHTDF established a planning unit at MoCHTA during the past project period, but in fact there is only one officer for the whole Ministry.

The Land Commission and the IDP Task Force have received logistical support but are not fully functional and able to use the provided assets due to a shortage of staff and inadequate resources. Another constraint experienced by NGOs is that corruption at HDC level is still common.

Other negative factors that prevent the RC and HDCs having their full mandate and operational capacity are the outstanding elections. At the moment the HDCs are operating with 5 appointed people instead of 33 elected members.

3.3 Community Empowerment +QiF

3257 Para Development Committees (PDCs) have been formed by CHTDF. 30 - 40 % are potentially sustainable in terms of community activities. 1,685 Para Nari Development Groups (PNDGs) have been formed and of which 50-60%²⁵ may be sustainable as community based institutions. The rights and positions of women in leadership have improved to some extent. For example, before PNDGs the number of



²⁵ ET meeting with gender cluster representatives in District visits.

women in the Executive Committees of PDCs was 30% and this has increased to 40% according to CHTDFM&E desk of UNDP. Out of 27,487 PDC EC members 10,985 are women. It is evident that the community empowerment process has been effective to some extent in this.

However, participation in decision making by women is still very limited and in some villages, women are not allowed to make decisions even in their own organizations and projects. It is also evident that leaders of some PNDGs are not even aware of Para project activities which they are supposed to have designed, implemented and controlled as a community²⁶. PDCs also frequently organize the programme of the PNDG as a sub activity of the PDC.

CHTDF aimed to improve the linkages between the PDCs and the Union/Upazilla Parishads and this has been effective to a limited extent. Visits and access by Government extension departments to the FFS increased from 219 in 2008 to 444 in 2012.


The departure of partner NGOs and Community Facilitators from the CHTDF is relatively recent and it remains to be seen what the longer term impact will be on the functioning of the PDCs and PNDGs. At present most of the PDCs are still running their activities and reportedly over 90% of them have been able to deal with bank and financial institutions and develop and use plans/rules/guidelines for managing and undertaking community level initiatives. The rules and guidelines include the Para Development Plan, Fund Management Guidelines, General Ledger, Project Management Rules, Meeting Management Rules, and Savings Management Rules.

About 78% of the PDCs members are reported to have increased their capacity to identify their own problems and provide solutions. Procurement committees have been established in 95% of the communities. Similarly, monitoring committees have been formed in 74% of the target communities, and a majority of them (74%) monitored and evaluated their progress in accordance with participatory monitoring and evaluation process.²⁷

Observations during the field visits indicated that the PDCs and PNDGs have been very dependent on CHTDF and specifically on the PNGO frontline staff such as the Community Facilitators with regard to holding regular meetings, follow-up of their development schemes etc. which suggests limitations in the effectiveness of the community empowerment interventions and it is not evident yet to what extent this will have a detrimental impact.

Finally, it remains to be seen to what extent the PDCs and PNDGs are inclusive of all individuals in the community or whether these organizations serve the interests of a few. The ET has analysed the information provided from the PNGO records of the 1829 PDCs - 655 from Bandarban, 461 from Rangamati and 713 from Khagrachari – and these indicate that 31% are likely to be able to run their PDC activities after the phasing out of PNGOs.

The aim of CHTDF to increase household income has been achieved in some households. Most of



²⁶ Focus group discussions with the PDC leaders conducted by ET during visits to communities in the 3 districts.

²⁷ CHTDF Annual M&E database 2012/2013).

the PDC representatives express satisfaction but equitable distribution of benefits remains an issue. The propensity to save is claimed to have increased but when people still need to borrow from the mahajans as is the case, the question about equitable benefits needs to be addressed. It is encouraging to note that the 3657 PDCs have collectively saved a total \$715,221 (approximately \$200 per PDC). It is also noteworthy that the communities have increased savings in 2012 both at collective and individual level by 17.23% from the previous year. Group and individual savings are an important contribution to empowerment but strategies to enhance inclusion, transparency, access and lending policies etc. are also essential.

In terms of inclusiveness and social cohesion, the project has a standard principle of collective efforts in the community empowerment process but it was not effectively promoted or understood or applied by the communities. An independent study identified two categories of people; marginalized people such as wage labourers, widows and older people and the local elite or well-off families. The study indicated that 37% of households were either excluded from the start or dropped out from activities for community empowerment. The reasons for this included the inability to make a contribution in cash or kind, not refunding of money against selling of assets of PDC assigned to the respective HH, disagreement over the selection project components, frustration or distrust in PDC activities and lack of information on deposited money in Bank accounts etc. This imbalance clearly needs to be corrected by CHTDF in the future.

3.4 Economic Development

The weaver groups, cultivation of mushrooms, production of honey through beekeeping have proved to be effective economic development components. The individual entrepreneurs have been provided with effective and appropriate training and some of them have received a bank loan for their business. 43 percent of women in the involved households are reportedly active in various work started by the CHTDF. Synthesis between agriculture/ food security and the economic development component is evident. After the introduction of AFSP component, the knowledge and skills gained from various training courses have become more effective in the practical field. A value-chain activity is also carried out with CHTDF support which is implemented by Practical Action and ALO. The limited information available on the value-chain activities made analysis and comment not possible.

Building community level confidence, contributing to establishing peace and the approaches of community level organizations - PDCs – is theoretically good. However, the sequencing of activities and allowing adequate time for capacity building whilst taking varying cultural issues into account were needed to be more effective. The PDC operational guidelines, community empowerment and economic development presented a unique development model to establish peace and conflict resolution in post conflict situation. As community based organizations there are notable shortcomings in implementation strategies owing to the lack of capacity. At the centre of CHTDF activities QIF was the basis of Community Empowerment. In spite of the community empowerment guidelines stating that UNDP would not support to micro credit (CE Guideline, Step-15, page-35), some PDCs have been running micro-credit subsequent to getting returns from first round investment. However not all members have equal access to credit. Whilst the creation of a community based revolving fund should be welcomed, the issue of equality of access to credit would need to be assessed for individual PDCs including:-

- i. Number of people eligible for loans
- ii. Criteria for lending (credit worthiness)

- iii. Total number of lending events
- iv. Total number of individuals accessing loans
- v. Size of loans
- vi. Repeat borrowings.

3.5 Education:

The EU and CIDA have contributed to the provision of education for over 20,000 children in remote areas of CHT through the establishment and/or renovation of 300 schools in 12 Upazilas in the three hill districts. 120 schools were newly constructed and the remaining 180 schools were renovated. 72 prior to November 2008 and the remainder during 2009-2012. The task of establishing and running schools in remote areas is challenging in terms of supervision and management, re-forming School Management Committees (SMCs), renovating school buildings, recruiting qualified teachers and encouraging the participation of communities in the running of schools. HDCs have the provision and management responsibility for the education programme and NGOs – with support from CHTDF -were engaged for community mobilization. Management however has generally remained with LoA staff rather than integration with the line department.

The NGO-DAM was identified to implement teacher training and needs assessment training. The NGOs - SC and SIL (International Indigenous Language Specialist) and 7 Indigenous Language Committees (LCs) were established. Pre-primary Multi-Language Education (MLE) materials were developed for 11 indigenous communities but the materials in 4 languages were not used because those communities were not in programme areas (12 Upazila). Teaching methods and relevant support: 600 teachers were trained and 581 were supported by the programme. The child friendly teaching environment plus the WFP school feeding programme has increased school attendance. Teaching methods need to be further strengthened to ensure high quality education.

The ET found on field visits that, although SMC, PTA and Mothers Groups had been formed in the schools, they were unaware of the need for compliance with the national education system. The objectives, role, responsibilities and actions of the Groups indicates that CHTDF had not paid sufficient attention to this aspect since the SMC members with previous experience in running schools were aware.

The CHTDF has been supporting 300 schools. 23 are primary schools (NGPS) and 37 are registered non-government primary schools (RNGPS) and the majority, 240 schools, are supported by CHTDF. Reportedly *“160 schools have very active SMC who are confident to run the school properly.”* By implication this suggests that almost 50% of Schools supported by UNDP (140) have SMC but are not ‘confident to run their schools properly’. This is in spite of the fact that “in 2012, a total of 5020 SMC members received refresher training on their roles and responsibilities and in 2011 2,494 SMC members received trainingand are actively engaged in managing a range of school activities’ A review of the training should identify where it was ineffective.

This situation was noted in a number of interviews with SMC member during field visits where it was evident that many SMC members remained dependent on CHTDF staff.

All those associated with the schools - teachers, SMC and MGs - are understandably anxious about the future of their school if financial support is stopped. The advocacy of CHTDF for relaxing criteria

such as the total numbers of students and geographical coverage for nationalizations is a positive and effective role. CHTDF has contributed to the nationalisation of 53 schools in total - 50 primary schools, 2 CGPS and 1 Non-MPO schools. The capacity building of the implementing partners in social mobilization and uninterrupted and longer-term agreements with NGOs would ensure that the proactive role of communities could be more effective.

The vibrant and functional SMCs are able to run schools without the project support but all the 300 SMC received funds initially for improving school facilities. The project review data shows that 82% of schools have toilets/sanitary latrine and 100% have safe sources of drinking water i.e. water filters and or tube wells. However, a number of the tube-wells have cracked concrete aprons that will allow foul water to enter the bore-well and contaminate the water supply. Obviously action should be taken to remedy this.

With regard to improvements in the quality of education, the quality of teachers is obviously of critical importance. CHTDF has commendably trained over 700 teachers on 'quality education'. And reportedly schools are practicing some forms of child centred methodology (65% in 2013); teachers' attendance rate increased to 93.2% from 91.2% in 2012 and the average attendance of the students increased from 81.9% in 2012 to 84.7% in 2013²⁸).

An emphasis on training women who have been educated in the CHT would have many cultural as well as responding to needs at different levels.

The national level advocacy has contributed to the achievement of permission to provide lessons to students in schools in the CHT. A strategy to identify and train teachers from the CHT using peripatetic teams to hold regional group training sessions is an obvious way to deliver quality education with provision for culturally acceptable materials.

Some schools are in the process of registration and some are on the way to nationalization.

3.6 Health

The programme was mandated to integrate the GoB health and family planning programmes, provide immunization and Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI, Antenatal Care (ANC) and Postnatal Care (PNC) services through mobile clinics. Only 134 CSBA have been trained instead of 200 but they are providing support, services and safe delivery. To correct this shortfall the HDCs have submitted a proposal to Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoH&FW) through MoCHTA but the results are not yet known. The programme has been working in malaria control and the prevalence of malaria has been substantially reduced. The government health department and Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC, a national NGO) have been involved in the same districts so precise attribution of the improvements to CHTDC is not possible.

The Revised Technical Assistance Project Proposal (RTPP) and CHTDF Project Review Report-February 2013 specified that it would construct/renovate and equip 100 health infrastructure facilities based on needs but to date only 31 infrastructures and logistics supports were provided to government healthcare facilities- 22 Upazila health complexes and 3 district hospitals²⁹ The fact that 'RTPP figures are indicative' does not explain or justify this low achievement. The targets of the numbers of treated patients, integration with government line departments and creation of facilities

²⁸ HDCs Education Periodic data 2013

²⁹ CHTF Project Review -2013.

have not been reached either. Poor project design which fails to take realistic regional conditions into account in terms of the physical or political situations may explain the lack of effectiveness and the setting of unrealistic and unachievable targets. However, the target number of successfully treated patients by the CHTDF health service has been reached.

Training CHSWs on health care and education to serve communities in remote areas has been an effective approach. As a result, the programme has been able to cover 1.7 million patient cases in hill tracts. The CHSW worked as service providers as well as community mobilizers. The CHSW's capacity and skill development enabled them to effectively deliver services.

The mobile team, consisting of a medical doctor, nurse, health educator, technical staff and support staff performed effectively because of the comprehensive coverage of support services and referral systems were ensured. SCMC created the scope of community ownership and the programme introduced a system of nominal fees that helped to generate some money for maintenance of clinics and ensure some community responsibility for the health service.

A network of 886 CHSWs in CHT provides health care services and advice to the communities. SCMC formation and capacity building activities are effective and SMC manages and supervises the health clinics and supports the service providers. A sense of community ownership and participation is apparent. Institutional capacity building for LoA and HDCs have provided for more effective management.

3.7 Food Security

Agriculture and food security: Prior to CHTDF only 20% farmers used improved variety seeds and this has been increased up to 73% reportedly resulting in some increased production. It is claimed by CHTDF personnel that 85% farmers use compost fertilizer in their agricultural activities but this is not apparent from the field visits of ET.

3.8 Cross-cutting issues

Gender: Gender clusters have provided an effective avenue to the women of the Chittagong Hill Tracts through its different affirmative actions. CHTDF has recently started organizing civic actors as peacemakers to champion the issues of peace and confidence building in the CHT communities. Three quarters of the peacemakers are women. A network of women's rights oriented organizations and women-led organizations have been formed under the initiatives of gender cluster called Chittagong Hill Tracts Women Organizations Network (CHTWON). The CHTWON develops leadership among the younger generation of development activists who are gradually taking up leading roles in the network.

Chapter-IV: Impact

4.1 Confidence Building

The CHTDF Programme concept has a strong focus on advocacy and confidence building as part of an integrated approach to strengthen the effective implementation of the Peace Accord and meet specific needs in the post conflict situation. The main objective is to: 'Facilitate confidence building to solve long-standing problems to development and peace in CHT.'

The component was sub-divided into two broad areas of intervention i) minority and indigenous rights and culture and ii) dialogue and advocacy to strengthen the implementation of the Peace Accord. The list of planned activities is multifaceted, comprising activities on national and district level as well as the inter-linkage of both such as facilitation of dialogue, study tours abroad on indigenous issues, cultural festivals, exchange visits across the communities and support to different sub-sectors of the Peace Accord in land disputes, regional elections, indigenous police, forestry and rehabilitation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

At community and district levels confidence building is additionally viewed as a cross-cutting concept throughout all other sectors. It is mainly implemented by increasing contacts and relations in two directions among and between communities as well as between institutions and communities. Furthermore, the project's underlying assumption is that the improvement of living conditions with regard to health, education and food security will engender stability and confidence building.

Achieving this component is highly dependent on the general political situation over which, obviously, the programme has no real influence. The main results can be summarized as follows:

On the international level:

- The CHTDF programme has become an important vehicle to advocate for the interests and concerns of the Indigenous Population and the implementation of the PA in Chittagong Hill Tracts among the international donor community in Bangladesh:
 - UNDP is the chair of the donor coordination platform, the thematic working group in CHT of the Local Consultative Group (LCG). In this role UNDP has been engaged in raising awareness on the needs for the implementation of the Peace Accord. UNDP sets the agenda and supports the DPs (e.g. provision of briefing papers and talking points) in taking forward the implementation of the Accord so that all key DPs, their diplomatic missions and their governments are focusing on the same issues and raising the same points. This has shown results by getting the Govt. to go further on the CHT Land Act amendment process and on lobbying the MoHFW to finance CHT HDC-managed health services from its own budget (Tribal Health Plan).
 - UNDP facilitated and accompanied visits of Ambassadors and donor representatives to CHT and became instrumental in providing first-hand information on the current situation, lobbying for their further engagement in CHT and were able to liaise with Circle Chiefs for lobbying of international HR advocates.
 - UNDP has recently established a UN CHT Task Force to formulate the UN joint framework for future programmes in CHT. This is also a promising approach to streamline and coordinate further on the current UN programmes towards PA implementation, although at the present stage not all UN agencies are participating³⁰.

³⁰ FAO Technical Report 'Support to Preparation of an Integrated Project for Environment Friendly Agriculture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (March 2013)

However, not all the UN organizations working in the CHT are currently part of the proposed UN joint framework and other UN agency work in the CHT predates the UN Framework for future programming and seems to suggest the absence of any collaborative programming through the Facility.

On the national level:

- Through ongoing policy dialogue using ‘windows of opportunities’ to advocate for the implementation of the Peace Accord, CHTDF has been effective and instrumental in keeping the Peace Accord on the political agenda:
 - Two high level dialogues were held on the implementation of the Peace Accord with the involvement of the Parliamentary Caucus on Indigenous People, members of Parliament, indigenous leaders, donors and MoCHTA. The meetings resulted in a commonly agreed Action Plan for the pending subjects of the Peace Accord. High level politicians came on board (e.g. the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister) and the Parliamentary Caucus became a new effective partner in PA implementation.
 - An agreement with the Peace Accord stakeholders (Jana Samhati Samiti and the Government of Bangladesh) on the 13 points of Land Commission Act Amendment was reached comprising crucial elements on land ownership of the indigenous population as well as the agreement of GoB representatives to approve the Act before the national elections.
 - Another priority area was rule of law. Advocacy efforts succeeded in the integration of 212 indigenous police officers into the 25 police stations in CHT. In addition capacity building was provided to the police via training (human rights and gender) as well as gender sensitive police facilities.
 - The position of MoCHTA to the Line Ministries has been strengthened to a certain degree by inter-ministerial meetings and advocacy for the transfer of Line Department responsibilities. Especially effective will be the Ministry of Health’s budget allocation to MoCHTA via the CHTDF Health Component (as per Peace Accord). Additionally,
 - in the aftermath of the communal attacks in Taindong (August 2013) UNDP raised awareness and the support provided to MoCHTA had a positive effect, resulting in greater attention from the Government via the Prime Minister’s Office Advisor to the incident.
 - As part of its advocacy approach CHTDF developed relationships with journalists and editors leading to more reporting and editorials on CHT developments and raising greater national awareness on CHT.
- Overseas study tours provided knowledge and experience sharing to more than 100 national and regional stakeholders on indigenous issues, minority rights in relation to effective conflict resolution.

At the district and community levels:

- To a certain degree the international presence of CHTDF has a stabilizing and protecting effect on the local level, at least in the road accessible areas because potential perpetrators of human rights violations feel observed.
- In the area of minority rights and indigenous issues several effective activities were conducted which were instrumental in strengthening the cultural identity and the capacities of the Indigenous Population to solve the outstanding conflict issues in a constructive way through such events as cultural festivals, studies and publications of ethnic history and traditions.
- A regional advocacy strategy was developed and an advocacy officer was recruited for RC in order to enhance the capacities of CHT institutions to raise awareness and lobby for their interests.
- Two Dialogues were held on the harmonization of laws of the HDCs and other Local Government Institutions to clarify roles and mandates of the different institutions.
- Capacity building in constructive conflict resolution on various levels and with different stakeholders such as NGOs, headmen and a group of 47 ethnically balanced peacemakers (35 were women leaders) has created some awareness and knowledge on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In terms of the wider scenario of CHTDF, this action contributed in peace and confidence building at the minimum level.
- Cross-community (incl. Bengali and IP) activities for youth such as sports and debate clubs are offering young people positive alternatives to involvement in party politics or communal violence. These initiatives were implemented in close cooperation with regional and local institutions such as RC and the Regional and District Sports Association to ensure local ownership.

- Confidence building as a cross-cutting issue has shown some effectiveness in an improvement in communication between governmental institutions and communities and between communities via institutional capacity building, improved service delivery and cross PDG meetings (as stated by interviewees and assessed in the household survey). An important role in this regard was played by the programme's group mobilization and capacity building activities such as users committees, women groups and services management committees in health and education.
- In the aftermath of several communal violence incidents, initial responses with regard to relief and emergency supplies were made available. For example re. the communal violence in Taindong, CHTDF raised awareness, liaised and coordinated with DPs (Red Cross and ICRC) resulting in immediate relief to the victims. First aid was provided by the Upazila Union Council(s), the army and BGB. Later the CHTDF contributed \$40,000 and the FAO \$250000 for recovery of livelihoods for rehabilitation that contributed to the community regaining confidence to some extent.
- In the sense of a 'peace dividend' confidence building has shown effects as cross-cutting issue by improved capacities of governmental institutions, food security, economic revitalization and overall service delivery (as stated by interviewees and assessed as well in the household survey).

The programme has made efforts to apply a conflict sensitive approach, but the regular approach with the basic principle of inclusiveness does not apply to CHT as the main conflict between settlers and IPs is asymmetric in structure: The IP population is the most vulnerable group and disadvantaged by the settlers illegally occupying their land backed by the security forces. In this specific case, the PA would be seriously undermined, if the illegal settlers are given equal access and integrated into a programme designed to support the disadvantaged IP population.

However, according to the interviews with CHTDF director, the governmental institutions pressed for an integration of the settlers as a pre-condition for programme implementation. UNDP compromised in favour of the programme with regard to the Health and Community Empowerment Component. Within the first component the settler communities were equally covered. In the latter project CHTDF has set neutral criteria of vulnerability being equally applied to the IP and settlers population such as lack of service delivery and remoteness. As the settlers are usually living in the plain lands with better access to resources, these criteria are resulting in a predominant participation of IP population in the community empowerment programmes. Given the particular political context this is a pragmatic solution tailored to the specific conditions keeping at least all stakeholders on board and ensuring continuing programme implementation.

Apart from the above identified achievements, the overall progress of the implementation of the Peace Accord is very slow. Fifteen years after signing of the PA, the essential objectives are still pending. It is obvious that, for various reasons, the political will of the GoB is weak. The violent incidents in 2012 between settlers and the Indigenous Population in Rangamati and 2013 in Taindong shows that CHTDF's impact towards confidence building and sustainable peace has been limited. In addition it is evident that the CHTDF's development and cross-community activities do not compensate for the non-implementation of the PA especially with regard to the predominant unsolved land conflict between IP and settlers.

A special constraint is the role and high level of influence of the military in CHT. The military presence is in direct conflict with an effective PA implementation that committed the Government of Bangladesh to withdraw the temporary army out of the region.

Among the indigenous population there is some frustration on the slow progress and on some occasions there is criticism of donors and UN agencies that they are not using their position effectively to put sufficient pressure on the governmental institutions. There are still high numbers of IPs and IDPs being victims of land grabbing and violent attacks who have not received any rehabilitation or compensation. Impunity of the perpetrators is still the norm. There is a need for a stronger focus on legal assistance, rehabilitation and compensation as a transitional justice system to be incorporated into the future programme.

The CHTDF has recently developed a detailed advocacy and policy dialogue strategy (2012) but no comprehensive conflict analysis was conducted³¹. Therefore there is no clearly defined approach or specific measures to address the most conflict prone sub-districts. Especially on the local level, the activities are implemented in a summative way without a formulation or definition of the underlying concepts of 'confidence' (confidence on which level, between which stakeholders and with which purpose) 'theories of change', respective targets and indicators or a pinpointed strategy on how this is to be reached.

The project intervention logic, the implied 'theory of change' for local confidence building is that increased contacts between communities will reduce tensions and conflicts. This has partly proved to be true as the strengthening of exchanges has shown positive effects (as per research of the household survey). However, it is also inevitable that intensified contacts in a social environment have the potential of creating competition and creating new causes of social disputes as the occurrence of conflicts within PDGs showed (see also chapter on community empowerment). Even if PDG conflicts are not related to the political conflict lines and are naturally of smaller scale and not a threat to sustainable peace building, flow of programme recourses might also create cases of competition between the main conflict parties of IPs and settlers. Hence, there is a need for a continuous conflict monitoring as an integrated part of the regular monitoring system.

The political sensitive approach of considering the interests of all parties is showing some negative side effects: The integration of settlers into the CHTDF has created grievances among the IP communities and mistrust towards UN as this is seen as legitimizing the settlers and undermining the PA. The ET found that communities are not well informed on the selection criteria such as of low level service delivery and remoteness, which are applied equally to all groups enabling IPs as well as settler groups to benefit. There is a need for a better direct communication strategy to inform communities on the neutral selection vulnerability criteria.

³¹ At the point of time of the evaluation the analytic documents did contain an analysis for advocacy and lobbying of the stakeholders with regard to PA implementation, but did not contain a an overall systematic analysis considering the different conflict levels (Local, national, international), geographic mapping, the structures, root causes and triggers, the phases and course of events and an assessment and prioritization of the peace building needs.

Furthermore, conflicts have occurred within the community empowerment PDGs over fund distribution and the ET found several cases of unresolved group conflicts on the use of project resources that left the PDGs dysfunctional.

Another unresolved complication is that there are still UN agencies with long historic partnerships implementing programmes via the Line Ministries ignoring PA mandated CHT institutions and undermining the Peace Accord. As long as there is no acknowledgement of the PA among all UN agencies, the UN country team is not applying an effective conflict sensitive programme approach.

4.2 Capacity Development

Capacity building has already shown a degree of impact on the overall objective to promote an enabling environment for development in CHT by improved service delivery.

Capacity building initiatives were launched and delivered at different institutional levels MoCHTA, HDCs, CHT RCs, CHT Circles, (P)NGOs and PDC/PNDGs at community level. Also the supply of computers, visual aids and furniture for MoCHTA and HDCs had a positive impact on the delivery of services to a degree. Although the components for advocacy and confidence building were implemented, that is, resources mobilization for service delivery /development management and interventions, transparency and accountability, planning, coordination and organizational capacity are key capacity indicators, according to the capacity assessment study, the 'staff perceived that they don't have much capacity on advocacy and confidence building'³². The organizational capacity to manage block grants, monitoring and supervision, implementation of grants, reporting to donors and government authorities, aspects of human resource management and procurement of assets HDCs are reportedly '..... slightly capable³³'. Although HDCs have gained some experience in terms of project implementation, coordination and supervision of activities through the practice of service delivery this has been undermined because the full transfer of power and authority embedded in the PA has not been implemented. The lack of progress on implementation of the PA has also impacted negatively in other ways for example, Project planning unit(s) initially supported by donors in MoCHTA were under-utilised and essentially defunct. This lack of positive impact on capacity building has had a knock-on effect for the communities in the CHT. Additional capacity building and training will be necessary if a positive impact is to accrue and be of benefit to the people of the CHTs in the future.

Other limitations on positive impact are identifiable such as lack of resource mobilization, revenue collection, skilled human resources, limited interaction with stakeholders, no formal coordination mechanism with stakeholders including international NGOs, insufficient policies and guidelines to ensure participation of grassroots level stakeholders -UP, UZ, SMC, traditional leaders and community based organizations' representative.

A further capacity development issue affecting impact is that of policy. HDCs are obliged to follow government policies in financial, human resources, procurement and asset management and separately a ruling and policy for HR management. With regard to development projects however the government does not have its own policies for implementation and whilst they are partly steered by government donor agencies also play a role. There is no specific clause in the existing policy of KHDC

32 Capacity Assessment report-2011, KHDC, page-22.

33 Ibid. Page.24

on donor fund management³⁴ although it manages some donors' funds. As a result, transparency and accountability of HDCs are unclear areas from policy perspective. This presents an important challenge to HDCs and though capacity building initiatives should focus primarily on the enhancement of policies and human resources fundamental policy development is required to make HDCs effective as local government institutions.

4.3 Community Empowerment +QiF

The increase of income diversity and the savings tendency among the involved communities has created a limited financial safety net. It has created social capital in a post-conflict state and a part of their profit was made available for acquiring different social assets including building of social infrastructure and some water and sanitation facilities.

The multi-stakeholder approach has had a mixed impact on the CHT communities. The involvement of PDCs, PNDGs, local government bodies, traditional leaders, government line departments and other relevant stakeholders in the entire process, provided an opportunity to work together to benefit the grassroots communities. In fact this opportunity was not taken so a potential positive impact did not happen. However the presence of GO-NGO service providing agencies at grassroots level has increased. It has also contributed to improving skills and knowledge of community members on various livelihood issues including some organizational skills specifically on management aspects such as financial and organizational record keeping and both the PDC and PNDG members benefitted. The interventions have covered most of the remote communities in the CHTs. There are considerable numbers of communities who have come into contact with GO-NGO development initiatives for the first time. Household annual income of the supported agriculture farm households is claimed to be increased from BDT 112,067 in 2012 from BDT 68,852 in 2008, which is a 63% increase.

As the CE process was focused on QIF, economic opportunities or income generating schemes were given priority by communities and most of the community interventions by PDCs and PNDGs aimed to utilize the QIF BDT 400,000 for the old PDCs, BDT 200,000 for new PDCs and BDT 200,000 for PNDGs or women-only projects. The capacity development interventions were also focused on QIF and most of the training provided to the communities was related to the financial management of QIF with the exception of leadership and gender. Thus the project had a very low level of impact on community empowerment. The degree of the impacts of project interventions is not always measurable on the basis of increase of financial income. Although a community may increase their income, that does not guarantee sustainability of the PDC as a community organization. Essential impacts should focus on leadership dynamics, maintaining community organizations, linkage building with enabling agencies such as UP, UZP, HDC and RC etc. These impacts will enable increased mobility of the community to approach government/bank officials, for opening and maintaining accounts, different government and non-government service providers, police officers, and local government officials.

There are instances where community based conflicts have increased because of resources made available by CHTDF UNDP. No specific effective conflict transformation mechanisms or frameworks such as the Local Capacity for Peace (LCP) were found to be used in the field. The different dividing and connecting factors in the community based activities of CHTDF need to be identified in order to

³⁴ Ibid. Page.53

make the development resources useful to the targeted communities and achieve the ultimate purpose of the project interventions.

4.4 Economic Development

According to the NGO respondents, cow rearing and banana cultivation are the most profitable activities which have had a positive impact on household income. Day-labouring was the income source of 13% of households in 2008, which has decreased to 12% in 2013 according to the CHTDF household survey.

In the absence of any opportunity to conduct a detailed survey it has not been possible to measure the impact of CHHTDF in economic development activities. The UNDP has conducted an impact evaluation through the 'Household socio-economic survey' but accurate attribution of any programme impact cannot be verified as the sources are rarely identified in the survey report. The difference of household net income between intervention and non-intervention areas is Tk 8330 which is 8.2 percent higher. The survey also reported that access to food round the year increased by 55.5% against a baseline of 36%. Again the attribution of positive project impact is not possible but obviously a percentage is as a result of the work of CHTDF.

4.5 Education

The positive impact of the CHTDF programme is that it has undoubtedly increased IP children's access to schools in the remote areas and the benefits can only multiply in the future. A significant number of parents increasingly value education and encourage their children to attend which is significant progress in changing attitudes that will have positive long term impacts. The CHTDF education programme has stimulated a demand but the issue of sustainability and acceptance into the government system poses a real threat to continuation.

4.6 Health

The CHTDF health programme was started under the direct execution modality with support from partner NGOs for community mobilization after which it was transferred to HDCs under the LOA agreement. To achieve the goal, two approaches were adopted e.g., transitional strategy for immediate health service provision in remote areas and a long term strategy to support the implementation of the Tribal Plan and build the capacity of HDC to manage the transferred health department. However, positive impacts of the capacity building of the HDC are not evident. Although the programme is the responsibility of the HDC, the management essentially depends on LOA staff rather than core staff of HDC albeit guided by a nominated councillor. In the absence of a ministry approved and functional health programme organogram, HDC's institutional capacity and management is therefore limited in terms of formulation, management systems for components, rules and regulations etc. HDC only has the authority to recruit third and fourth class employees which has obvious implications when health and education needs qualified staff. As a result, HDC remains dependent on temporary LOA staff, institutionally weak management and is fragile and ultimately non-sustainable.

The HDCs should manage health programme rather than the line department but in reality, the ministry retains full control and despite CHTDF capacity building of HDCs, they are effectively

prevented from managing the programme. However, capacity (building) is not the main issue, the main obstacle for implementation of health services in the CHT is the exclusion of HDCs by central government in decision making, planning and budget control. Health can only be fully managed by HDCs once government allocate financial and other resources. The MoHFW has now provided finance to meet the cost of the salaries of CHSW and CSBA support staff and the logistical and other related costs of the mobile clinics are to be met from Tribal Health component of ESD OP sector programme. The MoHFW to MoCHTA is in line with the PA and sustainability of the programme and is an official recognition of the value of CHSW services to the people of the CHT.

The outcome and results of level data is important to measure the impact of health programme against specific indicators in the log frame but this data is not available. The log-frame indicators refer to reduced maternal mortality, infant mortality, prevalence of stunting, immunization etc. A 'baseline survey' was conducted in 2008 and subsequent surveys have been carried out but there appears to be no data available to assess impact – 'impact is not visualised'. This is clearly an unfortunate shortcoming and it has not been possible to come to conclusions on the impact of the health programme. The HH Survey states that immunization coverage increased from 61.2% in 2008 to 92% in 2013³⁵.

A comprehensive monitoring system was designed with external support but is not fully functional and although CHTDF has a customized database outcome level indicators are absent. The CHTDF health programme has largely concentrated resources on curative/treatments rather than focusing on preventative health care including public health education/changes in behaviour, access to clean drinking water/reduction in waterborne diseases, improved sanitation, nutritional improvements etc. in the CHT areas.

4.7 Agriculture and Food Security

In the communities where the Agriculture and Food Security Project (AFSP) have been implemented some positive impacts are recorded. The level of food production has been increased and the propensity to save has reportedly increased from 28.5% in 2008 to 97.8% 2013. This has impacted on the previous dependency on local Mahajans or money lenders. Statistics shows that 11% households who are involved in the activities of AFSP have stopped borrowing money to buy food. So although almost everyone makes savings only slightly over one tenth of those do not need to borrow from unofficial sources?

Key achievements of the AFSP are presented as:

- improved knowledge by farmers of improved practices and increased production and yields
- Increased annual income
- farmers access to extension services
- decrease in food deficit months.

Where women have some control over resources the impact is very positive. A considerable number of women are involved in health education projects of CHTDF. Local women are recruited as Community Health Services Workers (CHSW), Community Skilled Birth Attendants (CSBA) and teachers in schools. With the support of CHTDF most of the CHT institutions have developed gender policies to ensure gender parity.

³⁵ CHTDF Household Survey in the CHT September 2013.

- Prior to CHTDF only 20% farmers previously used improved high yielding varieties (HYV) seeds but it has now increased to 73%.
 - The use of 'balanced fertilizer' (chemical compound fertilizers) has risen from 36.9% to 87.2% of farmers. It is claimed that 89% of farmers use compost for fertilizing their land in Khagrachari, 48% in Rangamati and 18.3% in Bandarban but little evidence was found during the ET field visits of improved compost preparation and use except newly dug compost demonstration pits located in the centre of the paras mostly devoid of any compostable materials.
- Food production is obviously dependent on seasonal factors and changes and it is too early to say what the real impacts are, especially from the perspective of sustainable impact.

4.8 Crosscutting issues (Gender)

The interventions of gender clusters have different impacts in different intervention areas. As gender is a cross-cutting issue, it has different impacts on the different components. Despite the provision for including women in PDC executive committees, control over resources remains largely in the hands of men. The formation of the PNDG groups has enhanced and positively impacted on the position of women in their respective communities. The opportunity to join together in common activities, especially where there is a degree of controlling influence over resources, is very positive. A considerable number of women are involved in health education projects of CHTDF and, with the support of CHTDF, most of the CHT institutions have developed gender policies to ensure gender parity.

Chapter-V: Sustainability

5.1 Confidence Building

The achievements in the Impact section are potentially sustainable if the structural changes continue after the programme completion. The local level of confidence is fragile and can obviously be disrupted by violent incidents or the sudden closure of programmes.

5.2 Capacity Building

Sustainability of Institutional Capacity Building: Due to the political constraints the major part of capacity building is not yet sustainable. However there are partly sustainable effects such as the skills acquired by the staff of the institutions as well as the establishment of departments (e.g. PME cells at HDC) and organizational procedures (e.g. annual planning). The increased capacity with regard to revenue collection has sustainable impacts as it is supporting the independence of the regional institutions from Line Ministries and donor budgets.

5.3 Community Empowerment + QiF

Sustainable community empowerment has to include socio-political awareness and understanding that the strength of communities exists in working together. In spite of the income generation promoted through QiF, if the remote villages in the Chittagong Hill Tracts are to benefit from sustainable livelihoods and socio-economic development much more structured effort is still required to achieve real community empowerment in this region. The widespread poverty, lack of water and sanitation facilities, lack of education, health and other public services in remote villages and continuing tensions among the IPs and Non-IP communities still persist in the Chittagong Hill tracts. Community empowerment and good governance requires a systematic strategy to be embedded in any programme if more sustainable livelihoods are to result.

According to the PNGOs estimates just under one third (31%) of PDCs ³⁶will be functional and sustainable in the sense of running their day-to-day activities in the future. Functional, means the maintenance of organizational and financial records, making regular savings with practices seen as honest, transparent and accountable and no major cases of fund misuse that cannot be resolved by the community members. The criteria also suggests that PDCs should have a functional Para Development Plan (PDP). It is important for project staff to recognise that when community people are provided the opportunity and understanding and feel genuine membership and ownership of *their own* organizations this results in more control over their own lives and enhances prospects for more sustainable livelihoods.

The Para Development Plans (PDP) initiated as part of the CE strategy by the UNDP CHTDF was not feasible for the majority of people and therefore not sustainable. The PDCs were not given sufficient time, appropriate information or the opportunity to consider their needs and plan realistically for their

36 Although this figure is indicative and to some extent speculative -and open to challenge- it is used in this report to suggest that if sustainable PDCs and PNDGs are valued by CHTDF then a review of the probability is advised.

future development. Although the PNGO developed the required number of PDPs to reach the target with regard to their contract with UNDP, this was necessarily accomplished by substituting quantity for quality. Facilitators in the majority of cases stated that they 'developed' PDPs within 1 to 2 hours. The project was fatally compromised in terms of the lack of participation that was needed to give it a chance of success. The project that was potentially sustainable became simply a 'Quick fix' rather than a strategic plan based on community needs.

Currently approximately 77% PDCs are fully or partially functional and continue activities in part or whole. Although IP communities traditionally were accustomed to co-operation (as opposed to competition) prior to the signing of the PA they generally lacked knowledge and experience in dealing with formal economic and social development strategies and practices. The PDCs have played a role in facilitating a learning process in this regard.

However 23% of all the PDCs that were formed are defunct and have either been abandoned or are inactive. There are various reasons for this demise including lack of unity; exclusion of some households; misuse of financial and other community assets/resources by the leaders; low level of awareness as members of a community; irregular meeting/consultation/ activities and/or dominated by influential people for their own interest and gain. This has meant that ordinary members of the community would not be included as full members, develop ownership or be part of the decision making process. There is obviously a strong need to limit and protect against this malpractice if self-sustaining community development is to be realised in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

With regard to the sustainability of PDCs and PNDGs, the CHTDF has taken some corrective measures and adjusted guidelines accordingly. For instance, PNDGs were devised by CHTDF it was evident that the low status of women prevented them from accessing resources and decision making. Similarly, when women's savings were seen by men as household savings, CHTDF introduced separate savings schemes for men and women.

These corrective actions are positive and contribute to more sustainable community organizations. Lessons learned or good practices are not well documented or disseminated to other communities for replication in their PDCs. This would enhance and sustain the PDCs and PNDGs as community organizations. The CHTDF recognises the need to provide legal status and build linkages to enable the PDG/PNDG organizations to attain Community Based Organizations (CBOs) status with authority to work.

The CHTDF have identified 'limitations to registration, such as, capacity of the departments; mandates of the departments; too much controlling regulatory system; self-reliant /empowerment etc.' Creditably, in order to overcome these obstacles and progress registration, the 'CHTDF fielded a mission to come up with suggestions about the matter'. However, as far as the ET could determine, no further progress is evident.

The PNGOs consider that their contracts were cut abruptly. Initially the PNGOs were contracted for one year. Subsequently however contractual periods were variable and uncertain and all the NGOs interviewed by the ET stated that the uncertainty made difficulties in managing the situation. There were sometimes breaks in the contracts and new Eols had to be made. The period of 'phasing out' was seen to be a continuation of this way of working. The termination of all PNGOs contracts was therefore an unexpected and abrupt closure. The NGOs felt that the idea of 'partnership' ('P'NGOs)

had very little meaning. The PNGOs were not consulted or well informed about the 'phase –out' policy and practice, particularly with regard to the impact and sustainability of the PDCs and PNDGs. This has culminated in a loss of confidence with no plan to handover responsibility to HDCs or UPs. The Union Development Coordination Committee (UDCC) process was introduced belatedly and the UnFC, UzST and UzAC are project specific and not permanent structures capable of sustaining and enabling community based development organisations.

A further and in some ways more important aspect of the PNGOs withdrawal is the impact that the closure had on the sustainability of the community organizations themselves.

5.4 Economic Development

The sustainability of income generating activities is influenced by the functional status of PDCs, skills of entrepreneurs, the quality of their project and availability of appropriate advice and support. Some of the income generating activities appear to be feasible but more time and critical analysis is needed to achieve success and sustainability.

5.5 Education

The educational programme was implemented with support from NGOs under the auspices of the HDCs and the supervision of LoA. The ET recognises that the fundamental issue of mainstreaming education is political. However, the CHTDF intervention has unintentionally served to discourage the education line government department from active engagement and taken the onus of responsibility away from them.

Although the government makes monitoring visits to the CHTDF schools, provides books and authorizes students to sit PSC examinations, these are statutory responsibilities of the line department.

In spite of these encouraging practices of cooperation, the CHTDF initiative has in some ways – especially financing- served to take responsibility away from the education line department. The key challenge for sustainability remains the challenge of mainstreaming the education system. Key activities include planning, financial planning/implementation and monitoring in compliance with the PA. The dual management by the line department and HDC needs to be resolved if long-term sustainability is to be achieved. Most of the capacity building was provided to LoA staff rather than the HDCs core staff. Focusing on the capacity building of LoA staff rather than institutional capacity building puts the project at risk. Although education is acknowledged as a 'transferred or transferable subject' to HDC, the resources and initiative to enable this transfer remains with the line department. Until this conundrum is reconciled and education in CHT brought under a single governance framework, sustainability cannot be achieved. A sustainable education system will contribute greatly to lasting to peace in the CHT.

5.6 Health

The health programme was initiated by CHTDF and subsequently handed over to HDCs and LOA staff (project based service contract) who manage it. The HDC Organogram does not indicate how the health programme will be managed in the absence of these resources at the district level. Currently budgetary and other resources are under the control and management of Civil Surgeon-Head of

Health Programme in the districts and the MoHFW centrally. Ultimately sustainability will be assured when the line department takes over the programme activities but the ending of CHTDF - HDC LoA agreements will otherwise jeopardise the programme. An early indication of the crisis is that after the hand-over of the water ambulance (Langadu) to HDC meeting the cost of fuel has been problematic and raises the question of sustainability of even a valuable asset and service.

5.7 Food Security

The second phase, AFSP II, is being implemented 2013 - 2018. Integrated Farm Management (IFM) and Farmer Field School (FFS) will be strengthened in the preparatory stage and 1800 IFM-FFS is proposed in 25 Upazillas. CHTDF also plans to enhance coordination and strengthen CHT institutions to manage the transferred agriculture services in cognisance with the Peace Accord. Coordination and provision of assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and MoCHTA are planned and policy and advocacy initiatives by FAO and UNDP are also included in the future plans of CHTDF. The FAO, JICA etc. are also working independently of CHTDF on 'food security' issues. FAO's substantive technical report³⁷ sets out a clear vision and strategy for a sustainable programme for agricultural improvement but this will not work through or be aligned with CHTDF.

With regard to the technology being promoted by the AFSP, the increased production and yields are dependent to some extent on HYVs of seeds, chemical fertilizer and insecticides – all of which are highly dependent on one another for increased production and are not sustainable. Food security programmes should not focus simply on technical fixes there is a need to build democratic and sustainable food systems.

The advantages of Jhum cultivation occupying the largest, albeit only 27%, of the estimated 364000 acres available for production, is that the produce is organically produced and therefore commands a premium price. Secondly, Jhum cultivation relies primarily on natural soil fertility/nutrient recharge and the idea that cropping intensity can be increased sustainably on these marginal lands and systems is alien to the culture itself. The claimed 'gains' by the AFSP are inherently short term gains and are not sustainable in the longer term without increasingly expensive and finite inputs.

No specific sustainability plan is identified in the CHTDF AFSP although FAO has developed a strategy³⁸ that has been endorsed by Rangamati, Bandarban and Khagrachari District Councils. The programme interventions in the CHT will require ongoing support to improve food security and poverty reduction if it relies on technical fixes using finite resources to boost production.

5.8 Gender as crosscutting issue

The CHTDF has contributed to the improvement of the position of women in the CHT through inclusive programmes and in the formation of the PNDGs. However, because the PNDGs are not aligned and or registered, sustainability beyond the life of the project is questionable. The majority of prominent NGOs of the CHT are aligned with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Women Organizations Network (CHTWON) which was established to promote and be active on women's rights. The network is

³⁷ Support to preparation of an Integrated Project for Environmental Friendly Agriculture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. MoCHTA, GoB & FAO. 24 March 2013,

³⁸ Agricultural Development Strategies for the Chittagong Hill Tracts . Improving livelihoods and food and nutrition security through sustainable production increases in crops, livestock and fisheries.FAO 2013.

registered under the joint-stock company act of Bangladesh, which ensures sustainability of the Network. The peacemakers have formed an alliance called Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace-Makers Alliance (CHTPMA), which will also further the women's involvement in leading community dialogue in the peace building process and alternative conflict transformation process in the future.

Chapter -VI: Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1 Peace and Confidence Building

Overall the programme has strengthened confidence and peace in the region to a certain degree. Especially since 2010, it has been able to strengthen its profile and strategy towards policy dialogue and Peace Accord implementation. Several results can be attributed to the project activities namely the integration of indigenous police, limited progress with regard to the transfer to CHT institutions, the consensus reached on the 13 points of the Land Commission Amendment and the Action Plan developed to push further the PA implementation. Furthermore the programme has succeeded to some extent in confidence building at the local level³⁹ and has had a protecting and stabilizing effect through its presence. In the sense of a 'peace dividend' confidence building has shown effects as cross-cutting issue by improved capacities of governmental institutions, food security, economic revitalization and overall service delivery, and by increased cross-community and government-community contacts (as stated by interviewees and assessed as well in the household survey).

However, the overall progress on PA implementation is still very slow and the project is still struggling to keep up the pressure and the dialogue efforts, especially with regard to the difficult political situation. In view of these challenging circumstances, there is the need for a higher emphasis and much more concentrated effort on this component to have stronger tangible results. A sub-component on the rule of law including a transitional justice mechanism would be highly effective to complement the already existing PA advocacy approach. In addition, there is a need to focus on the conceptual framework, conflict sensitivity and expansion of advocacy activities.

The following recommendations are made:

- In the future programme, more emphasis should be given to peace building and advocacy towards PA implementation with the key sub-components (Land Commission, Elections of CHT specific institutions, Refugee Task Force, transfer of 33 sectoral responsibilities to the HDCs, rule of law incl. demilitarization) as the non-implementation is not only causing reoccurrence of communal violence, but is also the main obstacle to development and sustainable project results. This means that higher budget allocation and additional staff is necessary.
- An in-depth conflict analysis should be conducted. This will provide entry points for a further peace building strategy on different levels with the key stakeholders such as communities, PA mandated CHT institutions, line governmental structures, military, political parties, traditional authorities and CSOs. It will complement the already existing CHTDF advocacy and policy dialogue strategy (based on the Institutional Context Analysis tool) containing an analysis for advocacy and lobbying of the stakeholders with regard to PA implementation, but not an overall systematic analysis of the different conflict levels (Local, national, international), geographic mapping, the structures, root causes and triggers, the phases and course of events and an assessment and prioritization of the peace building needs. It is therefore further recommended to use different analytical tools in order to get new insights on strategic options

³⁹ The Household Survey (page 34 and 35) and statement of respondents/interviewees in the field

e.g. systemic conflict analysis. This approach is widely acknowledged as an international standard.

- In the future programme, the underlying concepts of ‘confidence’ and the ‘theories of change’ have to be formulated and made explicit. This should include also the respective targets and indicators (confidence on which level, between which stakeholders and with which purpose) and a pinpointed strategy on how this is to be reached⁴⁰.
- As the impunity with regard to new and formerly committed crimes towards the IPs is a main concern, a comprehensive component on the rule of law should be designed and integrated into the confidence and peace building component. This would be in order to create a transitional justice mechanism and to bring forward the implementation of the related PA sub-components. It should consider a multi-sector approach providing not only support to the policy level (laws and constitutions) and the legal institutions including the police (1), but at the same time a compensation and rehabilitation scheme, legal assistance (class action might be a relevant approach) and psychosocial support for the victims (2) combined with an advocacy strategy which includes court case monitoring and public awareness raising (3).
- The network of local peacemakers, especially with regard to women according to UN resolution 1325, should be further developed to mitigate conflicts at the community level. A strategic focus is needed to place a network of skilled mediators to the most conflict prone sub-district (according to the conflict analysis). PDGs and traditional authorities might also have the potential to play a role in cross-community dialogue (This has to be assessed by the conflict analysis).
- The advocacy and peace-building on local and national levels should integrate partnerships with NGOs and CSOs and who have knowledge, experience and the trust of the people such as Kapeng Foundation, Malaya and National Coalition for Indigenous People⁴¹ e.g. by thematic tenders (indigenous issues in general and with regard to CHT, elements of the PA land issues, forestry, elections, human rights)⁴². It would also be useful to link in with other organizations with extensive experience of working in CHT such as BRAC in health, nutrition, malaria and TB and NGO Forum for Public Health- public health, water and sanitation to raise awareness and inter-link these stakeholders with the international donor communities and local level advocacy efforts. This is important from a UNDP point of view since these stakeholders are more independent from the GoB than UNDP.
- As already recommended in the UNDP Context Analysis (2012), special attention needs the dialogue with and the advocacy towards the military having high level influence on political party politics and being the most relevant and powerful stakeholder opposing any further steps in PA implementation. The future programme could develop a specific strategy considering the prior interests of the military such as reputation and its participation in UN Peacekeeping Forces. UNDP should use its internal channels via the Resident Coordinator and the Bureau for Crises Prevention and Recovery at the UN Headquarters to establish contacts to the DPA and Department for Peace Keeping Operations in order to create space for official and quiet diplomacy addressing critically the army’s role in the CHT conflict and its participation in the UN Peacekeeping Forces⁴³.
- Conflict sensitivity should be strengthened by improved transparency and by a communication strategy with the communities on the selection criteria of vulnerability. The conflict sensitive

⁴⁰ Definitions of ‘Peace Building’, ‘Confidence Building’ and Peace building and conflict prevention are given in Acronyms, Abbreviations and Definitions.

⁴¹ However, care should be taken by the owners of this report in circulation of this information because these organizations can be put at risk.

⁴² It should not be overlooked here that especially human rights organizations are as well challenges by restrictive practices and surveillance of the GoB and in some cases have been endangered by imprisoning of activists.

⁴³ This needs particular diplomatic skills and a careful strategy as previous efforts to make the army’s participation conditional of a ‘human rights screening in CHT’ resulted in renewed setbacks with the governmental dialogue.

approach should also cover other existing conflicts on the local level on which the conflict analysis will provide more detailed information. The communication strategy could also be used to explain the role and structure of CHTDF as a whole in order to avoid misconceptions. With regard to resource conflicts within PDGs, traditional authorities or local governmental institutions and/or local NGOs could be enabled and supported to play a role in mitigating these conflicts - via follow up contracts if CEP is continued.

The recently established CHT UNDP Task Force has the potential to strengthen coordination between different UN agencies and a consensus for conflict sensitive programming. Efforts should be made to integrate all UN agencies. (At the time of the evaluation, in November 2013, not all UN agencies – including some that are operational in the CHT have been involved).

- In order to improve the programme's responsiveness to emerging conflicts and changing scenarios, conflict monitoring should become an integral part of the established monitoring system.

6.2 Institutional Capacity Building

Overall there is a slight improvement with regard to the capacities of the CHT specific institutions resulting in an improved service delivery as indicated by both interviewees and the Household Survey. Specific achievements are increased public information dissemination by maintained websites, improved communication facilities by IT systems, progress in revenue collections and fund raising and the experience gained in CHTDF project implementation by the 'training on the job' approach.

However, there are still crucial constraints preventing the project capacity building efforts fulfilling its full potential such as coordination gaps between created CHT institutions and governmental line structures, staff shortage, lack of resources and pending of transferred responsibilities.

The following recommendations address the challenges:

- The capacity building component should be continued as a function of the regional institutions. This is crucial to the full implementation of the PA and the development of the whole region.
- An overarching development vision and plan should be developed comprising all institutions such as HDCs, traditional and local government institutions to reach a mutual understanding on the outstanding gaps and potential solutions (this recommendation was also given in the Review of February 2013).
- On the national level, the ongoing policy dialogue and advocacy should be strengthened with regard to the conflicting mandates and coordination gaps. At regional level the already started advocacy initiative should be continued.
- There could be a stronger emphasis on 'training on the job approach'. This could be strengthened by an ongoing and longer term process of setting up 'knowledge management cells' within the institutions receiving regular back stopping e.g. by monthly meetings with a technical advisor/trainer. Such an approach could not only be instrumental to ensure that training skills are applied during the daily work routine but also used to reflect on local solutions in terms of the existing conflicting mandates and coordination gaps with line institutions.
- A specific focus should be on transparency and accountability addressing the common corruptive practices. The expertise of Transparency International (which has a branch in Bangladesh with a good reputation) could be consulted to incorporate preventive action as integral part of institutional capacity building.

6.3 Community Empowerment

- It is clear that the percentage of PDCs that are successfully encompassing an 'empowering community institution' are less than one third of those started by CHTDF.
- Community Empowerment has generally been interpreted by CHTDF very narrowly and has not encompassed assets and capabilities to secure more sustainable livelihoods or indeed engender the basis of peace building.
- The opportunity for working towards the empowerment of grassroots communities was available when CHTDF first started work. If the 'community empowerment' process had been followed during the initial implementation of activities in the field, the situation of IPs might have been very different.
- The capacity of the majority of communities remains low in spite of receiving services for 5 years. About half of the PDCs are not yet confident to manage their activities and organisation. This may be due in part to a lack of capacity within the NGOs but in the main it is due to the fact that the provision for capacity building with the communities was seen only in terms of financial improvements and the need for socio – political empowering processes was relegated if not ignored. Capacity building for the NGO staff was also necessary to facilitate the capacity building of communities.
- No specific strategy was developed to sustain the PDCs and PNDGs as community institutions at the grassroots level. The PDP was not effectively facilitated in the field to make a strategic plan of the grassroots communities.
- No specific conflict over resources (existed at community level) increased to 'out of control'. But no conflict transformation strategy is evident in the project to translate the conflicts that did occur into an opportunity for collective action through community empowerment.
- However, the mandates of CHT institutions, including MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDCs, are to make use of opportunities for interventions in community empowerment in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Recommendations –

Community empowerment needs to be substantially strengthened. Specifically: -

- The existence of PDCs and PNDGs at the grassroots level can and should still be used as the basis of community work in the CHT.
- There is still an opportunity to introduce a sustainable livelihood initiative with the PDCs and PNDGs in the present project areas of CHTDF and outside to empower the communities. Steps can be structured to the specific situation of respective communities. Different strategies for successful, struggling and failed PDCs/PNDGs and new communities.
- Communities need to be facilitated to take stock and understand the changes – negative as well as positive- brought about by CHTDF including strengths and limitations of PDCs/PNDGs. What has changed in lives? What problems do families face? Explore potential solutions? This enquiry needs to reveal the reality of the situation to enable the identification of fundamental community needs. This should be the first step of future activities at community level with staff trained in

participation. Different methods and tools including PRA and AI can be used in community mobilisation process. The important point is that the process takes time.

- Location specific problems/conflict analysis should be done with communities given enough time to identify the real problems and the real conflicts that exist in the each community. Various PRA tools can be effectively employed.
- Socially inclusive strategies should be employed to ensure women, young people, children, the elderly and poor people should be given priority during any plan developed for the community based development interventions. Households living under the poverty line should be provided with extra incentives and safety-net facilities so that they can participate in all relevant community work and not be penalized for poverty. The strategy might usefully be based on a 'Livelihoods for Social Inclusion' model.
- There are obvious inherent dangers of creating a 'federation' of PDCs from political parties. Names of groups would advisedly have a social local connotation to avoid any linkage or interpretation as a political party'.
- A strategy on sustainable livelihoods should be developed to gradually integrate and transfer the project activities into the local government institutions, HDCs and locally capable and potential NGOs. This might usefully be based on the 'Sustainable Livelihoods Framework'.
- Capacity development facilities at community level should be undertaken on the basis of Participatory Learning Needs Assessment (PLNA). There should be a PLNA before developing community based capacity development plans, which will improve the knowledge-base of the respective community.
- The criteria for financing (Not QiF) the Participatory Strategy Plan (PSP) and PDP can be a future decision and grants may ultimately be made directly or through HDC, Upazilas etc.
- NGOs, as the technical facility at grassroots level, can create enabling environments for the grassroots communities to be able to maintain linkages with different tiers of service providers and local level policy-making bodies.
- Interventions can be operated through both DEX and NEX modality clearly defining the roles of different tiers of the government bodies such as central line ministries, MoCHTA, CHTRC, HDC, Upazilla Parishads and Union Parishads and PDCs.
- Standing Committees of Union Parishads should be activated and strengthened ensuring GO-NGO services to the communities. UP to maintain linkages with Upazilla Parishads and Hill District Councils
- The exit strategy for each of the PDCs should be developed at the beginning of the implementation plans so that the communities know and can prepare. The present status of the Para, the needs of the courses (advocacy, economic opportunities, capacity and skill development, linkage building with different GO-NGO actors to sustain their works) should be included and the phasing out process can be included in the plan.
- Considerations for implementation of community empowerment activities with 4 different types of PDCs;
 - Develop an exit/sustainability plan and facilitate implementing the plans to the PDCs who have already shown capacity to sustain their institution and provide very nominal monetary contribution.
 - Develop exit/sustainability/ phasing out plan and facilitate implementing the plans to the PDCs who are at middle (B) categories. They need more technical facilitation and mentoring supports in the organization development process utilizing their existing resources. Some monetary supports may be required for

some PDCs. A comprehensive assessment can be conducted to identify such PDCs in the beginning of the intervention.

- Conduct situation analysis with the weakest PDCs and facilitate identification of future needs, form PSP and support in the implementation of their plans. It may need a longer process as these types of PDCs may need a concentrated education process (de-education, neutralization and re-education). Monetary support will also be required for this type of PDCs.
 - Implement fresh community empowerment process in new communities. (In this case even the name of activity should be changed. It can be called just 'community based development' or 'alternative development' or 'sustainable livelihood' type of title). In this case the community should be given enough time to be familiar with different steps and process of organization development, be provided with appropriate skills and knowledge on empowerment, develop proper development/strategy plans. Then the community needs to be supported in the implementation process where partial monetary support may be given. The community should have specific plans identifying sources of fund or resources with guidance as to which they can do their own and which they may need outside support. Outsiders/donors/NGOs/ CHTDF will only provide support for activities which have been identified.
- Provide orientation/training, knowledge and information on 'community empowerment' to the people involved in implementation and facilitation of the CE process i.e. representatives of NGOs, HDCs, Government line departments and CHTDF. At the same time, social, political, educational and economic empowerment should get more priority in CE project approach.
 - Facilitate the transfer of locally appropriate technologies for sustainable income generation including agricultural with technologies appropriate to the geographical terrain.
 - Enable the construction of development plans for household-based IGAs in tandem with collective interventions. To ensure the inclusion of ultra-poor or disadvantaged families, an orientation process can be introduced to all HHs of the involved Paras to discuss the importance of inclusiveness and ensuring rights of most marginalized groups of the community in the process.
 - Training on Rights to Information (RTI) to be given to representatives –including women and young people of each PDC to ensure knowledge and awareness of their access rights to goods and services re GO-NGO.

It is important that communities play an active role in peace building at community level. To this end, a risk /feasibility assessment (social research) would determine challenges/opportunities for mobilization of CBOs on a location specific basis and is an essential component of a strategic approach to community mobilisation. The conflict and post-conflict context along with other social, cultural, political, economic conditions would be used to plan and implement the community mobilisation process.

- Sensitize & build capacity of the HDC core staff members on community empowerment/development processes so that they can play vital role in the implementation of projects at grassroots level.
- Provide orientation/training of all government officials of CHT on the issue of IP rights. The training should be provided through CHT ministry, all government department staff can be targeted under these training courses (third class staff to UNO & DC);

6.4 Economic Development.

- In any future programme, it is critical that a proper location specific problem analysis be undertaken that involves the community. Training on the tools for *Assessment for Potential Interventions* and *Rapid Market Assessment* can be provided to the programme implementing NGOs/PNGOs and the community groups. Subsequent activities should adhere to the sustainable livelihood framework which places the poorest of the poor and/or Indigenous People and the rights of the most vulnerable groups of the community at the centre.
- A strategy on sustainable livelihood should be developed to gradually integrate and transfer the project activities into the local government institutions, HDCs and locally capable and potential NGOs.
- Involvement of NGOs as the technical facility in the grassroots level to create enabling environment for the communities to be able to maintain linkages with different tiers of service providers and local level policy making bodies.
- Standing Committees of Union Parishads activated and strengthened ensuring GO-NGO services to the communities. UP to maintain linkages with Upazilla Parishads and Hill District Councils.

6.5 Education

- Education is one of the most important components in CHT but access to schools remains difficult for many children. The challenging terrain, language issues, the lack of qualified teachers, the lack of adequate learning facilities, poverty and undervaluing education are issues that are being addressed by CHTDF's Education programme. Bangladesh in general has progressed in education but the CHT is still far behind the national level.
- The Education project expected that 90% of children in the catchment areas would enrol as students and 80% enrolled for three years of education. Education materials and publications are developed in local languages and the education approach has been accepted by GoB. 90% of local teachers apply learned methods, 80% SMC are sustainable and effective. 30 Schools are supported by government and 70% of schools continue activities through community contribution and continuous support of NGOs. It was also expected that the Education unit in HDC would be established and functional by the end of the project.
- The education project meets the urgent need in people of the CHT and is bridging the gaps in remote areas. Alongside other key projects, it meets the prerequisites for development. It is also reducing the scope of marginalization and that will help to uphold the peace process. Despite the handover of the project to the HDCs, education is still financially dependent on donor funding support. HDCs do not yet have the capacity to run the programme and finance remains a challenge. The financial foundation of the project remains a challenge but if schools are closed and access to basic education is drastically reduced, the positive contribution of the education project to peace building will severely be compromised. CHTDF should focus on strengthening capacity for sustainability related to the implementation of the Tribal Education Plan and integration with PEDP-III and MoPE.
- The Education programme aimed to ensure the teaching methodology and contents are sensitized in relation to local contexts and specific demand. CHT community based basic education initiatives have been launched and are functioning in targeted areas. The cooperation between relevant local authorities (HDC, RC and Ministry of education) "towards workable division of

responsibilities” is still required. The education cluster has put systems in place to promote and sustain access to a quality primary education in the CHT with improved teaching, relevant learning materials, and an efficient and effective decentralized management system in line with the principles of the 1997 CHT Accord, PEDP II, the PRSP, and Education for All. However, it is not been streamlined with the single government system which is absolutely essential for sustainability of action and achievements.

Recommendations:

- The education project should focus on strengthening the capacity for sustainability related to the implementation of the Tribal Education Plan ⁴⁴ and integration with PEDP-III and MoPE. It should be implemented through the line department that is the nationally accepted education plan relevant to CHT and tribal people in Bangladesh. Integration should be the first and foremost criteria for the sustainability of education programme.
- The education line department has ‘officially’ transferred to HDCs so that all the programme and supports should go through HDCs and strengthen the education programme. The budgetary authority should also be transferred to HDC in order to make appropriate plans with capacity building support.
- One of the sustainability criteria is the need for school nationalization and establishing incentives. The advocacy and capacity building support needs to focus on initiating the nationalization process of schools. An incentive mechanism should be introduced for schools completing steps of registration.
- The quality of teachers needs to be improved through training. Experienced teacher trainers could devise courses to be delivered to groups of potential teachers brought together in different parts of the CHTs. Distance learning techniques could be used to reach places where the schools are. Teacher training manual on MLE and child centred learning has been developed in a holistic way. However, recognising the acute shortage of qualified and educated teachers in CHT if quality education is to be ensured it is necessary to focus on the essentials of each section of reading materials by emphasising ‘what is to be done’ by the teachers. This will help teachers and improve the quality of teaching and learning.
- The community based education supervision and monitoring system might be an effective option through community-based organization like PDC, UnFC and UzAC. An integrated supervisory mechanism should be developed to smooth operation and community participation.
- Forward planning is necessary to activate SMCs for self-reliance.

6.6 Health

The CHTDF health programme meets one of the basic needs of remote hill dwellers and has made a positive contribution mainly to curative health services in the CHT. Initially a direct service modality worked well with social mobilization support from local NGOs. The geographical and operating conditions of the health service in the CHT are very different to the rest of Bangladesh and it is therefore more expensive than the National Health Service. ‘The government spends about US\$ 5 per

⁴⁴ CHTDF evaluation 2009 (Annex-20, comment No.37)

head on Health, Nutrition and Population Sector Programme (HNPS). With the aim to improve local institutional capacity building, the project was handed over to HDC, but remained dependent on LOA staff rather than the HDC. Despite significant challenges, the health services reached communities in remote districts and provided an entry point to secondary healthcare for the first time.

The monitoring system developed by the project was narrowly focussed on the cumulative increase of “case management” rather than outcome level indicators. A comprehensive monitoring system of CHTDF including health clusters was designed with EC support in 2010, but it is difficult to ascertain the current operational status of the system. The system was developed by taking into consideration the interlocking logical framework. The M&E system was designed with regular updating provision of new activities and outcome indicators. The M&E system had provision to include new project activities with the aim to accommodate any changes in the programme in the future. However, though a survey and assessment has been conducted for donors, the CHTDF's comprehensive system not been updated for M&E and reporting except in the case of the CEP cluster.

It was well placed for integration into the public health system especially reporting to the line department but their limited acknowledgement of ownership and reluctant attitude is evident. Despite sustainability challenges, it has made an important contribution to the overall goals of CHTDF especially in achieving confidence building. However, the approach has a limited focus on curative remedial actions compared to the comprehensive health service delivery system of the national health system. However, the service delivery strategy is potentially acceptable to government and the necessary improvements are appropriate in the long term in the CHT context.

The CHTDF programme set up several specific project organizations and committees in health, education, community empowerment, agriculture and food security and economic development at the grassroots/para level which are not current integrated into existing structures. Following the establishment of the government committees in 2012, CHTDF has expressed the intention to move away from project specific development coordination committees to merge with existing government committees at district, Upazila and Union levels. This would rationalise the plethora of groups and committees such as, Satellite Clinic Management Committee (SCME) and CMC, School Management Committee (SMC), Mothers Forum, Parents Teacher Association (PTA) etc. This is a process that needs to be completed to achieve cost efficiency and effectiveness. The current programme excludes existing organizations and forms of governance. Local government authorities (Union Parishad, Upazila Parishad) are responsible for development activities of respective areas. Similarly, in the traditional system of governance, the Karbari and the headman are the key decision makers on social and economic issues. Unfortunately, neither group were included in the PDC executive bodies or involved with other economic development activities which are an omission in the project design. Inclusion of LGs in the activities of CHTDF would help establish a solid development base at the community level.

Recommendations

- There is a need to focus on ways of transferring responsibilities to the line department (MoHFW) with the HDCs and CHTRC cooperation supported by external technical assistance (TA). Health is a “transfer subject” and implementation of the Tribal Health Plan will only be possible when the management and budgetary authority are functioning together.

- The MoHFW recently approved a one-off block allocation budget to meet the cost of salaries of CHSW and CSBA through MoCHTA. This allocation should be formalized and continued on a permanent basis.
- An incentive scheme and monitoring system for health staff posted to the CHT should be created and Upazila and Union based health facilities should be in place.
- Within the HDCs there should be a comprehensive Health Unit for overall progress monitoring and coordination. This would help to reduce the number of absentee doctors in government health facilities at district, Upazilla and Union levels.
- The ability to meet the recurring cost of the mobile satellite clinics is crucial for the sustainability. If the MoHFW transfers the budget to HDCs, they can prepare, plan and allocate resources for MoHFW staff to travel around the districts and Upazilas. For the running costs of the satellite clinics, the project should resolve this issue with the Clinic Management Committees. Policies should be in line with national health policies and the tribal health plan principles. Along with this strengthening the local health care institution network is also vital.
- The health project generates a great deal of data that focuses on case management rather than strategic data. The monitoring system should focus on outcomes rather than outputs.
- Each programme assigned staff to oversee respective components but without any coordination of the components. Integrating training and programme activities can ensure cost efficient, practice and management. The programme should follow an integrated community development approach to encourage efficient action and accountability.

6.7 Food and nutritional security

The programme to date has been largely based on promoting increased yields of crops. However the technology is largely and increasingly dependent on non-sustainable resources. A fundamental shift in orientation is recommended that does not rely and focus simply on technical fixes but emphasises a sound food security system one that builds a democratic and sustainable food system in the CHT. This means capitalising on the rich bio-diversity and the abundance of natural resources for compost making and taking advantage of the opportunity to build on the inherent system of organic produce recognising the high value of these products in the market as well as the additional nutritional benefits.

Recommendations.

- Reassess the current programme in the light of recommendations from FAO and others for sustainability.
- Assess potential for substantial and enhanced production through compost making and utilization optimising the rich and abundant bio-diversity of the CHT.
- Examine market opportunities for organic produce.
- Examine the scope of NTFP – collection and primary processing.
- Examine the scope for value addition of primary products. For example, Sun dried tomatoes/bananas etc.
- Link agricultural production to economic development for value addition.

3 SECTION III: OPTIONS TO CONSIDER ON THE WAY FORWARD

3.1 Option's to consider on the Way Forward

The ToR require that, based on the findings of the evaluation, the ET provide some preliminary options on the strategic approaches to be considered for any subsequent programmes of the current CHTDF. In considering different options the ET has taken into account the progress made over the last 10 years and also recognised the huge obstacles and challenges faced by development programmes in the CHT. The changed and changing context including political volatility means that flexibility and responsiveness will need to be inbuilt into any strategic framework.

The intransigence of government and other key actors to implement the PA fully and the real political obstacles, challenges and dilemmas means there are no obvious guaranteed options for effective and efficient implementation of programmes.

The 'post conflict' situation presents additional and very substantive challenges that are not present in most other development programmes and considerations for strategic planning for the future.

Central to any planning is the issue of **Ownership** and it is of critical importance that Partner owned programmes are pursued. In spite of the importance of ownership being with the government there are obvious risks involved, the inherent and serious weaknesses of the responsible authorities, the lack of ability to plan a reform agenda or to manage and implement a programme plus the weakness of nominated not elected HDCs and CHT RC.

While recognising these weaknesses, the challenge is not only how to ensure that programme ownership, demand and results are in the hands of the responsible authorities but how to translate that into practical action. The inclusion of LGIs and traditional governance stakeholders would contribute to establish ownership, translate demand into practical action and results and would ensure that development actors would be part of the programme.

In considering the way forward for a future programme, it is important to recognise the remaining period for the current programme not only as a an 'exit strategy' but as a period that can be used for preparation, especially for putting in place strengthening measures and capacity building in MoCHTA, CHT RC and the HDCs. The period needs to focus on enabling and facilitating a demand led programme to evolve and needs to incorporate a bottom up process as well as planning nationally if ownership is to be real and valued by all. A programme constructed centrally without the participation of communities in the CHT is extremely unlikely to succeed and the resulting disappointment, disquiet and potential opposition can only pose a real threat to peace and stability. Planning must be a consultative and inclusive process involving all key development actors as part of the programme.

3.2 Essentials to Consider

3.2.1 Peace Building and Advocacy

- **Advocacy – key sub components** - Land Commission, Elections of CHT specific institutions, Refugee Task Force, transfer of 33 sectoral responsibilities to the HDCs, Demilitarization)
- **Advocacy all levels** community, district regional national and international and implementation of the PA and implement activities and engage with relevant stakeholders.
- **Joined up agency approach** - peace promoting development 'Joiners' and 'Dividers'
- **Conflict Analysis** - in depth - communities, local regional and national CHT and line governmental structures, military, political parties, traditional authorities and CSOs.
- **Strengthening democratic framework** HDC elections + CHT RC
- **Compilation of electoral register**
- **Transferable issues** - Health and Education from CHTDF to HDCs full transfer of responsibilities.

3.2.2 Programme Ownership

- **Construction of demand led Plan.**
- **Assessment of strengths and limitations of key institutions**
- **Establishment of planning unit.** MoCHTA/CHTRC/HDC's
- **Integration of community needs/demands**
- **Cooperation between key institutions** -MoCHTA, Regional, and District Councils linked institutions.
- **Inclusion of 3 governance systems** - traditional, the 'new' MoCHTA/CHTRC/HDCs and State government 'joined up' approach.
- **Relations with central government,** Inter- ministerial cooperation and others -ministries for resource allocation and at local government level.

3.2.3 Community Empowerment

- **Community Based Location specific analysis** - sustainable livelihood framework for social inclusion (LSI)
- **Community Needs assessment,** PRA location specific problem analysis be undertaken that involves the community.
- **Development of Community socio- economic Plans** Encourage a 'bottom up' approach
- **Community empowerment⁴⁵,** Reorientation encompass peace building.
- **Inclusion** Upazila Parishads, traditional governance system, Unions and the elected representatives and leaders in planning and implementation process.
- **Electorate issues** – Registration and electorate of the HDCs

⁴⁵ Enhancing livelihood capabilities and assets which enable marginalised communities to come to a new perception and understanding of their own voice and agency and to engage, influence and hold accountable the institutions that affect them

3.3. Options for Implementation

As part of the ToR the ET was required to discuss possible options for the way forward for any subsequent programme to the CHTDF including a One UN Agency Approach.

3.3.1 One UN Agency Support.

In addition to meetings with UNDP CHTDF staff both in Dhaka and in the three districts, the ET met with the UN country office Dhaka, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, UNESCO and the Co-Chair of the recently formed UN 'Task Force'. It also sought the views of current CHTDF donor partners of the One UN Agency approach as well as soliciting the views of potential partners on the Approach. An interview was also made with an ex UN staff member who had previously worked with the DaO pilot programme in Vietnam.

To date the CHTDF has performed a dual role, firstly as facilitator of donor resources and secondly, programme implementation - UNDP. As new funding opportunities are made available for new or existing projects so the CHTDF assimilates them into the project framework. It is therefore akin to a programme consortium accommodating new projects as opportunities for new funding are presented. It is not always clear how well new initiatives are integrated into the Facility or what impact new projects have, positive as well as negative, on the workload and infrastructure of the existing programme, synthesis with the goal and purpose of the CHTDF or the impact that this will have on the existing programme activities.

It is evident that during the last 10 years most of the individual UN agencies in Bangladesh have not generally channelled resources through the UNDP implemented CHTDF, preferring to work through the specialist counter- part line agencies for example, FAO with the Dept. of Agriculture (DoA), UNICEF with Hill Tracts Development Board. This way of working has not fully engaged MoCHTA, and tended to by-pass the CHT-RC and the HDCs. The FAO have recently⁴⁶ proposed programmes with MOCHTA and Khagachari, Rangamati and Bandarban HDCs.⁴⁷

A UN CHT Task Force was also formed in the middle of 2013 with the objective of stimulating cooperation between UN agencies and formulating a UN joint framework for future programmes in CHT.

3.3.2 'Delivering as One' (DaO)⁴⁸

The One UN Agency Approach – Delivering as One (DaO) was designed as a UN country strategy 'to improve the effectiveness of the UN system, contribute to national development priorities and move towards providing high quality policy advice and advocacy focussing on the UN's normative role'. It would clearly not be appropriate and beyond the scope of this evaluation to make recommendations on the virtues of the UN Bangladesh adopting the DaO, except with regard to the implementation of

⁴⁶ Environment Friendly Agriculture in the CHT September 2013.

⁴⁷ Agriculture Strategies for the Chittagong Hill Tracts: Improving Livelihoods and food and nutrition security through sustainable production increases in crops, livestock and fisheries. FAO 2012/2013.

⁴⁸ The comments made by this ET with regard to DaO are only in direct relation to the implementation of CHTDF.

the CHTDF and subsequent programmes. However, assuming a One UN Approach was institutionalised in Bangladesh what would be the impact on any subsequent programme to CHTDF?

Firstly, the DaO is inclusive of UN agencies but is not designed for multi-donor involvement. Secondly, from the experience of various countries who piloted the Approach, there are a number of issues to consider; the extensive efforts (and high cost) required in re-planning the Bangladesh Country Programme, fitting with government priorities, timing of start-up - different agencies have different budgetary commitments; difficulties of synthesizing the period and timing fund flows in relation to specific projects within the programme. It would also prove difficult to manage with regard to staffing and infrastructure; accommodating ongoing programmes and honouring commitments (including CHTDF) and including non UN partners in the UN programmes.

There are five pillars of 'oneness' for DaO 'plan, leader, budget, management practices and office(house)' Whilst the DaO may make efficiency gains for the UN, it is difficult to identify how these would benefit partners outside of the UN system or in existing programmes. Obviously the 'one plan,' 'one budget' under the 'one leader' would be under the control of the UN Special Representative but the identity and role of the arbitrator of programmes policy and priority could be a complicated issue with regard to multi-donor funded programmes including CHTDF.

The experiences of some of the countries piloting DaO⁴⁹ show that different (UN) stakeholders have varying expectations from projects which are not always synonymous. There are substantial benefits of working together but there remain major challenges over allocation of budgets, agency profile and programme design.

In summary whilst there are potential advantages to the UN in the long term in adopting DaO, it would require a great deal of reorganization and planning. According to the 'pilots' a long gestation period is required before benefits accrue and is not of benefit to ongoing programmes. The M&E also apparently remains a challenge with regard to structure of plans and specification indicators.

Taking the experiences of countries involved in the UN DaO Approach into account, and in view of the fact that any subsequent programme to the current CHTDF programme is planned to start early 2015, the time period is too short to be of any advantage from DaO in Bangladesh with regard to CHTDF.

One outcome from the DaO pilots that has reportedly proved effective and may be value for CHTDF to consider is a variation of 'Programme Coordination Groups'. These have proved valuable for reducing duplication and overlap and holding agencies accountable for outcomes.

There are not likely to be any detrimental effects to the CHTDF of the UN Bangladesh adopting the DaO approach but it is unlikely that any added benefits would accrue and from a multi-donor funded programme perspective is not considered a workable option for the promotion of development and confidence building in the CHT programme planned 2015-2020.

Introduction to the Three options for consideration.

The over-riding risk affecting all development options in the CHT would be the continued failure to make substantive progress on implementation of the PA.

⁴⁹ Country led Evaluation DaO Initiative in Vietnam.

Secondly, all three options necessarily recognise the current weaknesses of the institutional agencies responsible for implementation of development in the CHT and the very limited implementation of the PA. Co-operation between MoCHTA, other government ministries, HDCs and the CHT RC is in need of substantially strengthening. Without elections HDCs are accountable only to those who have nominated them which is a fundamental weakness. The election of representatives to the HDCs will be a milestone for the real implementation of the PA. Similarly with elected representatives to the CHTRC which is the authority to coordinate all institutions and development activities of the respective agencies including line departments, local government institutions and circle chiefs. The electoral role is essential for CHTRC and advocacy has an important role to play with government and the legal interpretation required in paving the way to HDC elections.

Thirdly, in considering different future operational options, the time span is critical for the introduction of any changes. Where changes are implied these are suggested as part of a transitional shift in the pattern of ownership, initiation and transfer of responsibilities. That is, a gradual phase in – phase out transition not a sudden cut-off from one system to another.

3.3.3 First Option: MoCHTA+HDCs lead the programme with TA support.

The emphasis is on Partner owned and demand led with a supportive role to be played by technical assistance required to deliver concrete results and not limited to training or an advisory role. The responsibility of the Managing Agency in this option would lie with MoCHTA and the three HDCs. CHT RC would be responsible for implementing development programmes through specialist NGOs to deliver needs based development activities based on the situational analysis and subsequent para specific development plans. A strong TA support team would need to be resident in the CHT and Dhaka and call on specialist inputs in close consultation with MoCHTA.

Advantages of the approach.

1. The key advantages of this option would be one of ownership and the potential for a demand driven programme.
2. The specific institutions MoCHTA, CHT RC and HDCs would be actively engaged, responsible and accountable for management and implementation for development in the CHT.
3. MoCHTA will be the fund channelling authority and HDCs, under the leadership of CHTRC, responsible for implementation of the programme –embodying a sense of ownership by the HDCs and the CHT RC.
4. The process of implementation by HDCs and CHT RC supported by TA would enable them to gain valuable experience and realize the needs of CHTRC. CHT RC and HDC would be responsible for review and formulation of policies.
5. This would initially need to be supported by a resident TA composed of a small team of core specialists enabled to draw on short term experts encompassing skills for rural development especially qualified in promoting more sustainable livelihoods in post conflict situations.
6. The TA would operate within the HDCs and CHT-RCs as well as MoCHTA and manage implementation working together rather than contractor or sub-contractor.
7. Line departments through their respective ministries would be integral ensuring increased interaction, planning and budgeting and improved communications and scope created for the

HDCs and CHT RCs. Local government institutions including the Union Parishad and Upazila Parishad would also be integral.

8. HDCs would contract NGOs in a partnership rather than contractor or sub-contractor status for project implementation. (The NGOs will be responsible for generating results rather than outputs)
9. The integrated approach will increase scope for the communities to be involved in identifying priorities and participating in the LGSP infrastructural development project implemented by the Union Parishad in respective unions.
10. TA inputs need to be flexible and responsive to changed and changing circumstances and 'call-down' on specialist short term inputs can be accommodated accordingly.

Key challenges of this approach.

In addition to the fundamental and inherent challenges and weaknesses outlined in the Introduction the key challenges with regard to the TA approach are,

1. Comparative lack of detailed knowledge and experience of the TA Team re CHT.
2. Lack of institutional authority in advocacy work nationally and internationally.
3. Lack of substantive institutional support framework.
4. Lack of infrastructural facilities at regional/district level -no visible UN presence - 'peace keeping'.
5. Lack of capacity and authority for co-ordination of multiple donors funding and action.

3.3.4 Second Option: MoCHTA+CHT RC + HDCs with TA, and CHTDF

The second option also recognises the need to transfer implementation responsibility from CHTDF to MoCHTA with the HDCs for implementation within the CHT through NGOs. A team of TA specialists would be required to orientate and train the NGOs as well as providing the HDCs with specialist socio-technical support through specialisations in rural development for more sustainable livelihoods in post conflict situations.

In this option there would be a continuing and major role for CHTDF in the ongoing work of advocacy, co-ordination and capacity building but would benefit from specialised TA inputs. The CHTDF would also coordinate and maintain liaison with donors and would continue to oversee the transfer of education and health. Both National Execution (NEX) and Direct Execution (DEX) modalities are considered advisable for effective implementation of future programmes. In addition to HDCs, a budgetary provision should be included for CHT-RC that recognises them as an integral part of MoCHTA and HDCs and the development process. Community empowerment/economic development plus the components of health, education, agriculture and food security should come under national execution modalities. The responsibility for implementation would be through MoCHTA + relevant Ministries and the HDCs for implementation and management with TA support level and professionally qualified sectoral-technical NGOs for field level implementation to generate effective outcomes. The sectoral-technical NGOs with specialization in respective disciplines would be responsible to implement the project at the field level with supports from Ministry/HDCs. LGI representatives, especially Upazila and Union Parishad, should coordinate project activities. The joint LGIs and HDCs effort of would enable inclusive planning, monitoring and supervision at community level.

Advantages of the Second Option.

The key advantages of this Option are that it encompasses all the advantages of the First Option but retains important elements from the current CHTDF – UNDP - for continuity and specialist inputs. They are,

1. Retain UNDP experience and presence in the CHT.
2. Retain the substantive authority and experience for advocacy nationally and internationally.
3. Retain visible presence of UN in CHT – albeit in a reduced capacity.
4. Ensure continuation of the effective role of capacity building.
5. Continued capacity and opportunity for CHTDF to generate and channel funds for development project.
6. Ownership and demand driven programme by the responsible authorities
7. The specific institutions MoCHTA, CHT RC and HDCs actively engaged, responsible and accountable for management and implementation of development in the CHT.
8. MoCHTA will be the fund channelling authority and HDCs, under the leadership of CHTRC, will be responsible for implementation of the programme –embodying a sense of ownership by the HDCs and the CHT RC.
9. The process of implementation by HDCs and CHT RC supported by TA would enable them to gain valuable experience and realize the needs of CHTRC. CHT RC and HDC would be responsible for review and formulation of policies.
10. This would initially need to be supported by a resident TA composed of a small team of core specialists enabled to draw on short term experts encompassing skills for rural development especially qualified in promoting more sustainable livelihoods in post conflict situations.
11. The TA would operate within the HDCs and CHT-RCs as well as MoCHTA, and on management implementation working together rather than contractor or sub-contractor.
12. Line departments through their respective ministries would be integral ensuring increased interaction, planning and budgeting and improved communications and scope created for the HDCs and CHT RCs. Local government institutions including the Union Parishad and Upazila Parishad would also be integral.
13. HDCs would contract NGOs in a partnership rather than contractor or sub-contractor status for project implementation. (The NGOs will be responsible for generating results rather than outputs)
14. The integrated approach will increase scope for the communities to be involved in identifying priorities and participating in the LGSP infrastructural development project implemented by the Union Parishad in respective unions.
15. TA inputs flexible and responsive to changed and changing circumstances and ‘call-down’ on specialist short term inputs can be accommodated accordingly.
16. Clearer identification of programme - donor implementer(s) roles and responsibilities.

Key challenges of this approach.

1. Responsible authorities unable to compile reform agenda.
2. CHTDF/UN TA continued to take initiatives provide supply driven agenda.
3. Co-ordination of Support Activities i.e CHTDF – TA.

3.3.5 Third option: Continuation of CHTDF

The advantage of continuing with the Development Facility as it exists is that an infrastructure exists and its strengths are well demonstrated especially co-ordination and advocacy. The limitations are also well recognised - problems with the key issue of ownership and service delivery and, the all-important issue of sustainability and an infrastructure, now in excess of the demand.

3.3.6 Summary

Whilst there are advantages and disadvantages with all the options and change will undoubtedly raise new challenges, it is an appropriate time to begin the transfer of management and implementation responsibilities to the specific government organizations in line with the Peace Accord. The approach, strategy, and modalities of CHTDF will need restructuring to create a sense of ownership and harmonization— of working together – with national, regional, district and community development programmes. Funding should be channelled through MoCHTA and HDCs with a strong technical assistance component and programme co-ordination and implementation in the CHT by CHT-RC/HDC. Exercising options does not indicate a sudden change of ownership or the closure of CHTDF rather a statement of intent and a transitional shift in ownership. That is not the end of operational funding for CHTDF rather establishing the parameters for a transfer of ownership.

The potential risks involved of operating with governments particularly where ‘responsible’ authorities are weak and currently not able to advance a reform agenda are well recognised. The proposal is therefore for a period of transition and making provision for planning units to be established – supported by TA and the continued presence of UNDP/CHTDF recognising the need for, and facilitating a demand led strategic plan that is owned by the ‘Partners’. Centralised and decentralised management would also need the support of the TA initially and periodically.

The notion of ownership by government at this juncture has risks attached but if the programme is planned and progressed carefully and deliberately, the risks involved would be minimised and the outcomes more positive. Conversely, if ‘ownership’ of the programme is retained by the donor agencies, there are different risks involved and development activities are unlikely to prove sustainable as is evident now.

ANNEX-I: TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

See separate document.

ANNEX-II: SWOT ANALYSIS

Strengths	Weaknesses
<p>1. Peace and Confidence Building</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace Accord implementation (Partial) holding • Work with GoB including 'quiet diplomacy' for fuller implementation of PA • Trained community level peace keepers in place and established network; • Establishes MoCHTA, CHTRC, and HDCs and strengthened capacity considerably; • Land Commission formed and amendment of land commission law is under process; • Created framework for IDP Task Force. 	<p>1. Peace and Confidence Building</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No tangible changes in implementation of peace accord during implementation of CHTDF • MoCHTA, CHTRC, and HDCs activities missing link with community level peace building; • Land commission and IDP taskforce remain effectively non-functional ; • Efforts and supports to land commission and IDP taskforce could generate less outcomes than expectation; • Tension between Peace Accord provisions transferring development responsibilities to HDCs and new sector programmes.
<p>2. Capacity Building of CHT Institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity of MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDC considerably strengthened; • Established linkages formally and non-formal among various institution - HDC, education, health, traditional circles; • Capacity to manage and deliver of basic services(health and education) enhanced; • Capacity assessment, capacity development plan and strategies developed through CHTDF support. • Implementation of capacity building efforts as per plan. 	<p>2. Capacity Building of CHT Institutions;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More capacity building efforts have been expended on LOA staff than core staff;
<p>3. Community Empowerment + QIF</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme of community empowerment implemented in wider areas; • QIF introduced and induced money to the community people; 	<p>3. Community Empowerment + QIF</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very limited community empowerment other than economic inputs; • Capacity and skill of community people was inadequate but

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3257 PDCs and 1685 PNDGs established as platform of community empowerment; • Use of local (IC) NGOs for community programme; • Increase access to LGI and other agencies and seeking support and services; • Increase by communities in use of line agencies and other services. 	<p>access to adequate money-led them to unmanageable position;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability and equity of QiF questionable • Communities tendency to be dependent on 'hand-outs'; • Functionality and sustainability of 30-40 % PDC's and 50-60 percent PNDG's questionable; • Intra-political conflicts in the CHTs; • Conflict over resources (existed at community level) may increase up to of level of 'out of control'.
<p>4. Economic Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food security situation in CHT improved • Collective marketing system initiated; • Developed people's capacity and skills on new IGAs and promoted through network and linkages; • Initiative had taken to establish linkage with private sectors financial institutions (Chamber of commerce, business houses etc.). 	<p>4. Economic Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural norms and practices not always; considered in economic development planning; • Collective income generating activities is non-feasible among IPs but it was not considered duly; • Capacity Building of economic development and value.
<p>5. Education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 300+ schools renovated /built and 20000+ children with educational opportunities; • Trained, dedicated and motivated School management committees (SMC) members; • Active mothers groups in place and their involvement in promotion of child education; • Strong demand of education facilities at remote areas; • Establish linkages with the government line department in terms of cooperation and supports; • Provision of MLE for IP children. 	<p>5. Education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of integration ran education under LOA with line department; • Absence of uniform and consistent monitoring and reporting system to line department; • Lack of confidence to run schools; • Lack of bridging of MLE with mainstream education curriculum in future; • Separate and non-aligned education management system in same area.
<p>6. Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of health services in some paras; • Establish health facilities in remote 	<p>6. Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • councillor-though non-elected has been assigned to oversee the respective health programme of CHTDF;

<p>areas;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trained SCMC members at the community to facilitate health services; • Trained CHSW and CBSB are in placed in community; • Ministry of Health agreed to allocate budget for salary of CHSW and CBSB to MoCHTA and HDCs; • Services network, clinic and SCMC are in place; • Community contribution in health service started despite severe poverty. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of specifically assigned person except a nominated councillor to oversee rather than LOA staff in HDCs to manage health program; • No formal system of reporting to line department; • Health is transferred subject to HDC but not finance and functionaries; • Two co-existed but non-aligned management system to service delivery within the same area; • Lack of integration with line department and two parallel system is in place.
<p>7. General/Others</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CHTDF Active bases in 3 districts of CHT; • UN vehicles contributes to feeling of more security. 	<p>7. General/Others</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Three systems of governance in CHT to reconcile; • Lack of coordination between district administration and HDC's.
<p>Opportunities</p>	<p>Threats</p>
<p>1. Peace and Confidence Building</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocacy - Peace Accord. Continue to press for implementation especially on tangibles such as Land Commission. • Need for 'quiet diplomacy' to continue. • Peace and Confidence Building. In depth conflict analysis – communities. 	<p>1. Peace and Confidence Building</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued presence of temporary army camps; • Anti-peace accord activists more powerful in CHT; • Decreasing demographic ratio of IP compared to settlers; • Increased spread of religious and communal violence.
<p>2. Capacity Building of CHT Institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDC strengthened with planning units. Planning units are supported and effective in formulating proposals for the three districts of CHT based on community based problem/conflict analysis. 	<p>2. Capacity Building of CHT Institutions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possibility in leadership changes in MoCHTA (both minister and officials) because of changes in power structure through upcoming election • Continued non-elected HDCs. • Lack of transfer procedures for subject department of health, education and • Transferred subjects but not finances and functionaries of respective departments;
<p>3. Community Empowerment + QiF</p>	<p>3. Community Empowerment</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HDC's in association with Upazila's support NGO's to facilitate Para Community Empowerment assessment and planning and collate findings into a needs based plan of action; • Community based needs based/conflict analysis facilitated for each Para including location specific vulnerability, strengths and limitations of institutional frameworks including existing PDC's and PNDG's and community based proposals for solving any problems. This analysis would be expected to result in a plan specific to the para; • Effective local conflict resolution mechanism established as part of Existence of PDCs as grassroots level community institutions to introduce/undertake community-based development interventions; • Existing PNDGs promotion of women's rights; • MoCHTA to promote community-based institutions PDCs and PNDGs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No further efforts made to support more sustainable livelihoods and peace-building; • Institutional development frameworks neglected/abandoned.
<p>4. Economic Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wide scope of diversity of IGA in hill tracts by utilizing limited resources; • Technical skill development of Human resources has a great potential for IGA; • Natural resources based and traditional IGA (handicraft, weaving, fruit cultivation, etc.) has great opportunity; • Market chain development for traditional products. 	<p>4. Economic Development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial management skill and capacity of IP people generally limited; • Lack of motivation to entrepreneurship development by IP.
<p>5. Education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong demand for more education facilities in remote areas; • HDC has scope to manage transferred subject and supervise the line department. 	<p>5. Education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Full transfer of education to HDCs including finance and functionaries; • No specific person in HDC organogram to oversee and

	manage education system.
6. Health <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong demand for health services in remote areas 	6. Health <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Full transfer of health to HDCs including finance and functionaries; • No specific person in HDC organogram to oversee and manage health system; • Lack of management skill and capacity of HDC.
7. General/Others	7 General/Others <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unstable central government.

ANNEX-III: DETAILED COMMENTS BY DONORS ON THE DRAFT REPORT AND RESPONSES OF ET(JE) TEAM

Section II: Main Findings of the Evaluation

2. CHTDF Design and Relevance

SI #	From the Report (copy/paste)	Comments by donors	Action requested/suggested	Comments by the Experts
1.	Executive Summary			
1.1		<p>Executive summary must take into consideration parts re-drafted following integration in the report of the following comments as appropriate.</p> <p>Section 1.3 'Limitation' should be expanded by adding the JE's acknowledgement of the limit of the evaluation and work performed recognizing that the scope of it as in the ToR would imply more extensive study to gain knowledge of the dynamics of the post-conflict context and time that unfortunately was limited because of continuous</p>	Redraft the Executive Summary	<p>Agreed. The Executive Summary has been re-written taking Comments and responses into account .</p> <p>Section 1.3 Amended as suggested.</p>

		hartals etc..		
	SECTION II: Main findings			
2.	2.1 Confidence Building			
2.1	In view of the slow progress of Peace Accord implementation hindering the development of the region and the resolution of ongoing violent land disputes, this component is highly relevant to meet the needs in the current post conflict situation.	The JE makes no specific comments here, other than the general comment that the component is highly relevant to meet post-conflict needs but as mentioned in the previous sections, CHTDF design did not explicitly address peace consolidation via PA implementation.	It is suggested to expand the section by adding comments on CHTDF's design in term of whether the project's initial objectives and underlying assumptions were sufficient or appropriately focused to allow for a greater emphasis on peace consolidation or peace building in the first place.	<p>Suggestion agreed. Add,</p> <p>The inclusion of confidence building in the design of CHTDF giving a clear strategic direction to conflict reducing initiatives and 'to resolve long standing issues critical to peace and enhancing prospects for development CHT'. However, the underlying 'theories of change' and definitions of confidence and peace-building should have been made explicit in the conceptual framework of the programme to allow for a more focussed strategy especially with regard to the different levels and dimensions of peace building. For example PA implementation and the different aspects of community conflicts.</p> <p>A comprehensive conflict analysis should have been conducted at the beginning of the programme and used in the programme design (See also chapter on 'Effectiveness' and the respective recommendations). According the context analysis tool the first systematic stakeholder analysis was conducted only in 2012 and is regarded as a major shortcoming of the CHTDF.</p>
3.	2.2 Capacity Development			
3.1	Awaiting information	Waiting from whom? We are not aware; assume it is internal evaluation team matter.	Complete the section	<p>Completion Agreed. Capacity building of the CHT specific institutions is highly relevant as the functioning of the CHT specific institutions and governmental structures. Capacity development is of central importance for implementation of the PA and the development of the CHT.</p> <p>However, the focus on increasing the capacity of the CHT institutions to</p>

				deliver services and community development, the design of this component did not emphasise sufficiently the necessity to build advocacy capacities of these institutions.
4.	2.5 Education			
4.1	In 2005, the net enrolment rate was 82.7%, the retention rate up to class five was 80.6% and adult literacy rate was 38.8%. <u>By June 2012, it reached 98.7%, 79.5% and 58.8%. These remarkable achievements have been made on the indicators of MDG goals.</u>	Good to know data source, if from government, these are usually overrated, CHTDF figures are more realistic. More fundamentally, the JE does answer the fundamental questions on relevance expected, e.g. was the support and design relevant considering access to education in CHT, education being a transferred subject and core element of the Peace Accord, no tuition in the 11 indigenous languages etc.	Please include appropriate data sources.	Clarified and data sources given: The data source is 'MDG Progress report-2005, page-1, and MDG Progress Report 2013, General Economics Division, Bangladesh Planning Commission, The people republic of Bangladesh- page-35. Undoubtedly '.....the relevance of providing educational opportunities to children previously denied is of great value.' as indicated in the Report. And yes, the support and design was relevant but ultimately relevance also depends on the success of subsequent activities if the educational gains are to be sustainable. The implementation of PA is the responsibility of the government so aligning design components potentially enables a sense of ownership and responsibility. The project design did not demonstrate alignment with the educational department to ensure the full participation of district and Upazila education officials, other than occasional follow up and monitoring visit. Neither did the design ensure accountability of DPEO and UEO to the respective authorities especially to HDCs in terms planning, monitoring and budgeting. Consequently, the education project is essentially being managed and supervised by the LOA staff of HDCs.
4.2	However, in the intervention areas the net enrolment and gross enrolment in CHT have reached 90% and 95% respectively less than the national average.	The source mentioned in the report is not correct. Source of this information is CHTDF Project Completion Report-CIDA, December 2012	Please include data sources in the report.	Corrected Source given. The source of the data is "CHTDF Project Completion Report CIDA: (31 March 2008- 20 June 2012): December 2012

4.3	The attribution of approach and strategy of education clusters remain unclear in many respects.	In what respects? As you did not mention anything.	Please explain in what respects these remain unclear.	<p>Clarification of the statement provided and included in the Report.</p> <p>The education programme is very relevant for promotion of education in CHT and much has been achieved. It has provided opportunities to disadvantaged children in hard to reach areas, 20,000 students gained access to education, mother tongue based education (MLE) curriculum developed and operationalized, 337 people have been trained on child centred educational methodology, 120 new school established, 276 schools building renovated, SMC formed/reformed according to government guidelines and from the 300 SMCs formed 160 remain very active, occasional joint monitoring visits by the line department organized, initiative taken to adopting special provision for CHTDF supported schools in the nationalization process, awarding no objection certification by MoEF to schools established on forest land and so on. Despite these achievements the non-alignment between the project and the line department remains a challenge. Attribution with regard to approach and strategy in some other respects however remains unclear. For example, adult literacy is said to have increased by approx. 20% but CHTDF introduced adult literacy activities in only 30 schools</p>
4.4	It was expected that 70 per cent schools would continue activities through community contribution and continuous support of NGOs.	Consultant should mention the sources of this data. We don't know from where consultants collected this information. Target in fact was community schools to be registered/nationalized, since it is not realistic to expect communities to continue financing schools	Please include this data source in the report.	The data source is CHTDF Phase III log-frame attached as Annex-2, in CHTDF Evaluation Report 2009. Stating "70% of schools continue activities through community contribution and continuous support of NGOs".
4.5	A significant number of	How did you measure it? Do	Please explain how did	Explanation provided.

	SMCs are not capable or confident enough to run a school by themselves.	you have any data sources? According CHTDF M&E data, 160 projects school have very active SMC who have confident to run the school properly.	you calculate/measure this information? Kindly mention the sources if you collect this information from any survey/report.	The ET visited all three district and held discussions with SMC members. In response to the question, 'in the absence UNDP support how will you finance the running of the school? Most interviewees said that the school would close if support from donors was withdrawn. Community contributions are also likely to be inadequate and difficult to rely because of poverty and the lack of livelihood options in CHT. Integration into the state system rather than coexistence would be effective means ensure sustainability of education.
5.	2.6 Health			
5.1	In spite of the contextual difficulties, CHTDF has set up an appropriate and relevant health service with professional doctors and CHSWs at the grassroots level and has made a significant contribution to the provision of assured health services in terms of short-term remedial action to remote communities. <u>The short-term remedial function is valuable but in the long-term the concept might be counterproductive</u>	The concept is aligning with counterparts consensus. There is no risk of insubstantial line management even in longer terms since line department was fully involved in the policy decisions. Moreover HDC managed services are not parallel but in extension of other government health services. Only overlapping is in management of services, where HDC LOA staff is taking functions that could be carried out by government department at district and Upazila level, which will be addressed in the coming years.	Need recognise these elements and take into consideration them in the report.	Comment accepted and text adjusted accordingly. Accepted that 'HDC services' can be viewed as an addition/extension to other government health services The concern of the ET has not been explained clearly. The concern is that providing a curative service is expensive, and whilst the line agency might easily agree to the policy decision whilst funding sources are available from outside when funding has to be met by line agency budgets that might invoke a quite different response.

	<u>owing to separate and insubstantial line management in health governance.</u>			
5.2	Service provision has mainly focused on curative services with low levels of health education support and prime public health issues such as water and sanitation are rarely addressed.	Health education is part of responsibilities CHSW, and education sessions are conducted by health promoters at mobile clinics. They conducted 240,330 health education sessions since December 2008 to December 2013 which include sanitation and personal hygiene with others. Moreover CHTDF/HDCs are supporting and taking part in various national and international awareness campaigns. Also, it should be noted that while demand-driven support for water has been provided in community empowerment programme and sanitation provided to schools, CHTDF was not mandated to deliver WATSAN in the form of donor agreements/projects signed.	Without these considerations the comment is not really credible. Need to modify this by addressing the information mentioned in the comments.	Agreed. The number of health education sessions conducted by CHSW is acknowledged. Also acknowledge that CHTDF/HDCs are part of awareness campaigns. Health education is one of the responsibilities CHSW, and education sessions are conducted by health promoters at mobile clinics. 240,330 health education sessions have been conducted between December 2008 to December 2013 which includes sanitation and personal hygiene. CHTDF/HDCs are also supporting and taking part in various national and international awareness campaigns. Demand-driven support for access to clean drinking water has been provided to community's but the response has been low safe sanitation coverage (14%) (CEP monitoring data.) Whether CHTDF was 'mandated' or not to deliver access to clean water and sanitation with regard to relevance of health provision by CHTDF these two aspects are considered fundamental to good health –care
6.	Relevance of			

	Approach -HEALTH			
6.1	The health service delivery approach and system is an <u>ad hoc arrangement</u> created in a post conflict situation which has proved to be relevant.	The term ad-hoc is not appropriate. The approach was designed with purpose of establishment of health services meeting with specific needs of CHT people with management arrangement in line with Peace Accord (subject transferred).	Suggest re-considering according to the suggestion given	Agreed. The comments accepted and reworded Delete ad Hoc The health service delivery system is a non-aligned arrangement relevant to the specific needs of CHT with regard to the peace accord in the post conflict situation. The health department is an agreed transferred subject to HDC.
6.2	Under the LoA with HDCs, the health service programme is implemented in parallel and until it is brought under a uniform management system	HDC managed health services operate in extension of other government services and not parallel. Management of health services need to improve of both HDC managed and other government services. HDCs managed services need to be mainstreamed with other government health services, HDCs need to be engaged in management of other government services, at present they have no involvement in important decisions as planning and budgeting.	If after having taken into consideration the comments, the JE wants to keep the term 'parallel' the JE must <u>fully justify</u> the choice of the term.	Agreed. The term parallel is omitted. The text now will read Under the LoA with HDCs, the health service programme is an extension of government services, not currently aligned, but will ultimately be brought into one management system by the HDCs. 'There is room for improvement in the management of both the HDC and government managed services. Under the LoA HDCs managed services need to be mainstreamed with other government health services, HDCs need to be engaged in management of other government services, at present they have no involvement in important decisions as planning and budgeting'.
6.3	The government has been implementing	Health services under SWAP are in general not suitable for	Suggest re-considering	Not agreed. To say that 'SWAP has not been used so far' is not correct.

	<p>health service programme across the county under SWAP including in CHT.</p>	<p>CHT context. The allocated amount of the tribal health plan and CHT in SWAP, has not been used so far by MoHFW. The comment by the JE is not relevant without considering the limits of the SWAP in CHT</p>		<p>Under the SWAp, GIZ had provided support from January 2009-11 in Health, Nutrition and Population Sector Programme of Bangladesh. The World Bank had supported HNPSP: Improving Returns from Capacity Building Investments, Bangladesh from June 2008- January 2009. Similarly, Under HNPSP, seven development partners (DP) pooled their funds into a multi donor trust fund (MDTF) administered by the World Bank. In addition, 10 DPs supported the Programme through parallel funding mechanisms to the health and population section of Bangladesh. The Chittagong Hill Tracts like other districts were included under the programme.</p> <p>Strategic Plan for Health, Population and Nutrition Sector Development Programme (HPNSDP) 2011-2016, is a national programme of Bangladesh for health sectors development that also include CHT like other districts. "The goal of HPNSDP is to ensure quality and equitable health care for all citizens by improving access to and utilization of health, population and nutrition services, and the development objective is to improve both access and utilization of such services, particularly for the poor'. The Chittagong Hill Tracts is not out of national programme.</p> <p>The strategic plan covered the health programme of Bangladesh. Activity provisions of HNSDP are 1) Improving health services in terms of a) Maternal, Neonatal, Child, Reproductive and Adolescent Health; b) Population and Family Planning, c) Nutrition and Food Safety, d) Diseases Control Program s(malaria, leprosy, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS), e) Environmental Health and Climate Change, f) Disease Surveillance, g) Behaviour Change Communication (BCC). The line department of respective health Ministries have has been implementing these activities. So SWAp has been used in almost all cases in CHT.</p>
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				Under the SWAp, Improving service provision includes service providing points like Upazila health System, Union Health and Family Welfare Centre (UHFWC), Community Clinics (CCS) and Secondary and Tertiary health care service is available in CHT which is run by DGH under the ministry of health and family planning. Civil Surgeon is top manager in each district under the Directorate General of Health (DGH). SWAp is used in CHT.
6.4	However, health seeking behaviour, attitudinal and behavioural changes and learned knowledge have not been transformed into practice.	Evidence shows that health seeking behaviours in the intervention areas has significantly improved. Examples: 954 safe deliveries conducted in the community by Skilled birth attendants in 2013 in opposed to no such facilities in 2008(HDC managed health database). Community people who heard about STD/STI increased from 5.4% (2008) to 12.3% in 2012 (Household survey 2013) (Household survey) and Hospital delivery during last pregnancy increased from 3.6% (2008) to 10.2% in 2012 (Household Survey 2013).	Need to justify the comment	Partially agreed and elaborated: The difficulty in having exact figures for analysis is evident in this case. For example, According to the HH Survey knowledge of STD/STI increased from 5.4% (2008) to 12.3% in 2012. But according to HPNSDP in 2009 approximately 46% of the population has heard of HIV and 13% of women have complete information on HIV transmission ⁵⁰ . The House hold Survey data indicates that in use of family planning methods in the CHT increased from 57.2% in 2008 to 72.8% by 2012. Given that the corresponding national contraceptive prevalence rate 56.07 and in 2012 rose to 61.0 the figures from the Household Survey 2013 may need to be viewed with some caution. It would be useful through a survey or the health sector data to compare data on morbidity, MMR, IMR, occurrence of illness, water born diseases, patient outflow in the health institutions, institutional deliveries, CPR etc.
7	2.9 Conclusion-			

	Relevance			
7.1	<p>However the design did not allow sufficiently for an empowerment process to be progressed within the communities nor did it ensure that the <u>capacity building made provision for increased institutional capabilities to be actively incorporated into the CHTDF.</u></p>	<p>Not clear what is meant as it is not clear at all what exactly 'empowerment' means for the JE here and throughout the entire report. This concept (empowerment) must be properly defined. Also capacity development is actually integrated in all program components.</p>	<p>Please explain/modify this information. In particular it would be useful to have a clear view from the start of the meaning of the term 'empowerment' according to the JE.</p>	<p>The view of the ET is that empowerment is a prerequisite for sustainable development, 'pro-poor' growth and indeed peaceful co-existence. "Empowerment (as defined by the World Bank) is the enhancement of assets and capabilities of diverse individuals and groups to function and engage, influence and hold accountable the institutions that affect them. The term empowerment necessarily includes different facets of social, economic and political processes. Economic empowerment is defined as the 'capacity of women and men to participate in, contribute to and benefit from growth processes in ways which recognise the value of their contributions, respect their dignity and make it possible to negotiate a fairer distribution of the benefits of growth. Socially empowered facilitates taking steps to change society so that a person's place is respected and recognised on the terms of that person not on terms dictated by others and politically empowered enables increasing equity of representation in political institutions and enhancing voice of the least vocal so that they can be fully engaged in making the decisions that affect them and the lives of others like them. Definition based on 'Conceptualising Empowerment.... 'Eyben R, Kabeer N Cornwall A 2008 IDS Brighton UK.</p> <p>The ET recognises that capacity development (CD) is an integrated process in all programme components of the CHTDF interventions. But the fact is that 'community empowerment' was somehow not fully achieved as the PDCs still require accompaniment support to be sustainable as inclusive community organizations. There are some improvement in income generation and increase mobility of the community members to the government and other service providing</p>

				<p>offices. However, weaknesses are observed within the communities in organizational factors like political (developing common social 'vision' of the community for their development in long run), organizational (ensuring participatory decision making process where the voice of women, youth, labourer/landless/poorest of the poor, smaller ethnic groups etc are given proper treatment or regards, leadership dynamism), social and economic (mobilizing the enabling agencies UP, UZP, traditional system etc. including improvement of their skill and capacities in participation, management and monitoring community works and channelling resources from public and private sources, linkage building with market chains or systems etc.). So the alternative phrase can be as follows-</p> <p>However the because of the weakness of the design empowerment of the communities could not be ensured fully which is to be progressed that the capacity building made provision for increased institutional capabilities of the communities.</p> <p>Capacity Building in this instance relates directly to the empowerment of individuals and communities to take greater control over their own lives and influence the institutions – government and others - that affect them.</p>
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(8) 3. EFFICIENCY

Sl#	From the Report (copy/paste)	Comments	Action requested (inform/modify/clarify etc...)	
8.1	3.1 Confidence Building	It would have been useful if the JE went further to mention that a key aspect of effective advocacy relates to lobbying many stakeholders, especially the Development Partners and key national actors which require extensive engagement and is not efficient by	Clarify a) whether efficiency is a relevant yardstick when it comes to advocacy and promoting national dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders; b)if yes, then propose concrete alternatives that are more efficient; c) if no, then clearly	Partly agreed. Efficiency is measuring the cost effectiveness and whether resources have been transferred to the planned results in a timely manner. This is assessed in the report. This comment refers more to the outcome level dealt

		definition but builds the relationships required.	recommend that these types of activities should continue.	<p>under effectiveness of the report- (the community based confidence building activities are acknowledged and described on page 34, see also footnote 29 on outcome/output level).</p> <p>Details will be added. According to the Household Survey 2013 'peace dividend' confidence building has been effective as a cross-cutting issue such as gender food security, and overall service delivery, and by increased and between community and government</p> <p>An important role in this regard played the users committees, women groups and services management committees in the area of health and education.</p>
8.2	... the Peace Accord as BNP was the ruling party until the elections in December 2008	BNP ended its period in power in October 2006. It was followed by the Caretaker Government until January 2009 when Awami League took power	Correct the information	<p>Agreed Correction.</p> <p>BNP ended its period in power in October 2006. It was followed by the Caretaker Government until January 2009 when Awami League took power</p>
9	3.2 Capacity Development			
9.1	Efficiency of Institutional Capacity Building: CHTDF has transferred resources into the planned outputs. However,	The report could reference CHTDF approach of having institutions drafting their own institutional capacity development plans and to support with capacity development grants is a highly efficient way of capacity development,	Suggest re-considering the comments	<p>Agreed. To be added after the final sentence:</p> <p>Overall the capacity building programme has achieved the envisaged outputs from the allocated resources. However, there have been some shortfalls in coordination and management, especially with regard to delayed fund delivery hindering timely implementation of project activities</p>

	there have been shortfalls in coordination and management and time consuming administrative procedures that caused delays in project implementation. HDCs stated that money transfers took a long time and that the UNDP regulations for funds disbursement are difficult to handle, as HDCs have to spend 80% of the current installment, before they can send the next funding request.	with very low transaction costs. While comments of HDCs are correct and represent real challenges caused by the flow of funding to the Facility and UNDP accountability framework, these are not issues fundamentally questioning the efficiency or overall quality of CHTDF's CD support. CHTDF has systems in place to process progress reports/requests for instalments within 7 working days which is among the fastest for any development organisation.		according to the HDCs. In addition, the view of respondents is that the UNDP regulations for funds disbursement are difficult to handle since 80% expenditure must be accounted for before the next fund request can be submitted. This caused cash flow shortages and the inability to pay staff salaries on time. A detailed cost benefit analysis could not be conducted during the framework of this evaluation. However, according to the UNDP staff capacity development grants were cost efficient with low transactions costs.
10	3.3 Community Empowerment +QiF			
10.1	BDT 200,000 for each of the new PDCs was often disproportionate in terms of responding to community needs and if the efficient utilisation of resources	Incorrect statement. Except the piloting all communities/PDCs were given tk. 400,000. The report should capture the changes made in the guidelines to give more access to resources by the women. Considering experiences, the guideline is given that the women, who	Modify and correct it with information mentioned	Comment agreed and corrected with additional information. Proposed rephrasing as follows- 'During the pilot phase communities were provided with BDT 300,000, which was later increased to BDT 400,000. According to key respondents interviewed a subsequent instruction was that at least 50% of the 400000 should be available for women-led /managed schemes. The focal communities met by the ET said the amount provided to the PNDG is fully

	was to be optimised.	possess 50% membership in PDC should get access to at least 50% resources.	in the comments .	utilized for women-driven projects. The other 50% are to address community needs as a whole which is regarded as insufficient to meet the needs of a community. A point to note is that the variation in the size of Paras - between 15-200 HHs –means that the standardized allocation some paras are being provided with 10+ times more' investment capital' than others. Consequently, in some instances the amount -BDT 200000 or 400000 represents a relatively large sum to be administered by the PDCs whilst others the sum is less meaningful. To study the use pattern of resources was clearly beyond the scope of this evaluation but would be important to assess prior to implementation of future programmes.
10.2	However, efficiency in utilizing the QIF allocation is low.	It is not clear that how the efficiency is measured here. The objective of providing QIF grants is to support livelihood improvement or income generation. It would be good if the report could give a picture on how the households received benefits out of the QIF grants. According to recent household survey, conducted by renowned research organization, income of the HH increased by 19.3% comparing to the baseline of 2008. (Source: Household Survey in the CHT 2013)	Need to modify it otherwise explain and justify the statement on lack of efficiency by adding proper data and relative sources.	Partially Agreed. The ET is aware that according to the Household Survey that in the 5 years householder incomes have increased by 19.3% since 2008. However, to attribute this only to QIF would not necessarily be correct. There are likely to be a number of other factors both related to CHTDF and others and include agriculture/food security, bee keeping, mushroom growing and others mentioned at the HH survey report. It is also important to note that increase in HH incomes do not indicate equity of benefits. Efficiency with regard to utilization of QiF is observed as low because the collectively purchased resources for example cattle, were in many cases divided up between some members of the communities. Whilst this may have meant efficiency gains for those individuals the issue of equity of benefits and thus the overall efficiency as a peace 'joiner' is questionable.
10.3	According to the programme implementing NGOs only about 31% to 40%	Not clear how this was measured and what data sources were used. It would be good if more explanation is given how it is defined as "active" and "fund	More explanation is required	Additional explanation provided. The ET has further investigated the efficiency of QiF utilization by mailing all programme implementing NGOs to provide efficiency status information on respective PDCs. The NGOs conducted study meetings with their CEP

<p>of PDCs are active and able to utilize funds efficiently.</p>	<p>utilization efficiency". The project is being implemented in the area where higher rate of illiteracy prevails strongly. The JE continuously seem to overstate only one element of sustainability of the CEP that is the continued existence of PDCs as organisations, and does not sufficiently address other forms for sustainability in the form of the communities' continued ability to take collective action (organising around issues rather than in PDC) and political capacity to claim responsiveness from government institutions.</p>	<p>how it is defined as "active" and "fund utilization efficiency" . And also include data sources in the report.</p>	<p>teams to assess the status of PDCs. (nov 2013) The results from 13 of the 20 Upazillas(65% of the CHTDF Upazillas) made available to the ET. The results indicate that 46% of the PDCs utilize funds efficiently, 30% required more/continuing support and 24% that are non-functional PDCs . do not utilize funds for the purpose intended at all.</p> <p>It is recognised that The project is being implemented in the area where there are low literacy rates – and acknowledge by the ET as a limiting factor.</p> <p>The ET in recognising potential limitations from NGOs with regard to activeness of PDC's they have assessed 'active' using eight indicators. They are i) Regular Activity ii) Have ownership on the PDC and its properties, iii) maintain regular records iv) Deposit savings regularly v) No major allegation of misuse of funds, vi) Transparent financial management, vii) Own substantive assets, viii) have adopted a sustainability plan. PDCs that fulfil these criteria are considered 'efficient' by the programme implementing NGOs.</p> <p>Other forms of sustainability have been discussed in the 'sustainability' section of this Report but include 'communities continue collective action (organising around issues not just PDC) and are able – through increased 'voice' to claim responsiveness from government and other institutions without paying 'conveyance' and other so-called 'relevant costs' ('Anushongik Khoroch') for such services. (Often demanded by government line departments for the provision of services)</p> <p>On PDCs and PNDGs.</p> <p>The ET assumption is that the PDC's and PNDGs were formed as a fundamental part of CHTDF for enabling community empowerment. It is assumed that the groups were promoted and developed to have a life</p>
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				beyond that of project specific purpose. The PDCs and PNDGs have the capacity to represent groups of people bound by a common purpose and dedicated to achieving specific objectives. If the PDCs and PNDGs disintegrate so too common purpose and a potential weakening of (the potential for)community empowerment the promotion of equity of agency and more sustainable livelihoods for all will be affected. If these organizations were not formed for this purpose why were they formed?
10.4	However, efficiency in utilizing the QIF allocation is low. According to the programme implementing NGOs only about 31% to 40% of PDCs are active and able to utilize funds efficiently and the Community Empowerment Process (CEP) Cluster demonstrates an even lower rate of 30%.	The statement of referring CEP Cluster on “efficiency of PDCs” is not correct. There was no discussion about efficiency of PDCs between JE member and CHTDF (CEP&ED cluster). The team member asked CEP&ED cluster about ideas for “how many PDCs can continue without any external support” (specifying ‘if CHTDF or other partners were not here’). In other words, JE member asked about sustainability but here the report is stating the figure for efficiency. In regard to sustainability, it was referred that about 40-50 percent PDCs will sustain without any external support and this figure will increase with minimum external support (ADB’s project is working with 600 PDCs, FFS in 1800 PDCs, ABDI and MDG activities engage about 1000 PDCs). In terms of ‘functionality’ the Cluster clarified that at least 80% of PDCs remain functional at this moment – after	Reflect correct information in report.	<p>Agreed corrected-</p> <p>To conduct a comprehensive investigation of fund utilization was obviously beyond the scope of this evaluation and an output to purpose review should be carried out.</p> <p>However efficiency in utilizing the QIF according to the programme implementing NGOs is only about 46%</p> <p>In terms of sustainability the Community Empowerment Cluster referred that about 40-50 percent PDCs will sustain without any external support and this figure will increase with minimum external support (ADB’s project is working with 600 PDCs, FFS in 1800 PDCs, ABDI and MDG activities engage about 1000 PDCs).</p> <p>In terms of ‘functionality’ the Cluster perceived that at least 80% of PDCs will remain functional after the departure of partner NGOs in September 2013.</p> <p>Regarding ‘efficiency of PDCs’ – all the PDCs utilized their resources as per the plans and received expected benefits (regarding benefit, the independent HH survey can be referred) as per the cluster.</p> <p>According to the cluster the current situation of the PDCs are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Savings programme (outside QIF grants) for all 3257 PDCs

		<p>the departure of partner NGOs in September 2013.</p> <p>Regarding 'efficiency of PDCs' – all the PDCs utilized their resources as per the plans and received expected benefits (regarding benefit, the independent HH survey can be referred).</p> <p>The bellow information, which were shared with evaluation team, may help to get an idea about current situation of the PDCs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Savings programme (outside QIF grants) for all 3257 PDCs continuing – refers to functionality. • Currently 1400 PDCs have bank balances more than Tk. 50,000 – apart from PDC assets and individual HH benefits received from QIF grants. • Most of the PDCs have assets average value is equivalent to QIF grants value. • 1700+ PDCs have rice banks with increased rice stock and it is expected that more than 90% rice banks will be continuing long. 		<p>continuing – refers to functionality.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Currently 1400 PDCs have bank balances more than Tk. 50,000 – apart from PDC assets and individual HH benefits received from QIF grants. • Most of the PDCs have assets average value is equivalent to QIF grants value. • 1700+ PDCs have rice banks with increased rice stock and it is expected that more than 90% rice banks will be continuing long. <p>These are indicators of stimulants to group activity and may generally seen as positive.</p> <p>However, if the purpose of forming PDCs was to provide an organizational base to stimulate an empowering process then caution needs to be heeded before assuming that all activity is positive activity. The examples given eg 'ADB project working with 600 PDCs' does not necessarily confirm the claim of functionality in terms of PDC purpose but rather one of utilization by a contracting agent.</p> <p>Secondly, the poorest sector of some communities were excluded from membership and others can no longer be considered members which obviously questions the status of current 'membership' of those PDCs.</p> <p>Similarly, the claim that all 3257 PDCs have savings may be correct but what is important is who has access and control over those savings?</p> <p>Rice banks undoubtedly have the potential to contribute to improved access to food at community level and are recognised as a valuable investment.</p> <p>However, not everyone has the capacity to generate surpluses and it is inevitable that surplus producers benefit disproportionately. This issue – utilization of QiFs - maybe misplaced under 'efficiency ' and can be dealt with better under 'sustainability'.</p>

10.5	CE graph 2 : PDC Categories : by district (Category: A, B, C)	<p>Actually, we did a very basic assessment few years back through PNGOs where the methodology was not followed properly. We just asked about the perception of Community Facilitators to get an idea on the current (that time) PDCs' performance. We are not sure, whether ET is referring that assessment. If it is the case, that assessment should not be referred here for two genuine reasons – (i) methodology is questionable and (ii) it is already few years and should not be referred for current situation.</p> <p>After that basic assessment, CHTDF did not conduct any assessment yet to categorize PDCs in this way.</p>	<p>As the reference mentioned in the evaluation report is PNGO database, please indicate the time when PNGO collected this information.</p> <p>If it is the very basic assessment that said in the comments, should not be referred in this report.</p>	<p>This information was collected and analyzed by the programme implementing NGOs in November 2013. So we can assume it as latest information. The process of collection of this information is given in the previous response (feedback no 10.2).</p> <p>For future purpose to rate the PDCs a 'Minimum Conditions and Performance Measurement, linking with the increased or decreased funding level to the PDC according to its scoring under MCPM might be usefully employed..</p>
10.6	15% in Bandarban, 18% in Khagrachari and 35% in Rangamati have already dissolved or abandoned their community interventions.	What are the sources of this information?	Include proper data sources.	<p>Source and criteria provided.Source: Information provided by programme implementing NGOs. The term 'dissolved or abandoned' means that PDCs have one or more of the following characteristics 1) No Unity/exclusion, 2) substantial misappropriation of funds 3) Lack of social/organizational awareness 4) no regular activity, 5) strong (party) political motivation and bias 6) No sense of ownership 7) no democratic leadership, 8) no activity/ organizational life</p>
10.7	CE table 1 : Duration of PNGO contracts	This is not correct. Partner NGOs were selected through 3 different competitive processes – in 2004, 2005 and 2010.	Correct this informati	<p>Partly agree.</p> <p>This issue is not one of whether the process is generalised or not but essentially one of the status of 'Partnership' The point made by all</p>

		Few of them were successful in all 3 steps. Therefore, this should not be generalised.	on.	contracted NGOs is that they were treated as contractors rather than Partners and that the terms and conditions of the contracts were unreliable and created many difficulties especially for forward planning by the PNGOs. Instead of generalizing the situation we can say 'some NGOs have faced this situation'. So the description of the table can be- The table 1 (Duration of the contracts of some PNGO) shows the contract flows of the project- Accordingly the title of the table also can be- "CE table 1 : Example of the Duration of some PNGO contracts"
10.8	The JE has noted from different sources that the PDCs and PNDGs were not given adequate time to analyse area-specific problems or develop their 'community-driven' small-scale projects.	The statement is not correct. If the evaluation mission would analyse the time between PDC formation / mobilization works and QIF grant disbursement – would get clearer picture that how much time was given for mobilization and capacity development of the PDCs. Usually, this gap is about 6 months – before the PDC/community started utilizing the QIF grants. In addition, NGOs were also given flexibility to decide on the capacity development needs and taking action accordingly – even, without informing CHTDF involving therefore significant internal discussion within communities which the JE seems to have ignored totally. However, the evaluation mission missed the point to capture that how the NGOs responded to the needs.	Suggest re-considering this information/comment	Statement of fact and source provided. The meeting of the ET with NGO executives (organized by CHTDF) provided this information. They claimed that insufficient time was provided and that PDCs needed more time to assimilate opportunities for organizational and economic development, to understand and assess the process of community empowerment such as analysis of area-specific problems skills and capacity enhancement, , develop their 'community-driven' small-scale projects, and development of sustainable strategies etc. and could have been more sustainable in terms of aspects if the PDCs and PNDGs are given adequate time
11	3.5 Education			

11.1	The education programme was initially implemented in partnership with NGOs but later handed over to HDCs.	Education program is implemented in partnership with NGOs and HDCs. HDCs have the responsibility for <i>provision</i> as per the Peace Accord and subsequent laws of Bangladesh and engage NGOs in <i>production</i> of the services. Where HDCs had the main management function and NGOs were engaged in community mobilization.	Modify this information.	Comment Accepted and amended. The education programme was implemented by CHTDF in 'partnership' with NGOs and HDCs.
11.2	Progress monitoring and reporting of CHTDF schools has not yet been integrated into the government line department	Not correct, Out of 300 CHTDF supported schools, 23 are Government Primary Schools (GPS) and 37 are Registered Non-government Primary schools (RNGPS)-these have been fully integrated into the government system. In addition, students from the CHTDF supported Non-govt. Primary School (NGPS) attended in the Primary School Certificate (PSC) Examination since 2011. In 2011, a total of 999 students from CHTDF supported schools participated in PSC examination and passing rate was 96%,In 2012, a total of 1,380 students participated in PSC examination and passing rate was 92%,In 2013, a total of 1,110 students from CHTDF supported schools participated in PSC examination and passing rate was 95%,	Correct and modify this information.	<p>Clarification of statement provided.</p> <p>This issue is related to integration of CHTDF established schools in the progress monitoring and reporting system. CHTDF supported schools including 23 government primary schools and 37 register non-government primary schools and those are integrated into progress monitoring and reporting. These schools are primarily run by the government with support from CHTDF , but the bulk of the schools 240 established and supported by CHTDF are not included in the progress monitoring and reporting system of District Primary Education-the line department of education.</p> <p>As a result, Monitoring information datasheet developed by line department of CHTDF established schools is not available in the District primary Education department office as those schools do not report to DPEO as per their format.</p>

11.3	CHTDF supported schools report directly to HDC and therefore the Department of Education (DoE) at district level does not assume responsibility or ownership or integrate them into the district primary education system.	Not correct and unsubstantiated conclusion. Line departments in general are supportive to integrate CHTDF supported community schools in the district primary education system.	Modify this information.	<p>Statement modified.</p> <p>The ET accepts that the major obstacles for including schools in the nationalization framework are at national and at policy level. However because CHTDF established and supported Schools report directly to HDC the department of education (DoE) at the district level does not assume responsibility or ownership, or integrate them into the district primary education system. Due to non-aligned management of schools run by CHTDF with Government line department e.g., DoE, ownership of CHTDF school by line department remain untied and they do not feel accountable on those schools.</p>
11.4	From the 300 schools established/renovated under CHTDF, 231 have applied for nationalization but DoE have not accepted any schools as their criteria has not been met.	Incorrect. 233 Schools applied for nationalization. 5 included in the 2nd phase of nationalization and another 18 have been primarily selected to be placed for 3rd phase nationalization. The focus on schools not being 'accepted' by DoE of the JE sets aside the Peace Accord and laws of Bangladesh. The government has transferred Functions to the HDCs but not yet allocated the Finances (in this case ensuring that HDC managed schools can access funding within the 'nationalization' framework). Government has agreed with PA/laws on a special approach to CHT, including an education system led by CHT government institutions and CHT specific criteria but DoE controls all	Correct this by addressing information mentioned in the comments.	<p>Accepted and revised</p> <p>From the 300 schools established/renovated under CHTDF, 233 have applied for nationalization but DoE did not accept any schools in the first phase as their criteria was not met. Subsequently 5 schools were accepted in the second phase of nationalization and another 18 have been identified for inclusion for the third phase nationalization.</p> <p>According to the PA and existing laws of Bangladesh, the government has transferred 'functions' to the HDCs but not yet allocated the 'finance' as if HDC managed schools can access funding within the 'nationalization' framework.</p> <p>The government has agreed with PA laws, the special approach to CHT - including an education system led by CHT government institutions and CHT specific criteria- but the DoE still controls all national funding and disqualifies schools based on national criteria i.e. <i>Number of students in schools and ownership of land by schools</i> which schools in the CHT cannot possibly comply with.</p> <p>Since education is a transferred department to HDCs the DOE should be under the control of HDC which has not happened to date. As a result, non-</p>

		national funding and disqualifies schools based on national criteria (i.e. Number of students in schools which CHT schools cannot possibly meet).		aligned management of CHTDF schools with regard to the line department is still a challenge to the provision of education in CHT.
11.5	From the 300 schools established/renovated under CHTDF, 231 have applied for nationalization but DoE have not accepted any schools as their criteria has not been met. <u>The criteria was that if any students of the school attended for PSC examination in 2012,</u>	<p>This is not the only criteria; also land ownership amongst others is an issue. Overall criteria for nationalization do discriminate against schools in CHT. CHTDF is supporting MoCHTA and HDCs to address these issues.</p> <p>Again, the focus on 'accept' of DoE by the JE sets aside the institutional set-up for education in CHT as per the Peace Accord and laws of Bangladesh (see previous comment).</p>	Correct the information.	<p>Accepted in part.</p> <p>Whilst the initial statement is largely correct the non acceptance – as the Comment states is was for a number of different reasons and the statement will be corrected . Suggest 'From the 300 schools established/renovated under CHTDF, 233 have applied for nationalization but the DoE did not accept any schools in the first phase as the criteria such as - certain number of student, school ownership of land , attendance of students in PSC examination in 2012,etc had not been met. However, the criteria of number of students and land ownership is difficult for schools in the CHT to meet.</p> <p>The criteria for nationalization of primary schools is followed irrespective area, but for CHT area there should have revised attainable criteria and this should be taken up by HDCs should with the ministry of Primary and Mass Education. If it is not possible to resolve through negotiation and advocacy a Taskforce ⁽⁵¹⁾ should be formed to review the implementation process and rules for nationalization of schools necessary for the CHT to expedite the nationalization process.</p>
11.6	Multilingual Education (MLE) educational materials and are not always consistent with the National Curriculum and the Textbook (NCTB)	MLE tools are supplementary to NCTB curriculum, hence not in contradiction.	Modify this information.	<p>Clarification given.</p> <p>The argument is MLE materials are not always consistent with national curriculum because the MLE curriculum was developed before the NCTB curriculum so there was no scope of making consistent with non-existence one.</p>

⁵¹ Reference Clause A (kha)-3 of Peace Accord

	curriculum and the bridging process remains unclear.			
11.7	Interestingly, 600 people have been part of 39 exposure visits within the areas but the visits rarely contributed to the improvement of the education system in respective areas. Replication of learned and proved knowledge is the key issue and exposure visits could be an opportunity for sharing experiences with an established format and method of recording ideas.	We have observed quite some improvements after exposure visits as: schools starting saving programs, community contribution to cleaning of schools, fencing of school boundaries. Replication of lesson learned like joyful learning approach with group sittings was also observed. CHTDF believes that while limitations exist for international study tours, peer learning between communities within the CHT and (to a lesser extent) between CHT and villages in the plains, is an effective and efficient way of developing capacity. If not able to conduct an actual assessment of the impact of peer learning for education in CHT, the JE could review CHTDF documents and the studies on peer learning processes more widely in Bangladesh (e.g. generally for UzPs and Ups).	Modify this information or present evidence of statements made	Agreed. Information modified. Exposure visits(39) were organised for a total of 600 people. The visits contributed to the improvement of the education system to some extent in respective areas. However, the ET considers that if a more structured learning and sharing of experiences with an established format and recording ideas was used this would make replication of lessons learned more effective. Community involvement in school activities include saving programmes, community contributions to cleaning, boundary fencing as well as joyful learning with group sitting arrangement are activities carried out by the community.
11.8	The information system of the CHTDF schools is not shared with the DPEO office	While there is scope for improvement of involvement of line departments, the project observed a good number of positive signs as community schools	Modify this by addressing	Comments considered and elaborated. According to the DPEO's interviewed by the ET the CHTDF – often referred to as 'UNDP Schools' do not make reports available to them and information flows in general are lacking. This is of concern because it

	<p>indicating that the system is not working. The line department is supposed to supervise all schools within the catchment areas but during discussion, the staff of line departments termed schools run by CHTDF as “UNDP Schools” and had no information about them. Generally, line department officials consider government and non-government schools as “their schools” while schools run by CHTDF is not.</p>	<p>visited by line departments, provision of free school books, UEO attending monthly coordination meetings with teachers, and students participating in Primary School Certificate (PSC) Examination.</p> <p>Number of visits conducted by the Government line department official (DPEO and A/UEO) to CHTDF supported schools: 2009: 95 visits, 2010: 91 visits, 2011: 210 visits, 2012: 150 visits and 2013: 156 visits. Source: CHTDF Education Annual Report 2012 and CHTDF Education Periodic database 2013).</p> <p>Again, the JE sets aside the Peace Accord and laws of Bangladesh when referring to whether DPEO consider as ‘their schools’. CHTDF operates in consistence with the PA and laws, and by doing so it lends support to the implementation of the Accord.</p>	<p>information mentioned in the comments.</p>	<p>indicates a lack of cooperation and coordination. This situation is clearly contrary to the spirit of the Peace Accord and laws of Bangladesh and is something to be aware of and concerned about because the schools are not being monitored in accordance with the line departments requirements. According to CHTDF government line department official (DPEO and A/UEO) visits to CHTDF supported schools were as follows: 2009: 95 visits, 2010: 91 visits, 2011: 210 visits, 2012: 150 visits and 2013: 156 visits. (CHTDF Education Annual Report 2012 and CHTDF Education Periodic database 2013). As indicated by these figures visits were not made to every school in any year between 2009 – 2013.</p> <p>The ET also recognises that the UEO at the Upazila level has a duty to visit community schools and occasional visits by line department personnel to primary schools is normal practice and that the distribution of free books is also mandatory. Also that all schools which are permitted by the education department to conduct lessons are eligible to hold Primary Schools in Certificate examination for their students.</p> <p>Since education is a ‘transferred subject’ to HDC the line department should be responsible to oversee all education but in the CHTDF established and supported schools this is not working satisfactorily.</p>
12	3.6 Health			
12.1	<p>The health programme was planned to be implemented in 22 Upazilas out of 25 and provide services to</p>	<p>Here doctors include mobile medical team, CSBA.</p>	<p>Reflect this in the report.</p>	<p>Agreed. The comments are accepted and text revised.</p> <p>The health programme was planned to be implemented in 22 Upazilas out of 25 and provide services to 3,000,000 people and 60,000 pregnant mothers through mobile medical team and CSBA.</p>

	3,000,000 cases and 60,000 pregnant mothers through doctors and CHSWs.			
12.2	However, it covered only 15 Upazilas and treated 1,729,498 patients which is about 57.5 of the target. The 25,241 pregnant mothers received healthcare which is about 42 percent of the target.	Figures from RTPP are indicative, not accurate planning figures.		Information contained in the Report clarified and reference given. The figures are not from RTPP, it from the CHTDF Project Review Report: February, 2013. The review report considered this figure as target and made comparison with the achievement. As both RTPP and Project Review used and presented same data, so it would be more consistent to use the data used by Project Review team.
12.3	In each month, more than 23000 people participate in health education sessions conducted by the CSHW, but the results are intangible.	Evidence shows that health seeking behaviors in the intervention areas has significantly improved. Examples: 954 safe deliveries conducted in the community by Skilled birth attendants in 2013 in opposed to no such facilities in 2008 ((HDC managed health database). *Community people who heard about STD/STI increased from 5.4% (2008) to 12.3% in 2012 (Household survey)* Uses of Family Planning Methods increased from 57.2% (2008) to 72.8% in 2012 (Household survey) and Hospital delivery during last pregnancy increased from 3.6% (2008) to 10.2% in 2012 (Household survey).	Reflect this in the report.	Partially Accepted The use of the term 'intangible' is incorrect and will be changed. However, in accepting the outcomes of health seeking behaviour provided –'954 safe deliveries conducted in the community by Skilled birth attendants in 2013 in opposed to no such facilities in 2008 ((HDC managed health database). Community people who heard about STD/STI increased from 5.4% (2008) to 12.3% in 2012 (Household survey)Uses of Family Planning Methods increased from 57.2% (2008) to 72.8% in 2012 (Household survey) and Hospital delivery during last pregnancy increased from 3.6% (2008) to 10.2% in 2012 it is not evident to what extent the behavioural change is as a result of CHTDF and secondly the efficiency of some of the examples provided such as the 'people who heard about STD/STI increased from 5.4% (2008) to 12.3% (2012)' does not appear very effective or efficient. It is also a fact that other agencies are sometimes working in the same areas and attribution to CHTDF is not assured.

12.4	The CEP monitoring data shows that only 14 percent households have safe sanitation.	This is mainly caused by inadequate government services in provision of safe water, which is beyond the scope of CHTDF programme. CHTDF does not have any specific intervention on water and sanitation but aware PDC/PNDG members through regular awareness sessions through PNGOs. WATSAN is a core mandate of UNICEF.	Modify this information.	The comment does not contest the assertion there is no need for any modification.
12.5	So bypassing water and sanitation education makes health education inefficient and partly meaningless.	Health education and diseases prevention is the parts and parcel of the programme. It achieved significant results also. Relevant information have given in above already.	Modify this information.	Agreed. Information modified. The use of the term 'bypassing' is not appropriate and will be changed. The efficiency of health education would normally be judged in relation to actions implemented in concert with that information. The point emphasised is that access to clean drinking water and sanitation is essential to good health. In the absence of government action and given the enhanced savings of all the PDCs it might be reasonable to expect that in taking more control over their own lives that aware communities would make efforts to initiate necessary corrective action and help provide these essentials. The CHTDF health programme covered both curative and prevention health services and CHSW arranged health education session to make people aware. According to the comments (12.6) although CHTDF did not assume a mandate for a large scale sectoral programme, 240330 health education session has been conducted. In spite of this attention on preventive health - safe water and sanitation- seem to have been relegated and is viewed as a weakness of project design since in hard to reach areas like CHT where timely curative health service delivery is even less available preventive health care is at a premium.
12.	Either the low	Problems lie with inadequate supply of	Modify	Fuller explanation of statement provided .

6	sanitation standards indicates that the benefits of clean water and sanitation is not covered in the health education sessions or the training is so inefficient that it could not influence and change the behaviour of people.	WATSAN services in CHT. CHTDF has not been given the mandate for a large scale 'sectoral' programme.	this information.	According to Comment (5.2) CHTDF conducted 240,330 health education sessions between December 2008 to December 2013 which included sanitation and personal hygiene with others. Despite these sessions only 14 percent households have safe sanitation coverage. It is argued that the effectiveness of those sessions is questionable since a very minimal outcome in sanitation was achieved in spite of its fundamental importance to personal good health and public health.
12.7	The Civil Surgeon is the top manager in each of the HDCs but the design and operational modalities of CHTDF have been ignored and the network and strengths in the line department have been built on.	Civil Surgeon is not part of HDC, however Civil Surgeon is reporting to HDCs. MoHFW was fully involved in design of the program. Improvements can be made in having CS to take more responsibilities in managing the CHTDF supported health services, and government action to enforce accountability to HDCs is also needed.	Correct this information.	Comments accepted and text revised . The Civil Surgeon is the senior manager at district level and accountable to the line department in terms of planning, budgeting, managing the of MH&FP programme and reporting to the HDCs. The design and operational modalities of CHTDF health programme is not aligned with line department but managed by the HDCs. So although the line department have a strong resource network the CHTDF programme is prevented from making optimum use due to this non-alignment.
12.8	The fact that the Ministry of Health has approved the budget for the salary of CHSWs through MoCHTA is the most positive improvement in CHTDF health programme.	This statement supports the previous comment.		The comments partially support the arguments. Actually it is not always the result of involvement of line department in designing the programme rather it result of advocacy campaign and negotiation of CHTDF with respective ministries. CHTDF negotiated and facilitated several inter ministerial meeting and approval of the budget for salary of CHSW is result of such repeated negotiation and facilitation of the process.

13	3.7 Agriculture and Food Security			
13.1	Smaller percentages of trainees (16%) have benefitted from non-land based activities training on horticulture, mushroom growing and bee keeping.	Not sure, how 16% is calculated. Cattle rearing, poultry and pig rearing is also non-land based training.	Please explain how it was calculated.	Reference provided. The calculation is directly taken from the Result Assessment Report of AFSP of CHTDF (ref page 36 of the report). The sentence will be- The percentage of trainees benefitted from training in non-conventional schemes such as horticulture, mushroom growing and bee keeping is given as 16%.
14	3.9 Conclusion Efficiency			
14.1	Due to the political situation and staff shortages there was a period 2005 -2009 when efficiency was low.	We are not aware on any staff shortages. Any sources? Not sure how mission concludes efficiency was low. You need to take into consideration difficult geographical conditions as well. What is the basis for saying 'low efficiency' in 2005-9?	Modify this information.	Agreed . Statement withdrawn.

4. EFFECTIVENESS

15	4.1 Confidence Building			
15.1	<u>On the International level</u>	As the chair of the LCG on CHT, UNDP/CHTDF does more than raise awareness, it sets the agenda and supports the DPs (e.g. provision of briefing papers and talking points) in taking forward the implementation of the Accord so that all key DPs,	Suggest modifying by incorporating this information.	Agreed. To be added in summarized form as part of the listing. Agree to revise with UNDP has recently established a UN CHT Task Force to formulate the UN joint framework for

		<p>their diplomatic missions and their governments are focusing on the same issues and raising the same points. This makes for effective advocacy and has shown results by getting the Govt. to go further on the CHT Land Act amendment process that it initially set out to do; and on lobbying the MoHFW to finance CHT HDC-managed health services from its own budget (Tribal Health Plan).</p> <p>The JE is incorrect re the objective of the UN CHT Task force which is to formulate the UN joint framework for future programs in CHT rather than streamline and coordinate current programs (although the latter could be a result of the task team's interactions). Certainly, as a result of the UN CHT Task team, there is a greater level of understanding of the specific characteristics of CHT, e.g. post-conflict, political situation, governance arrangements, ecological concerns and IP rights - for many UN colleagues from other UN agencies, this is the first time that they are getting this level of information and having to formulate their own programing accordingly so this has been effective.</p>	<p>Suggest correcting and provide the additional information</p>	<p>future programmes in CHT. However, not all the UN organizations working in the CHT are currently part of the proposed UN joint framework.</p>
15.2	•	<p>A further example of CHTDF's effectiveness in raising attention, successful advocacy and coordinating UN agencies/DPs on CHT as well as responding to significant developments in CHT was the response to the communal attacks in Taindong (August 3 2013). CHTDF raised awareness within UNDP about the urgency, liaised with all the first-responder agencies (HCTT, Red Cross, Red</p>	<p>Suggest modifying by adding information in comments to the section on Effectiveness at the International and National levels.</p>	<p>Agreed. Will be added accordingly in a summarized form in the listing as bullet point.</p> <p>A further example of CHTDF's effectiveness in raising awareness, successful advocacy and coordinating DPs on CHT as well as responding to significant developments in CHT was the response to the communal attacks in Taindong (August 3 2013). CHTDF raised awareness within UNDP</p>

		Crescent), and proposed a joint UN recovery needs assessment with MoCHTA to identify recovery needs. The support provided to MoCHTA and the UN presence on the ground had a positive effect, resulted in greater attention from the Govt., specifically the Prime Minister's Office because the Prime Minister's Advisor visited Taindong during the joint recovery assessment and met with members of the team) and resulted in more recovery assistance from the PMO, Govt., FAO and CHTDF.		about the urgency and liaised with HCTT, Red Cross, Red Crescent. The subsequent support provided to MoCHTA had a positive effect, resulted in greater attention from the Govt., The Prime Minister's Office Advisor visited Taindong .
15.3	•	Positive inter-agency "spill-over" has also resulted in a more synergistic and focused approach on food security in CHT from FAO and WFP the relevant technical agencies in the new Joint UN Framework for future programming in CHT.	Suggest modifying by adding this to Effectiveness at the "International level.	Welcome as the positive development is, it is difficult to know whether 'spill-over' is indeed responsible for 'a more synergistic and focused approach on food security in the CHT from FAO...'The FAO Technical Report 'Support to Preparation of an Integrated Project for Environment Friendly Agriculture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (March 2013) is a very valuable Report but predates the UN Framework for future programming in the CHT and in acknowledging past work of CHTDF seems not to suggest any collaborative programming through the Facility.
15.4	•	Both of the examples above illustrate CHTDF's effectiveness in raising awareness, planning, coordinating and implementing rapid response (given the usual constraints) CHT initiatives. CHTDF's convening power/capacity which others draw on has not been sufficiently captured by the JE report.	Suggest modifying by adding additional information at the international level.	Not agreed. The report outlines very clearly ...'that CHTDF has become an important vehicle to advocate for the interests of IPs etc. ...
15.5	•	At the international level, CHTDF also worked effectively with other CHT-related organisations. Using its own channels, CHTDF was also be able to selectively and effectively raise international	Suggest modifying – add information	Agreed to add additional information. Lobbying on the Land Commission Act and MOHFW has already been stated in 'Comment 1'- and will be added.

		awareness on key issues such as financing HDC-managed health services through the MOHFW (when funding by DPs ended) and the amendment of the CHT Land Act when the rare opportunity of a meeting between Lord Avebury (CHT Commission Chair who is well-respected in Bangladesh) and the Prime Minister's Advisor presented itself. Lord Avebury's discreet and effective advocacy received a positive Govt. response, particularly on health funding. However there are some concerns about engaging with international stakeholders who are also critics of the govt. so the advantages of collaborating with these stakeholders need to be emphasized in the JE.		
15.6	<u>On the national level</u>	As part of its advocacy outreach, CHTDF also developed good relationships with key senior journalists and editors leading to more reporting and editorials on CHT developments raising national awareness on CHT. Some national stakeholders, including from the media, may also be characterized as critics so as with international stakeholders, it would be useful if the JE can point out that the advantages of working with credible stakeholders with a good record on CHT/minority issues outweigh the occasional discomfort of govt. counterparts.	Add information and recommendation.	Agreed. Will be added in a summarized form in the listing and recommendations As part of its advocacy outreach, CHTDF also developed relationships with journalists and editors leading to more reporting and editorials on CHT developments and raising greater national awareness on CHT
15.7	<u>On the district and community level</u>	On response to communal violence, e.g. Taindong, the JE overlooks what constitutes effectiveness. No recovery/relief initiative can help any community regain confidence when it faces significant insecurity, including lack of response from security forces in the	Add information and clarify.	Not agreed. According to HDC Khargarchari there was no evidence that CHTDF engagement has led to a greater attention by authorities

	<p>face of attacks. The fact that CHTDF/UN remained engaged after the emergency/relief phase and focused on the lack of response from security agencies resulted in greater attention being paid to this issue, in terms of follow-up by the various authorities.</p>		
15.8	<p>By saying that “The program is applying a conflict sensitive approach with regard to the settlers/indigenous population conflict by integrating both groups into the program and then saying that “recent violent incidents in 2012 between settlers and IPs in Rangamati and Taindong shows that CHTDF’s influence on confidence building and sustainable peace at the local level is ineffective”, the JE is wrong on 2 counts. First, CHTDF does not apply conflict sensitivity by integrating IPs and settlers in its program. The JE does not distinguish between the various types of “conflict sensitive”, “do no harm” and conflict prevention approaches that exist in the current program. It could be argued that Conflict Prevention in CHT will only be possible when the Accord is fully implemented, including restoration of land to legitimate owners and users based on the laws that apply to CHT. There are real and valid concerns that actively integrating settlers in UNDP programs which some might argue creates social cohesion and is a balanced approach favouring both IP and settler communities, is in fact doing harm because the status of many settlers is still in question. By “involving” settlers in CHT development</p>	<p>Correct and address the inter-related set of issues that the comments highlight and clarify the different approaches that CHTDF’s adopts in order to address the conundrum posed by the presence of the settler population which for the most part undermines the CHT Accord.</p>	<p>Partly agreed and interrelated set of issues addressed. CHTDF has made efforts to apply a conflict sensitive approach, but the common approach encompassing the principle of inclusive is not wholly applicable to the CHT as the main conflict between settlers and IPs is uneven in structure: The IP population is the most vulnerable group and disadvantaged by the settlers illegally occupying their land backed by the security forces. In this special case the PA would be undermined if the illegal settlers are given equal access and integrated into a programme designed to support the disadvantaged IP population. However, according to the CHTDF director, the governmental institutions pressed for integration of the settlers as a pre-condition for programme implementation. UNDP compromised in favour of the programme with regard to health and community empowerment components. In the first phase the settler communities were equally covered but later CHTDF set neutral criteria of vulnerability being equally applied to the IP and settlers population such as lack of service(s) delivery and remoteness. Since the settlers are mainly located in the plain lands with better access to resources the criteria means that participation in the community empowerment programmes is mainly IP population. Given the CHT context this is a pragmatic</p>

		<p>programs, it could be argued that development programs are actually legitimizing illegal settlers - the JE could have been more helpful in identifying the level of involvement that would “do no harm” but not reject settlers outright either. At the very least, the JE could acknowledge that this is a very real concern in doing development and implementing the Accord in CHT. CHTDF has done this effectively in its health interventions (where settler communities are covered) as well as its criteria for coverage in other interventions emphasizing poverty levels and lack of services available (where settler communities are less involved). This is politically sensitive and very hard to do; the JE could be very useful in articulating this dilemma and explaining why promoting conventional social cohesion interventions would not apply to CHT.</p>	<p>solution that keeps all stakeholders on board at the same time as ensuring continuing programme implementation. Although the approach of considering the interests of all parties is something of a compromise there is no negative programmatic impacts on the IPs The integration of settlers into the CHTDF has created grievances among the IP communities and mistrust towards UN and is seen as legitimizing the settlers and undermining the PA. The mistrust is reinforced because the IP communities are not very well informed on the selection criteria.</p> <p>In order to minimize these negative impacts it is recommended that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) CHTDF should do further research to identify additional specific selection criteria for programme participation characterizing the disadvantaged living conditions of the IP population, which are not valid for the settlers to the same extent (e.g. lack of Bengali language skills or illiteracy that could be a disadvantage in case of a future legal assistance component.) By this a high proportion of the IP population in the programme could be justified by neutral criteria in the future. 2) A clear communication strategy indicating the selection criteria and political pre-conditions that discriminate in favour of the IP population vis a vis settler groups with regard to programme participation. (See recommendation already in the report) 3) CHDF, the partnering Donors, the UN senior management should negotiate strongly with the government and advocate for a programme in favour of the IP population towards a minimal participation of settler communities referring to the
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				<p>political context of the PA and the past human rights violations . The UN Resolution on Indigenous People is also a solid basis to argue for a stronger pro-indigenous population approach in the next programme. In addition the leverage could be increased by including it on the agenda for raising awareness through partnering NGOs, media and international stakeholders such as CHT Commission, CHT Campaign who do not face the same constraints as UNDP with its close working relations with the GoB .</p> <p>4) The respective conflict sensitive approaches should be clearly documented and be integrated into the monitoring system of any future programme (see also recommendation 11).</p>
15.9	<p><u>On the district and community level</u></p> <p><u>Conti.....</u></p>	<p>Second, the incidents in CHT are communal attacks by a stronger side (because of implicit backing by the security forces which do not intervene when attacks take place on their doorstep) on a weaker side to drive them away and grab their land. The incidents do not result from local tensions that social cohesion and confidence building activities because the objective of the stronger group is to drive out the weaker group. Directives from the political leadership that lawmakers, Deputy Commissioners and serving security officers would be held responsible for failing to prevent, to respond promptly to communal attacks, or to mete out justice to the criminals involved, would be the most effective conflict prevention response. This is why CHTDF has focused on building capacity of the CHT police (the newest component to the project) rather than ramping up social cohesion</p>	<p>Suggest providing accurate and detailed analysis of the conflict dynamics in CHT and why CHTDF has chosen its specific program interventions to address these dynamics as per the comments provided.</p>	<p>Partly agreed.</p> <p>The report acknowledges the capacity building of the police and is as well giving the historic background of the conflict and analyzing the prior needs of the present conflict situation e.g. the need for a greater emphasis on rule of law and justice, dialogue with the military. Specific recommendation for the future programme. It is not possible within the framework of this evaluation to provide a detailed conflict analysis. This is a separate task. However, on the police and military the following sentence will be added bullet-rule of law This is highly relevant as the security forces play a role in the present conflict favouring land grabbing by new settlers, failing to prevent communal attacks and arresting the criminals involved. Public opinions asserts that the law and order situation is lacking and the slow response from the security forces during the violence occurrence is very evident.</p>

		activities.		
15.1 0		<p>Contrary to the JE, comprehensive conflict analysis has already been undertaken. In addition to analysis of the Rangamati violence focusing on whether CHTDF needed to rethink its approach or what could be done better (i.e. with a programing lens), the CHT Development Facility also did a detailed report on the conflict dynamics in CHT, including a stakeholder analysis of the key actors (including the military) and recommendations for engagement with key stakeholders by key actors at different levels – this was presented to the UN Resident Coordinator in November 2012. An update on CHT conflict dynamics was undertaken and shared with BCPR and UN HQ in May 2013. In addition, for the CHT Household Survey conducted in 2013, a whole chapter on peace building was designed by CHTDFtoelicit responses from the communities themselves on the causes of conflict and remedial measures needed. The responses in the Household Survey support the points made above about the nature of the communal incidents in CHT. More recently, the recovery assessment of in Taindong after the communal attack also included conflict analysis. So substantial conflict analysis has been undertaken and continues to be done at regular intervals. The purpose of the Social Capital Assessment is to supplement the conflict analyses and the programing decisions that CHTDF has made.</p>	<p>Correct the JE and possibly modify by adding the information in the comments.</p>	<p>Not agreed. ET has acknowledged the different analysis conducted However, it would still be useful to complement the existing analysis, especially with regard to the design of a new programme. At the time of the evaluation the analytic documents did contain an analysis for advocacy and lobbying of the stakeholders with regard to PA implementation, but did not contain a an overall systematic analysis considering the different conflict levels (Local, national, international), geographic mapping, the structures, root causes and triggers, the phases and course of events and an assessment and prioritization of the peace building needs. Additional it can be recommended to try different analytical tools in order to get new insights on strategic options e.g. systemic conflict analysis.</p>

15.1 1	<u>On the district and community level</u> <u>Conti.....</u>	The communal incidents referred to above could be seen as Conflict with a big C which essentially requires a political approach to address the sponsors of violence in CHT. However there are conflicts with a small “c” over the management of development project resources which occurs in all development projects whether they are in conflict zones or not. Conflict management interventions are required in project interventions for these types of conflict but should not be conflated with the communal attacks which are a different order of conflict and need a political approach. Non-violent conflict over resources (conflict with a small ‘c’) is an inherent part of any society and it is inevitable that members of the 3,200 villages supported through QIP will be able to quote grievances of activities not decided funded by the PDCs/CHTDF.	Clarify the references in JE made about conflicts generated by CEP interventions so that the JE does not conflate different orders of conflict.	Partly agree. The ET assumed that the readers are familiar with the various conflicts described and they are different in nature with varying potential for escalation. However, will be revised and added, ‘...conflicts within PDGs are evident’ Even if PDG conflicts are not related to the political conflict lines and are generally smaller in scale and do not pose a threat to sustainable peace building, flow of programme recourses might also create cases of competition between the main conflict parties of IPs and settlers.
15.1 2	The recent violent incidents in 2012 between settlers and the Indigenous Population in Rangamati and 2013 in Taindong shows that CHTDF’s influence on confidence building and sustainable peace at the local level is ineffective.	The statement is not well-substantiated. It concludes ‘ineffective’ just by one incident in one corner of CHT. If this logic of the evaluation team is valid, then the team should also conclude the CHTDF interventions were ‘effective’ in all other localities of CHT where such communal violence did not take place! Many local, institutional, national political factors beyond the control of CHTDF were responsible for the Taindong violence. CHTDF’s effectiveness should also be measured how quickly and effectively it had responded after the violent attack. The report	As above – the comments provided on conflict and violence indicate that we do not think that the JE has adequately grasped the conflict dynamics, thus is unable to evaluate whether CHTDF’s approach/response is fit for purpose.	Not wholly agreed. The sentence needs to be understood in the context of describing CHTDF’s different levels of effectiveness. It is self –evident from the context that communal violence is interrelated with the political level and PA non-implementation. To be even more clear on this addition after ‘ineffective’: In addition it becomes evident that CHDF’s development and cross-community activities do not compensate for the non implementation of the PA especially with regard to the predominant and still unsolved land conflict between IP and settlers.

		did not take any of these efforts into question. And it is not realistic to expect CHTDF program can stop all communal violence in CHT.		
16	4.3 Community Empowerment +QiF	•		
16.1	1,685 Para Nari Development Groups (PNDGs) of which 50-60% may be sustainable as community based institutions.	Giving reference would be useful. As mentioned earlier, the JE focuses almost exclusively on the sustainability in the form of PDCs continuing as organisations and ignores the far more important issues of the sustained capacity for collective action and the political capacity to claim responsiveness from government institutions.	Please add reference.	Reference provided. The figure was provided during the ET discussions with the gender cluster representatives during a meeting with them.
16.2	It is also evident that leaders of some PNDGs are not even aware of Para project activities which they are supposed to have designed, implemented and controlled as a community	• If the source is not given, this seems rather a generalisation than an accurate and justified comment	Reconsider	Partly agree. Source focus group discussions with the PDC leaders visited in the 3 districts.. In one sense the statement may be seen as a generalization. However, on occasions the ET observed that the PNDG leaders were unaware and unable to inform the ET of their projects /schemes. The ET considered these situations indicative of weaknesses of women's full involvement in the development process and a weakness to be corrected.
16.3	PDCs and PNDGs are highly dependent on CHTDF and specifically on the PNGO frontline staff such as the	It would be useful to know more about the dependency and how the JE assess sustainability. After the departure of partner NGOs and Community Facilitators - most of the PDCs are still running their activities. Above 90% of the PDC members have been able	Suggest modifying this information by addressing information	Agree to modification of the statement as follows. However, it should be acknowledged that PDCs and PNDGs are not able to run their collective works independently except in a minority of cases. The modification can be as follows- The departure of partner NGOs and Community Facilitators from

	<p>Community Facilitators and this emphasizes the ineffectiveness of the community empowerment interventions.</p>	<p>to confidently deal with bank and financial institutions, and develop and utilize various plans/rules/guidelines for managing and undertaking community level initiatives. The rules and guidelines include Para Development Plan, Fund Management Guideline, General Ledger, Project Management Rules, Meeting Management Rules, and Savings Management Rules. About 78% of the PDCs members reported to have increased their capacity to identify their own problems and provide solutions. Procurement committees have been established in most of the communities (95%) and procurement activities were carried out in accordance with rules and guidelines set up bthese committees. Similarly, monitoring committees were formed in 74% of the target communities, and majority of them (74%) monitored and evaluated their progress in accordance with participatory monitoring and evaluation process. The graph below reflects progress made between year 2011 and 2012 on community development indicators (Source: CHTDF Annual M&E database 2012/2013).</p>	<p>mentioned in the comments.</p>	<p>the CHTDF is relatively recent and it remains to be seen what impact this will have in the longer term on the functioning of the PDCs and PNDGs. At present most of the PDCs are still running their activities and reportedly over 90% of the PDC have been able to confidently deal with bank and financial institutions, and develop and utilize various plans/rules/guidelines for managing and undertaking community level initiatives. The rules and guidelines include Para Development Plan, Fund Management Guideline, General Ledger, Project Management Rules, Meeting Management Rules, and Savings Management Rules.</p> <p>About 78% of the PDCs members are reported to have increased their capacity to identify their own problems and provide solutions. Procurement committees have been established in 95% of the communities. Similarly, monitoring committees have been formed in 74% of the target communities, and majority of them (74%) monitored and evaluated their progress in accordance with participatory monitoring and evaluation process. The graph below reflects progress made between year 2011 and 2012 on community development indicators (Source: CHTDF Annual M&E database 2012/2013).</p> <p>However, observations by the ET during the field visits indicated that the PDCs and PNDGs have been very dependent on CHTDF and specifically on the PNGO frontline staff such as the Community Facilitators with regard to holding regular meetings, follow-up of their development schemes etc. which suggests limitations and weaknesses in effectiveness of the community empowerment interventions.</p>
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				Finally, it remains to be seen to what extent the PDCs and PNDGs are inclusive of all individuals in the community or whether these organizations exist to serve the interests of a few.
16.4	Only 31% are likely to be able to run their PDC activities after the phasing out of PNGOs.	What does really mean sustainability in this case? Should PDCs continue or can be just considered starting point or an instrument toward empowerment and self-development? There are cases of PDCs that drop out but continue to implement development activities on the basis of skills generated through the project	Explain properly the concept of sustainability by taking into consideration other options and the benefits generated by the project even on drop-out PDCs	<p>Fuller explanation.</p> <p>The ET has not been able to locate a CHTDF definition of sustainability in the absence of which it has made assumptions based on internationally accepted definitions (provided in the 'Acronyms, Abbreviations and Definitions of this Report')</p> <p>The advantage of an structured organizational base generally regarded as having a greater propensity to embody principles of (social) 'inclusion' and valuable for sustaining inclusive strategies for enhanced empowerment and self-development of a community. It also provides a forum where utilisation of skills and knowledge generated through the project can be optimised even after the phasing out of CHTDF/NGO and as such potentially importantly contributes to sustainability</p>
16.5	PDCs collectively, are said to total \$715,221 in 2012, which is a 17.23% increase from previous year. The relatively minor increase in financial savings this aspect of effective empowerment of communities remains under-addressed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The individual PDC member's saving is outside QIF grants supports/projects or returns. Therefore, the empowerment of aspects should not be judged only based on this savings amount. It could be argued that 17.23% is a marked increase and a good indication that communities are continuing the individual savings. 	Modify this information.	<p>Agree Information be modified.</p> <p>It is encouraging to note that the 3657 PDCs have collectively saved a total \$715,221.(approximately \$200 per PDC). It is also noteworthy that the communities have increased their saving both at collective and as individual on average by 17.23% in 2012 from the previous year and is recognised as value addition even if relatively modest. Empowerment however should not be based only on group and individual savings effective empowerment of communities remains under-addressed - n particular with regard to strategies to enhance inclusion, transparency, access and lending policies.</p>

16.6	An independent study indicates that 37% households were either excluded or dropped out from community empowerment. (Source: Individual research report)	It is good to reflect the different studies. However, the report crucially missed to refer to recent independent household survey in the CHT (2013) in this regard – which gives different picture and which followed standard methodology than the individual researcher with very limited representation. Did you verify this information at PDC level and if yes, how many PDCs did you visit?	As this information is from the individual research report with limited representation, please also address recent household survey findings conducted by an independent organization.	Partially agreed. The ET considers it valid to include the findings of the individual research report on the basis that the issue of ‘exclusion’ of some community members from community organizations especially when it is the poorest of the poor who are excluded is something to be concerned about and challenge. The ET strongly recommends to conduct an independent evaluation on the strategic nature and extent of the CHTDF policies that allow for some community members to be excluded by virtue of their poverty and deprivation.
17	4.4 Economic Development	•		
17.1	Some PDCs, have been running micro-credit subsequent to getting returns from first round <u>investment</u> , however not all members have equal access to credit.	• This is not correct. There is no bar on creating a revolving fund by the PDCs from the return of the 1st round of investment	Please verify this information and reflect correct information in the report.	It is acknowledged that there is no problem in creating a revolving fund however the issue of access to credit would need to be assessed. Information for individual PDCs including vii. Number of people eligible for loans viii. Criteria for lending (credit worthiness) ix. Total number of lending events x. Total number of individuals accessing loans xi. Size of loans xii. Repeat borrowings.
18	4.5 Education	•		
18.1	CHTDF in partnership with Local NGOs had started the education programme and handed over to HDCs under Letter	Not fully correct, program is implemented in partnership with NGOs on community mobilizing and HDCs on management. As clarified in comments earlier, HDCs have the Provision responsibility and are engaging NGOs in the Production of the services with support from CHTDF.	Need to slightly modify this information.	Accepted and corrected HDCs have the provision and management responsibility for the education programme and NGOs – with support from CHTDF - were engaged for community mobilization.

	of Agreement (LoA) modality.			
18.2	The general awareness of roles and responsibilities by SMC members was found to be lacking and in many instances they remain dependent on CHTDF project staff.	<p>160 projects school have very active SMC who have confident to run the school properly.</p> <p>In 2012, a total of 5020 SMC members (28% of them are female) received refresher training on their roles and responsibilities.</p> <p>In 2011, a total of 2,494 SMC members received training and SMCs are actively engaged in managing a range of school activities including construction/ renovation, student enrolment, student and teacher attendance and the development of SDPs. (Source: Education Annual Report 2012)</p>	Add this information in the report.	<p>Accepted in part, information noted and report adjusted.</p> <p>The CHTDF has been supporting 300 schools 23 are primary schools (NGPS)and 37 are registered non-government primary schools (RNGPS) the majority, 240 schools, are supported by CHTDF. Reportedly “160 schools have very active SMC who are confident to run school properly.’ By implication this suggests that almost 50% of Schools supported by UNDP (140) have SMC but are not ‘confident to run their schools properly’.</p> <p>This is in spite of the fact that “in 2012, a total of 5020 SMC members received refresher training on their roles and responsibilities and in 2011 2,494 SMC members received trainingand are actively engaged in managing a range of school activities’</p> <p>The situation was also noted in a number of interviews by the ET with SMC member during field visits and noted, that in many instance SMC members remain dependent on CHTDF staff.</p>
18.3	CHTDF has contributed to the nationalisation of 53 schools in total - 50 primary schools, 2 CGPS and 1 Non-MPO schools.	The figure on school nationalization is not correct. Among 300 CHTDF supported schools, 23 are Government Primary Schools (GPS) there is no question of nationalization with them. 37 are Registered Non-Government Primary Schools (RNGPS) or Community Primary Schools (Government supported). These 37(2 are still in the process because of land disputes) were nationalized in the 1st phase. The rest are the community established Non-Government Primary Schools (NGPS).CHTDF supported 5 NGPS were also nationalized in the 2nd phase.	Correct this by addressing information mentioned in the comments.	<p>The comment is not understood in relation to the comment made in 11.4 that stated “233 Schools applied for nationalization. 5 included in the 2nd phase of nationalization and another 18 have been primarily selected to be placed for 3rd phase nationalization”. This comments appears to contradict the earlier comment?.</p>

		More fundamentally, in the context of absenteeism and other major constraints in delivering education services in remote areas of Bangladesh, the SMCs have played one role in ensuring that all 300 schools managed by HDCs with support from CHTDF are fully functional!		
18.4	The project review data shows that 82%of schools have toilets and 100% have safe sources of drinking water although it is not clear what the defining criteria is to qualify.	Toilet: This means sanitary latrine and Safe sources of drinking water means Pureit Water Filter and/or Tubewell.	Need to address in the report.	Accepted and revised The project review data shows that 82%of schools have toilets/sanitary latrine and 100% have safe sources of drinking water i.e., water filter and or tube well
18.5	It has been claimed in a CHTDF report that the quality of education has increased but it is not clear what criteria has been used to justify this assertion.	Indicators of progress are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trained teachers on quality education in the schools (Over 700 teachers received training on quality education who are now teaching the students in project supported schools). • Schools are practicing at least some forms of child centered methodology (65% in 2013-Source: HDCs Education Periodic data 2013). • Teachers' attendance rate increased (93.2% which was 91.2% in 2012. Source: HDCs Education Periodic data 2013) • The average attendance of the students increased (from 81.9% in 2012 to 84.7% in 2013). (Source: HDCs Education Periodic data 2013) 	Address this information in the report.	Accepted and revised: CHTDF trained over 700 teachers on 'quality education' who are delivering lessons to the students. And according to reports (HDCs Education Periodic data 2013) *schools are practicing at least some forms of child centred methodology (65% in 2013). *Teachers' attendance rate increased to 93.2% from 91.2% in 2012 and *the average attendance of the students increased from 81.9% in 2012 to 84.7% in 2013).

		• Introducing MLE in 132 schools		
19	4.6 Health	•		
19.1	The Technical Assistance Project Proposal (TPP) specified that it would construct/renovate and equip 100 health infrastructure facilities based on needs but to date only 31 infrastructures and logistics supports were provided to government healthcare facilities (22 Upazila health complex, 3 Sadar Upazila and district hospital).In terms of achievement of targets of treated patients	As per EU agreement, CHTDF has supported construction/renovation in 22 Upazila health complexes and 3 district hospitals. RTPP figures are indicative	Address the information mentioned in the comments.	Accepted and revised though Project Review Report-February 2013, provided wrong data. The Revised Technical Assistance Project Proposal (RTPP) and CHTDF Project Review Report-February-2013 specified that it would construct/renovate and equip 100 health infrastructure facilities based on needs, but to date only 31 infrastructures and logistics supports were provided to government healthcare facilities -22 Upazila health complexes and 3 district hospitals (Source: CHTF Project Review -2013). The fact that 'RTPP figures are indicative' is not a justified reason for this low achievement. In such out puts there must be categorical numerical targets set. If not that indicates a poor design of the project and/or inefficient project management.
20	5. IMPACT			
20.1	5.3 COMMUNIT EMPWERMEN+QI F			
	The degree of the impacts of project interventions is not always measurable on the basis of increase of financial income. One village may increase their income but that does not necessarily	The comment is correct but delves further assessment on what can generate impact on communities something that the JE did not explore. What about for instance the increased confidence of communities' representatives to approach government officials, banks to open accounts, police officers, etc. just to mention a few?	Reconsider the accuracy of the information provided.	Agreed. Accuracy of information reconsidered although it is not correct to say that 'the JE did not explore' other impacts on communities. The ET fully appreciates that the indicators of impacts are various and notes in CHTDF that in addition to financial income, increased mobility of community representatives to approach government officials, banks for opening and maintaining accounts, different government and non-government service providers, police officers, and local government officials is

	mean the sustainability of the PDC as a community institution			evident. Commendable as these changes are the impacts but should also include leadership dynamics, confidence in maintaining community organizations, linkage building with enabling agencies such as UP, UZP, HDC and RC etc. Although a community may increase income that does not necessarily guarantee sustainability of the PDC as a community organization
21	5.6 HEALTH			
21.1	However, the impact and outcome of capacity building is not visible at the HDC level, because the four/five nominated members' who run the HDCs are not elected or accountable to the people.	Even though councilors are not elected, they have successfully managed/implemented health services. Over the years gradual transfers of responsibilities from CHTDF to HDCs have taken place. At present HDCs are taking the lead in overall management of the services, starting from annual planning/budgeting to evaluation of services. The JE focusses only on HDC chair/councillors in the context of CD and does not capture that CHTDF CD support is to a large extent targeting HDC administrations.	Suggest modifying this information mentioned in the comments.	Statement modified and clarified. The statement relates to intuitional capacity to plan/budget and implement programme activities. The ET acknowledges that the programme is managed by HDC but the point made is that management depends primarily on LOA staff rather than core staff of HDC's guided by a nominated councillor. In the absence of a ministry approved and functional health programme organogram HDC institutional capacity and management is limited in terms of formulation, management systems for components, rules and regulations etc. HDC only has the authority to recruit third and fourth class employees which has obvious implications when, programmes such as health and education needs qualified staff. As a result, HDC remains dependent on temporary LOA staff, institutional capacity weak and management of the systems fragile and non- sustainable. Accepted and elaborated The logframe indicators that refer to reduced maternal mortality rates, infant mortality rates, prevalence of stunting, immunization etc., are not well documented. Though a baseline survey in 2008

				and subsequent surveys were conducted but baseline data was unavailable on those indicators. However, HH Survey 2013, shows that immunization coverage increased from 61.2 percent in 2008 to 92% in 2013.
21.2	Despite capacity building efforts of HDCs, they are not able to manage the programme.	Sweeping and incorrect statement. A very high degree of institutional, technical and managerial sustainability has been achieved (see progress reports) but Assume this is about managing regular government health services.	Suggest modifying this information mentioned in the comments.	Agreed. Capacity is not the main issue, the main obstacle is exclusion of HDCs by central government in decision making, planning and budget control - health can only be fully managed by HDCs once government allocate financial and other resources.
21.3	The logframe indicators that refer to reduced maternal mortality rates, infant mortality rates, prevalence of stunting, immunization etc., are not well documented.	Because of unavailability of the baseline data and subsequent survey, the impact is not visualized. However, the immunization coverage is increased from 61.2% (2008) to 92% in 2013 (Household Survey 2013).	Suggest modifying this by addressing information mentioned in the comments.	Accepted and elaborated The log-frame indicators refer to reduced maternal mortality , infant mortality, prevalence of stunting, immunization etc. However although a 'baseline survey' was conducted in 2008 and subsequent surveys have been carried out no data is available to assess impact – impact is not visualised. This is clearly a serious omission and means either the design of the health programme was not effective or the responsible agencies did not have the capacity to effectively manage the programme,. The HH Survey conducted in 2013, asserts that immunization coverage increased from 61.2% in 2008 to 92% in 2013.
21.4	A customized database is used by the project but in the database on outcome, level indicators are absent.	Not correct. As per the CHTDF Business Process for M&E and Reporting (which has developed as per UNDP Results-based M&E System), we collect information on outcome indicators through conducting Survey/Assessment. Please see CHTDF HH Survey Report 2013 and EPI Coverage Evaluation Survey Report 2010 for detailed information on outcome indicators.	Suggest modifying this by addressing information mentioned in the comments.	Clarification provided since the comment is not related to the Report statement. The Comment relates to commissioned surveys whereas the statement refers to the Monitoring Database developed by CHTDF with support from the EU mission 2010. The indicators of the health programme covered more 'output' level indicators rather than 'outcome' indicators.

6. SUSTAINABILITY

22	6.3 Community Empowerment +QiF			
22.1	According to the PNGOs just under one third (31%) of PDCs are functional and sustainable in the sense of running their day-to-day activities	The JE might probably have different concept of sustainability rather than relying only on PNGO's perception.	Suggest reconsidering a comment that lacks proper justification and is based on perception.	Accept in part and further explanation provided. Agreed, the criteria used by the PNGOs is open to question with regard to its validity and clearly the PNGOs have an interest in suggesting that a large proportion of the PDC's will not function well in the future without outside support for a longer period of time.
22.2	No specific strategy has been developed by CHTDF to take any corrective action to enhance and sustain the PDCs and PNDGs as community institutions.	CHTDF has taken corrective actions/adjusted guidelines according to programme needs throughout the period. As for example, there were no PNDGs in the beginning of the project. But, once it was observed that women are getting less access to the resources and decision making practice – formation of PNDG was started. Similarly, the members savings programme. Women's contribution was not recognized by the men at the beginning as it was as "HH savings". Later it is separated as "man" and "woman" member saving and it worked. There are many examples – where, project was flexible to address the local needs. The evaluation mission missed to capture all these learnings of the project.	Need to address this information in the report.	Agreed in part and Report clarified. With regard to PDCs and PNDGs the CHTDF has taken some corrective measures and adjusted guidelines accordingly. For instance, there were no PNDGs in the beginning of the project. But, after CHTDF realised the poor status of women in accessing resources and decision making – PNDGs were formed Similarly, the contribution made by women's savings was initially recognized by the men as "household savings". So CHTDF defined separate savings schemes for "men" and "women" to improve the situation. However, not all of the corrective actions necessarily enhance prospects for more sustainable community organizations and lessons learned or good practices are not well documented and disseminated to other communities for replication in their PDCs which would be potentially valuable to enhance and sustain the PDCs and PNDGs as community organizations.

		The JE adopts the views of one group of actors in CHT and equates sustainability of PDCs with registration which for reasons clarified to the team has not been pursued.		
22.3	This has meant that nearly a quarter of all PDCs (23%) have already been abandoned or are inactive. They are characterized by a lack of unity, with a high number of excluded households, misuse of financial and other community resources by the leadership, a very low level of awareness as members of a community, no regular meeting or activities and dominated by influential people in their own interest. Ordinary members of the community would never develop ownership or feel able influence decisions	This seems as a list of generalisations if not properly documented and sources are not quoted (other than perceptions). Moreover if 23% of the PDCs are not functional it means of course that 77% are properly working which, given the context and the lack of familiarity of CHT communities in dealing with development (started to be implemented for the first time through project) is a rather good result.	Reconsider generalisations or base the comments on actual data.	Partially agreed and will replace original text. Currently approximately 77% PDCs are fully or partially functional and continue activities in part or whole. Although IP communities traditionally are accustomed to co-operation (as opposed to competition) prior to the signing of the PA and the interventions of CHTDF and others they generally lacked experience in dealing with economic and social development strategies and practices and the PDCs have played a role in facilitating this process. However nearly a quarter of all PDCs formed (23%) are already defunct and have either been abandoned or are inactive. There are various reasons for this demise including lack of unit; exclusion of some community households, misuse of financial and other community assets/resources by the leaders; low level of awareness as members of a community; irregular meeting/consultation/activities and/or dominated by influential people for their own interest and gain. This has meant that ordinary members of the community would not be included as full members, develop ownership or be part of the decision making process. There is obviously a strong case to take account of these weaknesses and abuses if self-sustaining community development is to be realised in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
22.3	Neither has any attempt been made to encourage or provide legal status or the	The project discussed with all stakeholders, partners, communities about possibilities of registration. But, there are many limitations about the registration – such as, capacity of	Need to address this information in the report.	Information addressed and included in the Report. There is a recognised need by CHTDF to provide legal status, the building of linkages, to enable institutions to become Community Based Organizations (CBOs) with authority to work.

	building of linkages to enable these institutions to be Community Based Organizations (CBOs) with authority to work.	the departments, mandates of the department, too much controlling regulatory system, self-reliant/empowerment etc. Considering all the challenges, CHTDF fielded a mission to come up with the suggestion about the matter.		However, the CHTDF indicates that there are 'limitations to registration, such as , capacity of the departments; mandates of the departments; too much controlling regulatory system; self reliant/empowerment etc'. In order to progress registration the 'CHTDF fielded a mission to come up with suggestions about the matter'.However, as far as the ET could determine no further progress is evident
22.4	PNGOs were cut from the communities abruptly which resulted in a huge loss of confidence.	The PNGOs were notified about the last contract one year before on the end of the contract or discontinuation when the last contracts were signed. Therefore, the statement is not correct.	Need to address this information in the report.	The statement will be rewritten to better explain the contractual situation. Initially the NGOs were contracted for one year. Subsequently however contractual periods were variable and uncertain and all the NGOs interviewed by the ET regretted the uncertainty and the difficulties involved in managing the situation. The NGOs also said that there were sometimes breaks in the contracts and that after sometime new opportunities to make EoI,apply/contest for new periods were presented. NGOs had therefore assumed that the period of 'phasing out' was a continuation of this way of working. The termination of all PNGOs contracts was therefore unexpected and seen as an abrupt closure. It is also worth noting that the view of the PNGOs illustrates that the idea of 'partnership' ('P'NGOs) had very little meaning with regard to phase –out policy and practice particularly with regard to the sustainability of the PDCs and PNDGs. However the really important issue here is not whether the PNGOs were provided or not provided with fair contractual conditions rather what impact the abrupt cut had on the communities themselves particularly in terms of sustainability of important community organizations!
25	6.5 Education			
25.1	The intervention	Even though closer engagement of line	Need to	Partially accepted and revised

	<p>however has not encouraged the education line department to be actively engaged and has essentially the CHTDF has served to take the onus of responsibility away from them and now the key challenge facing is mainstreaming the education system.</p>	<p>departments can be achieved, we have observed many good examples of close collaboration of line departments as community school monitoring visits, provision of free books and students allowed to take part in PSC exams.</p> <p>Information on Schools visits and PSC examination have already been given above. Stakeholders' coordination meeting held regularly where representatives from govt. education office participated. In 2012, 10 stakeholders meeting held In 2011, 10 meetings and in 2010, 13 meeting held.</p> <p>Again, it is crucial that the JE takes the Peace Accord and laws of Bangladesh as the starting point when assessing institutional arrangements (see earlier comments).</p>	<p>address this information in the report.</p>	<p>The ET recognises that the fundamental issue of mainstreaming education is political. However, the statement that 'the CHTDF intervention has not encouraged the education line department to be actively engaged and has essentially served to take the onus of responsibility away from them and now the key challenge is mainstreaming the education system' is considered essentially correct.</p> <p>The government's monitoring visits to schools, provision of books and authorizing students to sit PSC examinations are recognised responsibilities of the line department and official coordination of stakeholders where representatives from govt. education office participated. In 2012, 10 stakeholders meeting held In 2011, 10 meetings and in 2010, 13 meeting held procedures.</p> <p>In spite of these encouraging practices the CHTDF initiative has served to take the onus of responsibility away from the education line department and the key challenge for sustainability is mainstreaming the education system -the key activities include planning, financial planning/implementation and monitoring - in compliance with the PA.</p>
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SECTION III: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

26	<p>1.Peace and Confidence Building</p>	<p>Would be useful if the Recommendations had specific sub-sections addressed to the relevant stakeholders on the roles they could play, e.g. the Development Partners, other UN agencies, UNDP – recognizing that CHTDF alone cannot bring about all the necessary changes.</p>	<p>Suggest the team re-format this section to show the roles to be played by various stakeholders but recognizing that the project will take on most of the responsibilities.</p>	<p>Partly agreed. Most activities are expected to be conducted by CHTDF. Other stakeholders are addressed per recommendation. To be added: recommendation 6, Apart from CHTDF's engagement it is highly relevant that the UN senior management, other UN agencies and donors are supporting the CHDF efforts towards PA implementation via their respective programmes and diplomatic channels by elaborating their own strategic approaches complementary to CHDF.</p>
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26.1	Furthermore the programme has succeeded to some extent in confidence building at the local level as a cross-cutting issue and has had a stabilizing effect although this is unquantifiable	Is this assessment therefore based just on perception? But even perceptions must be justified	Suggest re-considering this and other generalisations even if they express a positive comment.	It is not a generalization but conclusions of the ET based on the findings of The Household Survey (page 34 and 35) and statement of respondents/interviewees in the field
26.2	2. An in-depth conflict analysis should be conducted. This will provide entry points for a further peace building strategy on the different levels with the respective key stakeholders such as communities, PA mandated CHT institutions, line governmental structures, military, political parties, traditional authorities and CSOs. It will complement the already existing CHTDF advocacy and policy dialogue strategy (based on the Institutional Context Analysis tool).	Please note that an in-depth conflict analysis, including the key stakeholders, to provide entry points for a further peacebuilding strategy including engagement with key stakeholders (e.g. the military) was done in 2012; further, CHTDF has already begun to engage more with other national stakeholders and seen results (e.g. coordinated multi-stakeholder advocacy on the 13 point amendment in the CHT Land Commission Act). However there are limits to CHTDF's reach and clout in engaging with all stakeholders, notably in terms of direct access to the PM and the highest echelons of government and military. It would be very useful if the JE could recommend more active and regular engagement by the Development Partners and UN	Suggest re-considering recommendation to reflect the missing information, including that CHTDF already has a peace building engagement strategy which it is implementing. Suggest refocusing the recommendation to point out the roles of other stakeholders in high level engagement which they are better positioned to do.	Acknowledged and partially agreed. The ET recognises that the key to peace building is the full implementation of the PA and related laws, holding elections of the HDCs and strong enforcement of law and order in the CHT. The recommendation acknowledges the existing analysis (see also footnote) To add: At the of time of the evaluation the documents contained an analysis for advocacy and lobbying of the stakeholders with regard to PA implementation, but not an overall systematic analysis of the different conflict levels (Local, national, international), geographic mapping, the structures, root causes and triggers, the phases and course of events and an assessment and prioritization of the peace building needs. It is therefore further recommended to try different analytical tools in order to get new insights on strategic options e.g. systemic conflict analysis , necessary as a basis for the future programme design and strategy. This approach is widely acknowledged as an international standard.

		senior management with the Govt. on PA implementation (on transfer of subjects and funds); and by UN Headquarters on the role of the military (e.g. UN DPKO and DPA)		
26.3	3. In the future programme, the underlying concepts of 'confidence' and the 'theories of change' have to be formulated and made explicit. This should include also the respective targets and indicators (confidence on which level, between which stakeholders and with which purpose) and a pinpointed strategy on how this is to be reached	Regarding underlying concepts of "confidence", the JE should be aware that "confidence building" has been used inter-changeably with "peace building" because of perceived political sensitivities with terms like "conflict" and "peace building". It would be more important therefore to be explicit about the threat to peace consolidation posed by lack of progress on PA implementation, the status of the Accord itself and how future programing needs to address the serious challenges to both peace and development in CHT.	This needs further definition, clarification and detail earlier in the JE so that we are clear about the JE's own understanding of the terms, how they are applied to CHTDF and what is being recommended. The recommendation needs foundational analysis.	<p>Agreed. Definition of Peace Building provided: Johann Galtung's concept of peace distinguishes between 'negative peace', the absence of physical violence and a 'positive peace', describing a society without physical, structural and psychological violence based on positive relationships with a common understanding. The ET use this definition of positive peace.</p> <p>The United Nations Agenda for Peace of 1992 laid the ground for the increasing use of the term 'peace-building', defining it as a 'broad range of activities that are associated with capacity building, reconciliation and societal transformation. Peace-building activities identify and support structures and systems that intend to strengthen and solidify peace.'</p> <p>Definition of Confidence Building: The ET used the term confidence building as equivalent of peace building.</p> <p>Definition of Peace-building and Conflict Prevention Programmes/Projects: Development agencies sometimes attribute their programmes in conflict zones per se as 'peace-building work'. Researchers argue that interventions can only be regarded as peace-building programmes, if they are based on specific peace-building and conflict prevention methods. Others are following a</p>

				broader understanding distinguishing peace-building and conflict prevention programmes and those of development by their goals and objectives. In this evaluation the ET follow the latter definition: 'Peace-building or conflict prevention programmes or projects are interventions, whose primary purpose is to promote peace and prevent violent conflict.'
26.4	6. In order to increase the leverage of the advocacy efforts, the CHDTF programme could elaborate on further options for cooperation with relevant stakeholders on the international level such as research institutions, CSOs, NGOs, Embassies, Donors and UN agencies (e.g. UNPFII, OHCHR, CHT Commission, CHT Campaign, IWGIA). Regular exchange channels via electronic media, conferences, sub-working groups and workshops could be established. A high level international conference held in Dhaka might be an appropriate start-up event to bring stakeholders together and attract the attention in the political sphere on the urgent needs in CHT. CHDTF could also try to establish	Recommendations 6 and 7 on diversifying partnerships at the international and national levels have been strongly pushed for from within CHDTF and initiatives have already been taken, but there is also resistance due to concerns that some of the national and international stakeholders may not be viewed favourably by the Government due to their robust views. It would be useful if the JE could make the point that it is precisely because these stakeholders do not face the same constraints as UNDP that they are important advocacy partners.	Suggest for reconsider the recommendation to show that CHDTF is already diversifying its engagement with national and international stakeholders and this should be further encouraged and emphasized in spite of the fact that some of the national and international stakeholders may not be viewed favourably by the Govt. due to their critical views. It would be useful if the JE could make the point that it is precisely because these stakeholders do not	Agreed, will be added. In order to increase the leverage of the advocacy efforts, the CHDTF programme could elaborate on further options for cooperation with relevant stakeholders on the international level such as research institutions, CSOs, NGOs, Embassies, Donors and UN agencies (e.g. UNPFII, OHCHR, CHT Commission, CHT Campaign, IWGIA). <i>'In spite of the fact that these stakeholders may not be viewed favourable by the GoB due to their critical positions, partnerships with these stakeholders are highly relevant and potentially add more vocal and add 'voice' as they are not facing the same constraints as UNDP with its close working partnership with the GoB'.</i> Regular exchange channels via electronic media, conferences

	<p>partnerships with national prominent personalities (or even international), who are interested to serve for example as a 'patron' of the next programme. This is usually a very effective campaigning approach. In addition, the cooperation and partnership with the national media has to be further developed by media training, workshops on PA relevant issues and grant schemes.</p>		<p>face the same constraints as UNDP and can be more vocal that they are important advocacy partners.</p>	
26.5	<p>7. The advocacy and peacebuilding on local and national levels should integrate partnerships with relevant NGOs and CSOs such as Kapeng Foundation and National Coalition for Indigenous People e.g. by thematic tenders (indigenous issues in general and with regard to CHT, elements of the PA land issues, forestry, elections, human rights) to raise awareness and inter-link these stakeholders with the international donor community's and local level advocacy efforts.</p>		<p>As with above, reformulate the recommendation to emphasize that these partnerships are important and should be undertaken in spite of the Govt's discomfort (perceived or real) due to their critical views.</p>	<p>Agreed. Will be added. donor community's and local level advocacy efforts. As mentioned this is important as these stakeholders are more independent from the GoB than UNDP.</p>
26.	<p>8. Special attention is needed on</p>	<p>The recommendation to engage</p>	<p>Suggest reconsidering</p>	<p>Partly agreed. Will be revised</p>

6	<p>the dialogue with and the advocacy towards the military having high level influence on political party politics and being the most powerful stakeholder opposing any further steps in PA implementation. Based on the information of the conflict analysis, the future programme could develop a specific strategy considering the prior interests of the military such as reputation and its participation in UN Peacekeeping Forces. UNDP should use its internal channels via the Resident Coordinator and the Bureau for Crises Prevention and Recovery at the UN Headquarters to establish contacts to the Department for Peace Keeping Operations in order to create space for official and quiet diplomacy addressing critically the army's role in the CHT conflict and its participation in the UN Peacekeeping Forces.</p>	<p>with the military has already been made by CHTDF in the conflict analysis that was undertaken in 2012. It does not need to wait for the Social Capital Assessment which may not necessarily address this issue. Also, the power and interest of the military is assessed for 6 areas of Peace Accord implementation as part of CHTDF's Political Economy Analysis.</p>	<p>and possibly recommend a high level and coordinated UN approach to engage with the military on CHT involving the Resident Coordinator, Dept for Political Affairs (DPA) and DPKO. The conflict analysis underpinning this recommendation already exists so no need to wait for further assessments.</p>	<p>.The ET acknowledges that the conflict analysis of 2012 recommended that the CHTDF engage with the military. As the military most powerful stakeholder for furthering steps in PA implementation careful consideration is needed in any dialogue and the advocacy since they have a high level of influence on political party's. The future programme should develop a specific strategy for a high level and coordinated UN approach (involving the Resident Coordinator, Department for Political Affairs and Department for Peace Keeping Operations DPKO) in order to create space for official and 'quiet diplomacy' considering military's interests and good reputation as a respected participant in UN Peacekeeping Force. The army's role in the CHT conflict and its participation in the UN Peacekeeping Forces could be critically addressed</p>
26.6	<p>9. Conflict sensitivity should be strengthened by improved transparency by a communication strategy with the communities on</p>	<p>Recommendation 9 on the need for a strong communication strategy is important not only with regard</p>	<p>The recommendation is conflating too many different issues. As a suggestion it should be</p>	<p>Partly agreed, but recommendation is not conflating too many different issues, but outlining different aspects of conflict sensitivity. To be added:</p>

	<p>the selection criteria of vulnerability. With regard to resource conflicts within PDGs implementing NGOs should be enabled to mitigate these conflicts. The conflict sensitive approach should also cover the other existing conflicts on the local level, on which the conflict analysis will provide more detailed information.</p>	<p>to conflict sensitivity around selection criteria of vulnerability. It is very much needed to raise national awareness about the prevailing situation in CHT; and lay to rest misconceptions about CHTDF.</p>	<p>divided into 3 different sets of recommendations: a)The Communication strategy should focus on more than selection criteria of vulnerability as indicated by the comments – expand on this and include the launch of the CHT HH survey and engagement with the media on CHT issues; b)Given that CHTDF no longer contracts PNGOs, identify how typical CDD-related intra-group conflicts over development project resources/activities should be mitigated; c)Recommend developing alternative approaches for non-CDD-related local conflicts that would build on existing local capacities (govt, civil society, traditional institutions)</p>	<p>The communication strategy could also be used to explain the role and structure of CHTDF as a whole in order to avoid misconceptions. With regard to resource conflicts within PDGs traditional authorities, local governmental institutions or local NGOs could be enabled and supported to play a role in mitigating these conflicts - via follow up contracts if CEP is continued.</p>
26.7	10. The recently established CHT UNDP Task Force potentially	Recommendation 10 should be reformulated because inaccurate-e.g. all	Correct inaccuracies.	Partially Agreed and will be re-worded. The ET heard directly from UNICEF – who have worked in

	strengthens coordination between different UN agencies and a consensus for conflict sensitive implementation. However, not all UN agencies are involved and it is likely that the initiative will be discontinued.	UN agencies working in CHT are involved; no sign that this initiative will be discontinued- to commend the recently established UN CHT Task Force and suggest that it should not be confined to developing the joint UN framework for future programming in CHT but should also meet regularly to coordinate on conflict sensitive program implementation and for joint approaches to developments in CHT (e.g. natural disasters, conflicts, food crises etc.).	Re-consider the recommendation as per the comments.	the CHT for many years - that at the time of the evaluation (Nov 2013) they had not attended the UN CHT Task Force and indeed that they had not been invited. Also that although FAO has proposed/ started new programmes in CHT these will be implemented directly and in association with MoCHTA and not channelled through CHTDF. However the ET acknowledges that the UN CHT Task Force is not established with the intention of joint programming rather for conflict sensitive approaches and responses to eg natural disasters and conflicts.
27	3. Community Empowerment			
27.1	Mobilise community based organisations (CBO) so that they can play pivotal role in peace building and community development process.	The concept of 'mobilisation' in the context of post-conflict cannot be swiftly mentioned without proper explanation of what the JE means and without having assessed potential risks involved.	Suggest re-considering	Reconsidered and elaboration provided. It is important that communities play an active role in peace building at community level . To this end a risk /feasibility assessment (social research) would determine challenges/opportunities for mobilization of CBOs on a location specific basis and is an essential component of a strategic approach to community mobilisation. The conflict and post-conflict context along with other social, cultural, political, economic conditions would be taken in to plan and implement the community mobilisation process.
28	5.Education			
28.1	30 Schools are supported by government and 70% of schools continue activities through community contribution and continuous support of NGOs.	Where is this coming from? Giving sources would be helpful. As mentioned above, out of 300 project supported schools, 23 are Govt. primary school and 37 are Registered Non-govt. Primary Schools –all these are supported	Please add the sources and correct the information.	Accepted and reference inserted : It was expected that out of the 300 schools '70% of schools continue activities through community contributions and the continuous support of NGOs' (CHTDF Evaluation 2009: Annex-2: Logframe Phase III). However, of the 300 a total of 60 schools, 23 primary school and 37

		by the government.		Registered Non-government Primary Schools were supported by the government before CHTDF support . The government has not yet support. schools established by the project.
29	5. Education, Recommendations:			
29.1	The project should focus on strengthening the capacity for sustainability related to the implementation of the Tribal Education Plan	Tribal Education Plan does not exist, such a plan is only for health	Correct the information.	<p>Comment not Agreed.</p> <p>The report CHTDF evaluation 2009 (Annex-20, comment No.37) UNDP’s suggestion was “<i>The government does have a tribal education plan, but little effort has been made by government to use it.</i>”</p> <p>Subsequently the ‘National Education Policy’ was developed and approved by the government that included education issues of indigenous communities as well as an operational plan.</p> <p>Objective-23 of ‘National Education Policy’ ensured provision of primary education in the mother tongue, ‘Objective of primary education bullet 8, ensured education in mother tongue, and strategy has been spell out the implementation plan. The National Education Plan thus covered the whole issues of education of tribal children. The transfer of education to the HDC’s is part of Peace Accord implementation. The tribal education exists and full implementation of the plan is a key issue.</p>
29.2	One of the sustainability criteria is the need for school registration and establishing incentives. The advocacy and capacity building support needs to focus on	Registration is changed into nationalization. Supporting schools to be nationalized is major target for CHTDF’s advocacy work. Not clear what is meant with incentive mechanism	Correct the information.	<p>Comment accepted and reworded</p> <p>One of the sustainability criteria is the need for school nationalization and establishing incentives. The advocacy and capacity building support needs to focus on initiating the nationalization process of schools.</p>

	initiating the registration process of schools. An incentive mechanism should be introduced for schools competing steps of registration.			
29.3	The teacher's quality development, particularly in MLE and child-centred learning, should be integrated in the curriculum.	Training manuals on MLE and Child – centred learning have already been developed and teacher training on them are now going on.	Modify this information.	Accepted and elaborated Teacher training manual on MLE and child centred learning has been developed in a holistic way. However, recognising the acute shortage of qualified and educated teachers in CHT if quality education is to be ensured it is necessary to focus on the essentials of each section of reading materials by emphasising 'what is to be done' by the teachers. This will help teachers and improve the quality of teaching and learning.
30	• Health			
30.1	However,	What was the basis of the analysis? Geographical conditions are very different in CHT compared to other parts. This need to be considered in the analysis	Explain and modify this information.	Partly Accepted. In recognising that geographical and operating conditions are often very different in the CHT, the health service provision CHTDF is more expensive compared to the National Health Service delivery system. The government spends about US\$ 5 per head on Health, Nutrition and Population Sector Programme (HNPSP)"
30.2	A comprehensive monitoring system of CHTDF including health clusters was designed with EC support, but the exact operational status proved difficult to ascertain.	After designed the comprehensive monitoring system of CHTDF with EC support in 2010, several project were finished and some project have newly been started that required to revised the CHTDF consolidated system for M&E and Reporting.	Correct this by addressing the information mentioned in the comments.	Additional text to be added for clarification. A comprehensive monitoring system of CHTDF including health clusters was designed with EC support in 2010. The system developed was an interlocking logical framework and the inclusion of and outcome indicators. It also provided for the inclusion of new project activities with aim of accommodating changes in the programme. The UNDP Integrated Planning, Monitoring, Reporting, and Evaluation

		In line with the This system includes CHTDF consolidated Indicators' Framework, M&E Work plan, Indicators Tracking Sheet, mechanism for capturing qualitative information etc.		for Results, in 2011, CHTDF developed Results-based M&E System (CHTDF Business Process for M&E and Reporting) was implemented to respond to donors. However, monitoring and assessment is carried out the M&E and Reporting system has not been updated except in the case of the CEP cluster
30.3	Currently the CHTDF programme is not integrated into the system and structure. Several components of CHTDF i.e., health, education, community empowerment, agriculture and food security and economic development have given rise to several committees at the grassroots/para level. The CEP has PDC, PNDG, at Para level, UnFC and UzFC Union and Upazila level. In the same areas, Health Programme has Satellite Clinic Management Committee (SCME) and CMC.	Following the establishment of the government committees in 2012, CHTDF is in process of moving away from project specific development coordination committees as union, upazila and district level, and merge with existing government committees (District, Upazila and Union Development Coordination Committee). Grassroots level committees as PDCs will be linked with these government committees.	Address the information mentioned in the comments.	Comment accepted and will be included. The notes and welcomes the comment that 'Following the establishment of the government committees in 2012, CHTDF is in process of moving away from project specific development coordination committees as union, upazila and district level, and merge with existing government committees (District, Upazila and Union Development Coordination Committee). This indicates that the opportunity has been recognised and process of amalgamation begun and is ongoing and as such does not invalidate the statement. Text amended to: "Following the establishment of the government committees in 2012, CHTDF has expressed the intention to move away from project specific development coordination committees to merge with existing government committees at district, Upazila and Union levels. This would rationalise the plethora of groups and committees such as, Satellite Clinic Management Committee (SCME) and CMC, School Management Committee (SMC), Mothers Forum, Parents Teacher Association (PTA) etc. This is a process that needs to be completed for proper coordination cost efficiency and effectiveness.'

SECTION IV: CONTEXUAL AND PROGRAMETIC ANALYSIS AND WAY FORWARD

Section Rewritten

31	1. The Political Context and Administrative Challenges			
31.1	1.1The Political Context	<p>In dealing with implementation of the PA and IP factional politics, the JE has cause and effect the wrong way round. It is due to slow implementation of the PA that IP political factions are proliferating and the PCJSS leadership is challenged for “selling out” or failing the community. Many analysts believe this is another reason for the Govt to drag its feet on PA implementation (because it divides and weakens IP political leadership). Political clashes between IP political groups should not be a justification for non-implementation of the PA..</p>	<p>Suggested amending the section as suggested in the comments</p>	<p>Accept the comment. Section Rewritten The lack of government commitment in implementing the PA means that that the IP political factions are growing rapidly and the PCJSS leadership is challenged for “selling out” and/or failing the communities. This further divides and weakens IP political leadership and some analysts believe this is another reason for the government inactive position on PA implementation. Political clashes between IP political groups should not be a justification for non-implementation of the PA.</p>
		<p>Surprising that the JE makes no reference to the lack of HDC elections. HDCs should primarily be accountable to CHT communities, not to MoCHTA as stated in the report.</p>	<p>Add a section on the necessity of HDC elections and clarify the relationship between MoCHTA and HDCs.</p>	<p>Agreed. HDCs are currently only accountable to those who nominated them. The election of democratic representatives of the (empowered) communities to the HDCs would mean a milestone for the real implementation of the PA. The ET makes a strong recommendation for HDC elections and lobby with government to this end. The point on confidence building in the report argues that PA implementation should be the priority in the next programme and recommends advocacy activities need to be expanded to this end see page 50</p>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We are not sure why there are 	<p>Remove the section on</p>	<p>Agreed Rewritten. recognising that the political</p>

		sections on the 15th amendment to the Constitution on the CTG. Not the most salient point to make about the current political status quo. Moreover most of the section is adding very little to common knowledge. It would be better to focus on how progress could be made on CHT given that the AL has been returned to power even more absolutely this time round even if there are question marks about the election. It could be a positive for CHT – i.e. Govt. might move more resolutely on PA implementation to show its support for minority groups in Bangladesh and to win back the international community (who disapproved of the way the election was conducted).	15th amendment and CTG; focus instead on what could be achieved on PA implementation now that there is a govt in place.	situation has changed since the First Draft Report was submitted in December 2013 and ‘elections’ held in January 2014. Add to Recommendation <i>‘During the future programme, more emphasis should be given to peace building and advocacy towards PA implementation with the key sub-components (Land Commission, Elections of CHT specific institutions, Refugee Task Force, transfer of 33 sectoral responsibilities to the HDCs, Demilitarization) as the non-implementation is not only causing reoccurrence of communal violence, but is also the main obstacle to development and sustainable project results.’</i>
32	1.2 Programmatic Analysis			
32.1	Introduction plus 1. – 7.	It is not understandable what 'analysis' is this exactly and what this list would like to demonstrate	Specify better the use of the list of omit it	Agreed Deleted and Replaced. The listing of activities indicating outputs is considered useful to indicate the level of the commitment by donors to achieve the objective, ‘to strengthen capacities and empower the key CHT institutions and local communities to plan, manage and support self-reliant development activities, confidence building dialogues and other conflict reduction initiatives’
33	4. Education			
33.1	MLE curriculum (in 11 different languages) 132 schools made	Pre-primary Multi-Language Education (MLE) materials were developed for 11	Correct this information mentioned in the	Agreed and now Omitted MLE curriculum in 11 different languages was

	available	indigenous communities but materials in 4 languages were not used because those communities were not in programme areas (only in 12 out of 25 Upazila/Sub-districts).	comments.	developed and curriculum in 7 of which are made available 132 schools.
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2 Challenges faced by CHTDF

33.2	But whilst the activities and the supply of goods, services, capacity building and advocacy has been delivered this has been essentially <u>without the inclusion of permanent official institutions in the process.</u>	Not clear what this means. As indicated earlier, the JE needs to put the institutional structure established with the Peace Accord and subsequent laws as the basis of the assessment.	Try to make it clear.	Rewritten
33.3	So whilst the 'Number of training courses /modules and trainees and evaluation by trainees' has in most case been met the main objective of the capacity building was one of inclusion – that is- to ensure that the institutions were fully engaged in all the activities of CHTDF in order that the key institutions were capacitated to plan, manage and support development activities – <u>by and large has not happened.</u>	This is not correct. LOA staff is involved in day to day implementation/coordination but major management decisions are made by HDC officials and officers.	Correct this information.	Agreed Re-written new text.
33.4	More so regarding local organizations, Upazila Parishads, traditional governance system, Unions and the elected representatives and leaders have somehow been by-passed and left out of the project implementation process to the extent that resources and activities are not	Relation not clear. Moreover these institutions have not been left out, but played major role in planning and supporting of project activities, including selection of working areas/beneficiaries, assessing and approving of community projects, problem solving at community	Modify this information.	Agreed. This Section has now been modified. local The government institutions e.g., UP, UzP are responsible for development works and to oversee the activities of other organization within their area. The Union Facilitation Committees (UnFC) were formed and supported by the CHTDF for capacity building and made

	<p>seen as belonging to the community but to the UN.</p>	<p>level. The JE should also take three additional aspects into account while pointing at this issue: First, UPs and UzPs are supported through a very large national World Bank programme and other projects. Second, support to UzPs, including grants of more than USD 500K, is provided in 2014. Third, when UzPs were reestablished in 2009, the reenacted law did not reflect that the Peace Accord had been signed with resulting overlapping mandates between HDCs and UzPs. CHTDF's support is carefully designed to address this situation.</p>		<p>responsible for the approval of the PDC projects. The involvement of local government institutions in CHTDF activities is viewed as positive and as a way of ensuring participation of LGs. The Local Government Support Programme (LGSP) funded by the World Bank has been enhancing capacity of local government, towards functional institutions. The UzPs were re-established in 2009, but the re-enacted law did not reflect the fact that the Peace Accord had been signed resulting in overlapping mandates between HDCs and UzPs. Despite the challenges, coordination and collaboration of CHTDF activities, involving local government institutions is considered possible within existing legal framework and inclusion can strengthen the development process as well as making a contribution to the peace building process..</p>
<p>33.5</p>	<p>The situation at present is one whereby the UNDP implemented CHTDF is effectively the 'owner' and responsible for a multi-faceted development programme with a major infrastructure that is increasing costly to maintain. It would be overstating this situation to say that donor fatigue is apparent but after more than 10 years of the UNDP led CHTDF, partners and donors are becoming anxious that the</p>	<p>It is unfair to expect CHTDF program will directly and solely lead to implementation of peace accord. As clearly pointed out to the JE during the mission, responsibilities by the project and those of the government and other stakeholders, cannot be put at the same level especially without proper assessment of the context and the political forces and interests involved promoting and hampering the peace process. As a</p>	<p>Suggest re-considering to reflect what CHTDF can and cannot achieve.</p>	<p>Statement reconsidered and rewritten. The ET fully accepts that it is the government and other stakeholders who have the responsibility for implementation of the peace accord and there was no intended inference or expectation that the CHTDF Programme is in any way responsible for the non-implementation of the PA. A replacement to the original text is however provided.</p>

<p>infrastructure created to deliver an interim peace building/peace keeping programme is going to be <u>increasingly difficult to justify in the absence of tangible progress on the implementation of the PA</u>. Donors are still committed and there is evidence of donor support increasing further but the lack of substantive progress frustrated by the lack of progress and are increasingly asking the question ‘where do we go from here’?</p>	<p>result of this poor analysis, findings lack basic credibility and recommendations authority.</p>		<p>‘The reticence of successive governments and other stakeholders to implement the PA in full means that after 10 years of intervention partners and donors of CHTDF are becoming anxious that the infrastructural costs in delivering a confidence building/peace keeping programme is increasingly difficult to justify in the absence of tangible progress on the implementation of the PA. Many donors are still committed and there is evidence of donor support increasing further but the lack of progress also prevents some potential donors from making commitments.</p> <p>In clarifying the intention of the statement the ET considers it fair to ask that the comment ‘As a result of this poor analysis, findings lack basic credibility and recommendations authority.’ be withdrawn by the commentator.</p>
	<p>Opportunities and Challenges faced for a Forward Looking Strategy: As stated earlier, This does not mean that the project should be held responsible for PA implementation; rather,</p>	<p>Add as suggested in comments</p>	<p>Agreed. Rewritten. Political focus to be emphasised.</p> <p>‘.....the project needs to be focussed on the advocacy and implementation of the PA and implement activities and engage with relevant stakeholders to this end.</p>
	<p>The second challenge is that a greater and explicit focus on PA implementation would lead to blow-back by the vested interests that resist full implementation of the PA.</p>	<p>Add in order to clarify the risks involved.</p>	<p>Agreed. Rewritten</p> <p>‘The reticence for full implementation of the PA is obviously tied to vested interests who have opposed, and are likely to attempt to thwart efforts to influence the rules of the game by supporting effective development of the PA and</p>

				this poses an obvious challenge to implementation.
33.6	2. Summary	Is this necessary?	Re-consider	Agreed Delete

4. Continue/Increase Support

34	Peace/Confidence Building			
34.1	There is an urgent need to implement an in-depth conflict analysis -communities, local regional and national CHT and line governmental structures, military, political parties, traditional authorities and CSOs. This would be overseen by CHTDF.	The JE refers to the need to implement conflict analysis taking into account all stakeholders. However, far more important than undertaking such analysis (which was already done in 2012 although more information/analysis is always needed) is acting upon the information and making explicit the project's peace building objective. As stated before, there is the perception that the Govt. would not welcome such a focus, so this focus on conflict and peace building needs consensus amongst Development Partners and UNDP, followed by engagement with the Govt. on this issue.	The most important point for the JE to make is that because CHTDF is a peace building project, it needs to be able to address conflict and peace building openly in terms of its interventions and partnerships. Concerns about Govt sensitivity over addressing conflict openly (real or perceived) has been a significant obstacle faced in addressing conflict prevention programmatically.	AE Agreed and to be rewritten.

Options for Implementation

35	5.2 Possible Option for Way Forward:			
35.1	It is important at this time to consider different options for implementing development and confidence building in the CHT.	Overall comment on all options considered: greater detail is needed as all the options are very sketchy and does not provide much of a basis for choice. It is not clear on what basis the	Add more details and explanation as raised by the comments for all the options discussion.	Agreed. Section Re written. To clarify re the One UN Agency Support. 'Delivering as One' (DaO) The comments made by this ET with regard to DaO are in direct relation to the implementation of CHTDF. DaO is designed as a UN country strategy and based on the 'UN human development and capability approach'. It would clearly be beyond the scope of this evaluation to recommend or not the UN adopting DaO for

		<p>JE rejects the One UN Agency Support. A One UN approach would get round the tendency for UN agencies to work only with the specialized line agencies that they generally deal with. A One UN Agency Support covering all the key services could arguably accelerate transfer of services to and strengthen the capacities of HDCs who have to manage them. Several countries are piloting the One UN Delivery as One (DAO) where agencies develop a joint program identifying who does what; funds for the project are pooled and distributed to agency according to activity.</p>	<p>Address the concerns raised in the comments over the dismissal of the One UN Agency Support.</p>	<p>Bangladesh.</p> <p>The ET comments are therefore only appropriate to the implementation of the CHTDF and whatever might come afterwards.</p> <p>Assuming the UN had DaO in place in Bangladesh what would be the impact on impact on any subsequent programme to CHTDF.</p> <p>Firstly, the adopting of DaO would mean extensive efforts in re-planning the Bangladesh Country Programme and timing for start-up and the accommodation of ongoing/prior commitments (including CHTDF) would need to be taken into account. The five pillars of 'oneness' of DaO 'plan, leader, budget, management practices and office(house)' whilst capable of making efficiency gains for the UN would need to be assessed for their impact on existing programmes. Obviously the 'one plan' and 'one budget' under the 'one leader' would obviously be the arbitrator of which programmes were priority and which fall outside and this would most probably be under the control of the UN Special Representative.</p> <p>Experience from some of the countries piloting DaO that different (UN) stakeholders have varying expectations from projects which are not always synonymous. (Country led Evaluation DaO Initiative in Vietnam) So although there are substantial benefits of working together there remain challenges over allocation of budgets, agency profile and programme design.</p> <p>In summary whilst there are potential advantages to the UN in the long term in adopting DaO it would require a great deal of reorganization and planning that according to the 'pilots' is not of benefit to ongoing programmes requires a long gestation period before benefits accrue. M&E also apparently remains a challenge with regard to structure of plans and specification indicators. In view of the fact that any subsequent programme to the current CHTDF programme is planned to begin by the beginning of 2015 the time period is far too short to realise any advantage from DaO in Bangladesh with regard to CHTDF.</p> <p>One outcome that might from the DaO pilots that has reportedly proved</p>
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				valuable and may be valuable for CHTDF to consider is a variation of 'Programme Coordination Groups' for reducing duplication and overlap and holding agencies accountable for outcomes.
35.2	First Option: MoCHTA+HDCs lead the programme with TA support.	The JE appears to conflate the role of MoCHTA and HDCs – the former has primarily a coordinating and fund channeling role. What about the role of the CHT RC? Without HDC elections, HDCs are as unaccountable to the local community as CHTDF is. Last but not least, the JE does not assess how far MoCHTA alone can drive the implementation of the PA. Many in CHT would argue that it cannot and that the international community needs to remain engaged to push on these issues at least until the PA is implemented. The JE should take into account that while national ownership is valued, there are two sides to the Peace Accord (of which government represent one).	Address the points raised in the comments.	Partially agree and points raised in Comments addressed. It is the view of the ET that MoCHTA alone can drive the implementation of the PA. Many in CHT would argue that it cannot and that the international community needs to remain engaged to push on these issues at least until the PA is implemented.
35.3	Second Option: MoCHTA+HDCs with TA, and CHTDF	Needs to spell out the implementation modality that includes not only MoCHTA but other line ministries as well	Address the points raised in the comments.	Comments has been addressed in the text

		under NEX. This option also does not articulate the role or fund flow for CHT RC. However there is scope for advocacy on implementation of the Accord under DEX..		
35.4	Third option: Continuation of CHTDF	Whilst continuation of CHTDF has been deemed to be unsustainable and lacking the “local ownership” element, it could be argues that as long as the PA remains unimplemented and local elections for HDCs and the RC remain unimplemented, “local ownership” under other arrangements would also prove elusive.	Address the points raised in the comments.	Agreed. However, the ET considers that the next generation donors should not begin a new programme with this premise. The recommendations are not for business as usual rather to strengthen actions and activities that further contribute to the strengthening of the PA implementation. This does not imply a sudden cut-off of resources or the closure of CHTDF rather the re-orientation. The ET has emphasised the importance of the role of the electorate, the communities, and the need for social and ‘political’ empowerment not least to act, if not as a driving force, a substantive voice in the demands for elections to be held. It is not suggested that this task is straight forward but the alternative is to give up on advocating for democratic institutions and with it the abandonment of the Peace Accord. The remaining period of Phase III can be used to start the process of re-orientation and reevaluating what constitutes the programme demands needed in support of the PA. It is not expected that this process will be completed by the end of 2014 it will run into the subsequent programme.
35.5	(Under Third option: Continuation of CHTDF) The approach, strategy, and modalities require restructuring to create a sense of ownership and	If the JE recommending end of funding for CHTDF it should also be included what are the basis for that. Also in consideration that this conclusion is inconsistent with all the analyses, conclusions	More clarification needed given the points raised by the comments.	Clarification. The ET is not recommending the end of funding for CHTDF. The potential risks involved of operating with governments particularly where ‘responsible’ authorities are weak and currently not able to advance a reform agenda is well recognised. The proposal is therefore for a period of transition and making provision for planning units to be established – supported initially by TA – with the capacity to articulate a demand led plan that is owned by the ‘Partners’ . Centralised

<p>harmonization– of working together - with national sectoral development programmes. Funding should be channelled through MoCHTA and HDCs with a strong technical assistance component and coordination by CHTRC/HDC strongly considered as an effective option.</p>	<p>and recommendations made throughout the report. No mention is given to the potential risks involved especially for ownership of provision of technical assistance operating with the government, and especially in a situation where government institutions are insufficiently able to advance a reform agenda (See EU strategy for TC)</p>		<p>and decentralised management would also need the support of the TA initially and periodically.</p> <p>Whilst the notion of ownership by government at this juncture has risks attached if the programme is progressed carefully and deliberately the risks involved would be minimised and the outcomes positive. If this approach is not to be pursued and ownership retained by the donors agencies there is a different set of risks involved and development activities unlikely to prove sustainable.</p>
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Annex II: SWOT Analysis				
1.	2.Capacity Building of CHT Institutions			
	<p>As a general comment, the SWOT does not make any distinction between different agents involved. As a result the 4 criteria (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats become incorrect, mismatched, and lacking validity. For instance 'lack of transfer procedures for services (health, education etc) cannot be a weakness of the project but rather a threat. Transfer of subjects but not finances could become an opportunity for the project though a weakness on the implementation of the Peace Accord.</p>			
1.1	<p>Most capacity building efforts provided to LOA staff rather than core staff;</p>	<p>Not correct. LOA staff have received training to support the implementation of LOA activities, but under CD</p>	<p>Address the points raised in the comments.</p>	<p>Clarified: The MOST capacity building efforts provided to LOA staff along with core staff of HDCs. As the LOA staffs are involved in project implementation so they got more training than core staff of HDCs. The argument is based on</p>

		component and later with support of CD grants mostly officials, officers and staff have received the training and support		comparison between core staff and LOA staff.
1.2	Lack of transfer procedures for subject department of health, education and Transferred subjects but not finances and functionaries of respective departments;	This is not a weakness of the program, but threat from context	Need to correct it.	Accepted and revised; The point is taken out from weakness and placed under threat
1.3	Implementation of capacity building efforts as per plan.	Seems strength to us.	Need to correct it.	Accepted and revised. This point has taken out and placed as strength part.
2.	5.Education			
2.1	Lack of bridging of MLE with mainstream education curriculum;	CHTDF MLE materials are for pre-primary 1 (4+ age groups) where there is no government curriculum. For higher grades CHTDF MLE materials are supplementary and well bridged with mainstream curriculum.	Address the points raised in the comments.	Accepted and revised The MLE curriculum developed when there was no Pre-Primary School curriculum of NCTB. Now it needs revisiting curriculum to match with national curriculum.
2.2	Parallel education system in same area.	CHTDF supported schools not parallel, new schools constructed in areas without existing schools, schools follow government curriculum	Address the points raised in the comments.	Accepted the comments and reworded Separate education management system in same area which is non-aligned with the line department of government
3.	6.Health (Weaknesses)			
1.	No specifically assigned person rather than LOA staff in HDCs to	Not correct, health conveyor – councilor is assigned	Need to address it in	Accepted and revised. One councillor-though non-elected has been assigned to oversee the

	manage health program;	person	the report.	respective health programme of CHTDF;
2.	Two parallel system within the same area;	Not parallel. The system is set forth with the consultation with line department. CSBA are unique in same area.	Address the points raised in the comments.	Partially accepted and revised Two parallel systems within the same area in terms of management of the project because management is not aligned. Though it is mentioned that the system is set forth in consultation with line department but consultation does not ensure the uniform and lateral management until and unless it become under the management system. The CSBA is unique in the area.
4.	7. General/Others			
4.1	Three systems of governance in CHT to reconcile; Lack of coordination between district administration and HDC's.	Not weakness, but threats from context	Need to correct it.	This is debatable whether it is seen as a threat or weakness. By definition <i>weaknesses</i> is Internal factors 'coordination' is internal to the organization or programme and as such can be classified as a weakness. This is so since CHTDF was designed taking into account the different forms of governance So, by definition it is weakness. If however CHTDF considers that 'coordination' is outside of programme then it can be considered a threat ie external factors-are <i>threats</i> .
5.	Threats, 6.Health			
5.1	No specific person in HDC organogram to oversee and manage health system;	One councilor is assigned to oversee the education system	Need to address it in the report.	Comments addresses a different issue. Clarification provided. The statement relates to health but the comment cites education. However, it is true that one non-elected councillor- though is assigned to oversee the education system.

ANNEX IV: LIST OF PEOPLE MET

SL	Name	Designation	Organization /Agency
1	Fabrizio SENESI	Program Manager, Governance and Human Rights	Delegation of European Union, Dhaka
2	Olivier Brout	Head of office, ECHO	European Commission, Dhaka
3	Dr. Pierre –Yves Lambert	Attaché, Program Manager, Human & Social Development	Delegation of European Union, Dhaka
4	Stephanie ROUSSEAU	Coordination & Aid Effectiveness	Delegation of European Union, Dhaka
5	Mogens Strunge Larsen	Head of Cooperation,	Royal Danish Embassy, Dhaka
6	Tara Painter	Education Advisor	Canadian Embassy, Dhaka
7	Henrik Fredborg Larsen,	Director, CHTDF	UNDP, Dhaka
8	Prosenjit Chakma	Chief of Policy and & Deputy Director, CHTDF	
9	Alko Cair,	Team Leader, Planning Monitoring Reporting Cluster, CHTDF	UNDP, Dhaka
10	Kanae Ramodimossi,	Operation Manager, CHTDF	UNDP, Dhaka
11	Hossain Shahid Suman	Cluster Leader, Policy Confidence Building, CHTDF	UNDP, Dhaka
12	A. H. M Mohiuddin,	Advisor Education, CHTDF	UNDP, Dhaka
13	S.Y Khan Mojlish	Government Liaison and Reporting, CHTDF	UNDP, Dhaka
14	Rikta Mohinta,	HR Officer and Dhaka Office Manager, CHTDF	UNDP, Dhaka
15	Jaferson Chakma	Project Officer, Planning, Monitoring and Reporting, CHTDF	UNDP, Dhaka
16	Belerta Cela	Assistant Country Director, Result & Resource Management Cluster	UNDP, Dhaka
17	Pauline Tamesis	Country Director, UNDP	UNDP, Dhaka
18	Melina Nathan	Peace and Development Policy Specialist	CHTDF, UNDP
19	Dr. Pierre –Yves Lambert,	Attache, Program Manager, Human & Social Development	EUD, Dhaka
20	Stephanie ROUSSEAU	Coordination & Aid Effectiveness	EUD Dhaka
21	Henrik Fredborg Larsen	Director	CHTDF, UNDP
22	Hossain Shahid Suman-	Cluster Leader, Policy Confidence Building	CHTDF, UNDP
23	A. H. M Mohiuddin	Advisor Education	CHTDF, UNDP
24	S.Y Khan Mojlish	Government Liaison and Reporting	CHTDF, UNDP

25	Rikta Mohinta	HR Officer and Dhaka Office Manager	CHTDF, UNDP
26	Jaferson Chakma	Project Officer, Planning, Monitoring and Reporting	CHTDF, UNDP
27	Mogens Strunge Larsen	Head of Cooperation,	Royal Danish Embassy, Dhaka
28	Tara Painter,	Education Advisor	Canadian Embassy, Dhaka
29	Pauline Tamesis	Country Director	UNDP
30	Ketsamay Rajphangthong	Field Operations Sections	UNICEF
31	Louise Mvono	Deputy Representative	UNICEF
32	Matthias Keller	3rd Secretary	German Embassy
33	Dr.M Muktadir Kabir	Program Manager, Malaria health	BRAC, Dhaka
34	Dr. Mohammand Zafar Uddin,	Associate Director, Administration, Monitoring and Investigation	BRAC, Dhaka
35	Md. Mojharul Islam,	Program Manager, Partnership Strengthening Unit	BRAC, Dhaka
36	Profullah Chandar Barman	Program head Education	BRAC , Dhaka
37	Md. Monwar Hossain, Khondakar	Program Coordination, Education	BRAC, Dhaka
38	Andrew Zenkin	Director Research	BRAC, Dhaka
39	Hans-Joachim Hermann	Principal Advisor	GIZ
40	Dr. Prasanna Gunasekera		UNFPA
41	Henrik Van Asch Van Wijck	First Secretary, Political Affairs	The Kingdon of the Netherlands
42	Anne Van Drunen Littel,	Cluster Political Affairs	The Kingdon of the Netherlands
43	Tim Bototnikoff	Deputy High Commissioner	Australian Embassy, Dhaka
44	Mr. Bashudev Acharjee	Joint Secretary MoCHA	BoB Dhaka
45	Bibhash Chakraborty	Country Programme Manager	Saferworld UK
46	SMA Rashid	Executive Director	NGO Forum for Public Health
47	Joseph Harlder	Head, Advocacy and Information	NGO Forum for Public Health
48	Richard Butterword	Team Leader, Governance	DFID

<i>Sl</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Designation</i>	<i>Location</i>
	Md. Mostafa Kamal	Deputy Commissioner	Rangamati
1.	Nikhil Kumar Chakma	Chairman, Rangamati Hill District council	Rangamati
2.	Irfan Shareef	Chief Executive officer, Rangamati Hill District council	Rangamati
3.	Arunendu Tripura	Public Relations Officer, Rangamati Hill District council	Rangamati

Police Department

1	Amena Bagum,	Superintendent of Police	Rangamati
2	Md. Habibur Rahman	Additional SP (Crime)	Rangamati
3	Md. Ashrafujjaman,	(Headquarter), Additional SP	Rangamati
4	Md. Abul Kalam Azad,	Additional SP (Headquarter)	Rangamati

Line Department (health and Education)

1.	Dr. Md. Mostafijur Rahman	Civil Surgeon	Rangamati
2	Dr. Narayan Chandra Das	Civil Surgeon	Khagrachari
3	Khaza Mohammad Ali	District Assistant Primary Education Officer	Bandarban
4	Mr. Feroz Ahamed	District Assistant Primary Education Officer	Bandarban
5	AKM Riaj Uddin, District Primary Education Officer	Education	Rangamati

Upazilla Chairman met

Sl	Name	Position	Institution
	Md. Shamsul Haque	Chairman	Matiranga Upazilla Parishad, Khagrachari
	Sona Ratan Chakma	Chairman	Mohalchari Upazilla Parishad, khagrachari
3	Md. Tofajjal Hossen	Chairman	Longadu Upazilla Parishad, Rangamati
	Joy SenTanchangya	Chairman	Bilaichari Upazilla Parishad, Rangamati

Participants interacted during the mission Stakeholders Meeting

Longadu Upazilla, Rangamati			
Sl	Name	Designation	Organization
	Md. Tofajjal Hossen	Chairman	Longadu Upazilla Parishad
	Sabrina Tania	Vice Chairman	Longadu Upazilla Parishad
	Sukha Moy Chakma	Chairman	Longadu Union Parishad
	Abdul Barak Dewan	Chairman	Kalapukajya Union Parishad
	Md. Jahir Uddin	Chairman	Vasanya Adam Union Parishad
	Mohammed Kamal	AGM	IDF

	Kazi Mohammed Ullah	Statistical Officer	Longadu Upazilla
	Md. Mahbul Elahi	Youth Development Officer	Longadu Upazilla
	Mohan Lal Chakma	Representative	RHDC
	Mangal Kanti Chakma	Chairman	Atarokchara Union Parishad
	Ratan Kanti Nath	Upazilla Livestock Officer	LongaduUpazilla
	Ratan Chowdhury	Sub Assistant Agriculture Officer	Department of Agriculture Extension, LongaduUpazilla
	Anjan Kumar Dey	Sub Inspector	Longadu Police Station
	Dr. Md. Ibrahim	Thana Health Officer	LongaduUpazilla

Interactions with PDC & PNDG representatives

Purbo Chailatoli Para, Longadu Upazilla, Rangamati			
Sl	Name	Designation	Organization
	Md. Nurul Islam	General Secretary	Purbo Chailatoli PDC
	Firoza Begum	Cashier	Purbo Chailatoli PNDG
	Md. Jahir Uddin	Chairman	Vasanya Adam Union Parishad
	Amena Begum	Community Health Service Worker (CHSW)	Bahirtila, Member Para & Modhurtilla

Meeting with UzAC, Bilaichari Upazilla, Rangamati

Date: 03 November 2013, Venue: Upazila Chairman's Chamber

Sl	Name	Designation	Organization
	Joy SenTanchangya	Chairman	Bilaichari Upazilla Parishad
	Nurul Islam	UpazillaNirbahi Officer	Bilaichari Upazilla
	Amar Kanti Tanchangya	Vice Chairman	Bilaichari Upazilla Parishad
	Mina Chakma	Vice Chairman	Bilaichari Upazilla Parishad
	Sunil Kanti Chakma	Chairman	Bilaichari Union Parishad
	Koushik Chakma	Assistant Upazilla Education Officer	Bilaichari Upazilla
	Sudarson Sikder	Upazilla Agriculture Officer	Bilaichari Upazilla

Meeting with SMC/PDC/CHSW/MG at Shalbagan Para

Sl	Name	Position	Organization
	Jodulal Chakma	Chairperson	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School Management Committee
	Shanti Devi Chakma	Vice Chairperson	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School Management Committee
	Satyajoy Chakma	Treasurer	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School Management Committee
	Sumoti Chakma	Head Teacher (acting)	Shalbagan Non-government Primary

			School
	Subhash Chandra Chakma	Assistant Teacher	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Amar JibanChakma	Assistant Teacher	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Jyotimoy Chakma	Assistant Teacher	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Gurimorot Chakma	Member	South Shalbagan PDC
	Ban Chandra Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Barun Bikash Chakma	Chairperson	Adult Literacy Management Committee
	ArunBikash Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Laxmidhan Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Chandra Mohan Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Ranjit Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Amar BalaChakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Indraraj Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Lota Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Rosyebi Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Barun Chandra Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Shanti BijoyChakma	Villager	Shalbagan
	Champa Rani Chakma	Member	Mothers' Group
	Namita Chakma	Member	Mothers' Group
	Kalobi Chakma	Member	Mothers' Group
	Kalabi Chakma	Vice Chairperson	Mothers' Group
	Aruna Devi Chakma	Member	Mothers' Group
	Manoka Chakma	Community Skilled Birth Attendant	Shalbagan
	Smar Kanti Chakma	Teacher	Adult Literacy Management Committee
	Jotu Chakma	Chairperson	Parents Teachers Association
	Kaloketu Chakma	General Secretary	South Shalbagan PDC
	Jagpudi Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Rangabo Chakma	Member	South Shalbagan PDC
	Ganga Devi Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Ganga Devi Chakma	Villager	

	Sigepudi Chakma	Member	Mothers' Group
	Puichau Marma	Chairperson	Mothers' Group
	Hobu Chakma	Parent	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School
	Iktugi Chakma	Member	Mothers' Group
	Jaya Chakma	Villager	PDC members
	Laxmimuni Chakma	Villager	PDC members
	Kalabi Chakma	Villager	PDC members
	Janokdhon Chakma	Traditional healer	PDC members
	Niran Chakma	Member	Shalbagan Non-government Primary School Management Committee
	RangoChakma	Parent	
	Prem Devi Chakma	Member	School Feeding Management Committee
	Nayan Mala Chakma	Member	School Feeding Management Committee
	Singobi Chakma	Member	School Feeding Management Committee
	Kalasona Chakma	Parent	
	Bimalya Chakma	Parent	
	Laxmirani Chakma	Parent	
	Irei Ban Chakma	Parent	
	Kalabi Chakma	Parent	
	Shibratan Chakma	Parent	
	Soneka Chakma	Member	Mothers' Group
	Snehalata Chakma	Villager	
	Kananbala Chakma	Villager	
	Bimalkanti Chakma	Member	Parents Teachers Association
	Sujarita Chakma	Member	Parents Teachers Association
	Maya Devi Chakma	Member	North Shalbagan PDC
	Mile Chakma	Traditional Birth Attendant	Shalbagan
	Chanchana Chakma	Member	Parents Teachers Association
	Riton Chakma	Villager	
	Kalasona Chakma	Parent	
	Ruppe Chakma	Villager	
	Anil Chakma	Villager	
	Ujjwal Chakma	Villager	
	Laxmidhan Chakma	Villager	
	Arun Kumar Chakma	Member	Parents Teachers Association
	Sushil Kumar Chakma	Villager	
	OkhoymoniChakma	Villager	
	ChagakholaChakma (Nayan)	Villager	
	BironginiChakma	Villager	
	RinaChakma	Parent	
	Sabina Chakma	Cashier	Mothers' Group
	MayuriBalaChakma	CHSW	
	ChandilalChakma	Member	Parents Teachers Association

	Bijupudi Chaka	Villager	
	SorendraChakma	Villager	
	SadhanChakma	Villager	
	BishwbabuChakma	Villager	
	MousumiChakma	Villager	
	KalopriyaChakma	Member	School management Committee
	BinotaChakma	Member	Mothers' Group
	NatunmoniChakma	Parent	
	JeingjaimongMarma	Parent	
	Sadhan Marma	Villager	
	Champa Chakma	Villager	
	Priyaranjan Chakma	Villager	
	Chikonchan Chakma	Parent	
	KamalasundoriChakma	Villager	
	AmarjibChakma	Villager	
	PanchanChakma	Member	North Shalbagan PDC
	Nirot Chandra Chakma	Member	North Shalbagan PDC

Meeting with CHTDF Staff Members

<i>Sl</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Designation</i>	<i>Organization</i>
	Orishwarja Chakma	District Manager, Ragamati	CHTDF
	Robert Stoelman	Chief, Implementation	CHTDF
	Biplab Chakma	Chief, CEP	CHTDF
	Habibur Rahman	Cluster Leader, CEP	CHTDF
	Supriya Tripura	Program Officer, CEP	CHTDF
	Mahbubul Alam	Cluster Leader, SMU and Admin	CHTDF
	Dr. Md. ShaheenAkhtar	Program Officer, Health	CHTDF
	Uchimong Chowdhury	Confidence Building Expert, Gender and Local Confidence Building cluster	CHTDF
	Bihita Bidhan Khisa	District Community Empowerment Officer, Rangamati	CHTDF
	Samar Bijoy Chakma	Accountant	CHTDF
	A.F.M. Saleh	District Governance Officer, Rangamati	CHTDF
	Md. Golam Mostafa Kamal	Program Officer, Governance	CHTDF
	Shwe Aung Prue	Cluster Leader, Capacity Development and Services Delivery	CHTDF
	Sukheshwar Chakma	Program Officer, Education	CHTDF
15	Dr. Md. Shaheen Akhtar	Program Officer, Health cluster	CHTDF
16	Mr. Habibur Rahman	Cluster Leader, CEP	CHTDF
17	Mr. Mizanur Rahman	Monitoring Officer, CEP	CHTDF
18	Mr. Biplob Chakma	SMT members CEP	CHTDF

Participants NGO Executives, Rangamati and Khagrachi

Rangamari			
Sl	Name	Designation	Organization
	Jana Lal Chakma	Chief Executive Officer	CIPD
	Md. Iqbal Bahar Maruf	Programme Manager	SAS
	Tanay Dewan	Advisor	Hilehili
	Biplab Chakma	Executive Director	Taungya
	Mohammad Ali	Executive Director	Shining Hill
	Dr. NiloKumar Tanchangya	Executive Director	Hill Flower
	Dr. Babul Kanti Chakma	Medical Officer	Hill Flower
Khagrachari			
8	Arun Kanti Chakma	Executive Director	Assistance for the Livelihood of the Origins (ALO)
9	Shefalika Tripura	Executive Director	Khagrapur Mahila KalyanSamity (KMKS)
10	Binodan Tripura	Executive Director in charge	Zabarang Kalyan Samity (Zabarang)
11	Dhaneswar Dewan	Programme Manager	Hamari
12	Ripan Chakma	Executive Director	TrinamulUnnayanSangstha (TUS)

Meeting with Education and Gender Clusters

Sl	Name	Designation	Organization
	Shwe Aung Prue	Cluster Leader, Capacity Development and Service Delivery	CHTDF, Rangamati
	Sukheshwar Chakma	Program Officer, Education	CHTDF, Rangamati
	Jhuma Dewan	Cluster Leader, Gender and Local Confidence Building cluster	CHTDF, Rangamati
	Uchimong Chowdhury	Confidence Building Expert, Gender and Local Confidence Building Cluster	CHTDF, Rangamati

Chakma and Bohmong Circle Chief

Sl	Name	Designation	Organization
	Raja Barrister Devasish Roy	Circle Chief	Chakma circle
	Bohmongree U Chaw Prue	Circle chief	Bohmong Circle

Meeting with CHTRC, HDC

Sl	Name	Position	Institution
	Biro Kishor Chakma	Councilor	Khagrachari Hill District Council
	Mohammad Slahuddin	Chief Executive Officer	Khagrachari Hill District

			Council
	Md. Abdur Rahman Tarafder	Executive Officer	Khagrachari Hill District Council
	Jibon Roaza	Executive Engineer	Khagrachari Hill District Council
	Md. Shahab Uddin	Audit and Accounts Officer	Khagrachari Hill District Council
	Priyo Kumar Chakma	Administrative Officer	Khagrachari Hill District Council
	Gautom Chakam	Member	CHTRC

Meeting with the Taskforce for Identification and rehabilitation of Internally Displaced Persons and Rehabilitation of Tribal Refugees Repatriated from India

Date: 07 November 2013, Venue: Taskforce Office, Khagrachari

<i>Sl</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Institution</i>
	Krishna Chandra Chakma	Chief Executive Officer	Taskforce
	ShashwataPriyaChakma	Focal Person for CHTDF supported project	Taskforce

Meeting with DPEO, Khagrachari

Date: 07 November 2013, Venue: Chamber of DPEO, Khagrachari

<i>Sl</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Institution</i>
	Ramendra Nath Podder	District Primary Education Officer	Khagrachari

Meeting with Peace Makers

Date: 07 November 2013, Venue: CTDF conference room, Khagrachari

<i>Sl</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Institution</i>
	Nigar Sultana	Chairperson	JatiyaMahilaSanstha, Matiranga
	DhimanKhisa	Civic Actor	Khagrachari
	Shapla Devi Tripura	General Secretary	KharapurMahilaKalyanSamity

Meeting with BHDC, LoA staffs and CHTDF Bandarban Team

Date: 07 November 2013

<i>Sl</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Institution</i>
	LelungKhumi	Program Officer	Bandarban Hill District Council
	Pongkaj Moy Tripura	Education Officer	Bandarban Hill District Council
	KyawHlaSen	Grant Management Officer	Bandarban Hill District Council

	CharuBikash Tripura	District Governance Officer	UNDP CHTDF, Bandarban
	UshingmongChowdhury	District Community Empowerment Officer	UNDP CHTDF, Bandarban
	Khushiray Tripura	District Manager	UNDP CHTDF, Bandarban
	Bikash Chandra Sikder	Chief Executive Officer	Bandarban Hill District Council
	Dr. ChingSwePrue	District Medical Officer	Bandarban Hill District Council

Interaction with SMC and MG

Date: 08 November 2013, Venue: Sakhoy Commander Para Non-government Primary School, Bandarban

<i>Sl</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Institution</i>
	MenratMro	Chairman	School Management Committee
	SakhoyKarbari	Vice-chairman	School Management Committee
	RengwanMro	Member	School Management Committee
	Ipoy Mo	Cashier	School Management Committee
	MenyongMro	Member	School Management Committee
	ChuluiMro	Member	School Management Committee
	Langpung Pro	Member	School Management Committee
	YangnongMro	Member	School Management Committee
	NgungwayMro	Member	School Management Committee
	SongyenMro	Member	Mothers' Group
	FungramMro	Member	Mothers' Group
	RuilongMro	Chairperson	Mothers' Group
	RumnamMro	Member	Mothers' Group
	RuitumMro	Member	Mothers' Group
	RuiwanMro	Member	Mothers' Group
	TumlengMro	Member	Mothers' Group

Interaction with PDC/PNDG/FFS/CHSW

Date: 08 November 2013, Venue: Kalapani Para, Gomati, Matiranga, Khagrachari

<i>Sl</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Village/Mouza</i>
	Shyamala Devi Tripura	Community Health Services Worker	Kalapani area
	Md. Dulal Mia	General Secretary	Kalapani PDC
	Md. Tayob Ali	Chairperson	Kalapani PDC
	Md. Answer Ali	Member	Kalapani PDC
	Md. Babul Mia	Member	Kalapani PDC
	Ms. Sahara Begum	Chairperson	Kalapani PNDG
	Ms. Salina Begum	Secretary	Kalapani PNDG
	Ms. JoinabBibi	Member	Kalapani PNDG
	Ms. Sirina Begum	Member	Kalapani PNDG

Interaction with PDC/PNDG/MG/CHSWs/SCMC

Date: 08 November 2013, Venue: Juddho Kumar Para, Matiranga, Khagrachari

Sl	Name	Position	Institution	Location
	Shibu Kumar Chakma	Villager	Juddho Kumar Para	Khagrachari
	Nironjoy Tripura	Villager	Juddho Kumar Para	Khagrachari
	BijoySen Tripura	General Secretary	Juddho Kumar PDC	Khagrachari
	Jiban Kumar Tripura	President	Juddho Kumar PDC	Khagrachari
	Boshi Kumar Tripura	Villager	Juddho Kumar PDC	Khagrachari
	Kartik Tripura	Member	Juddho Kumar PDC	Khagrachari
	DebaRanjan Tripura	Villager	Juddho Kumar Para	Khagrachari
	Birendra Kishore Tripura	General Secretary	Satellite Clinic Management Committee	Khagrachari
	SurendraBikash Tripura	President	Parents Teachers Association	Khagrachari
	Chandana Devi Tripura	CHSW	---	Khagrachari
	LabangaMukhi Tripura	CHSW	---	Khagrachari
	BimalPati Tripura	Villager	Juddho Kumar Para	Khagrachari
	AniBala Tripura	Villager	Juddho Kumar Para	Khagrachari
	Ganga Mohan Tripura	Villager	Juddho Kumar Para	Khagrachari
	Kartik Mohan Tripura	Villager	Juddho Kumar Para	Khagrachari
	Beri Chandra Tripura	Villager	Juddho Kumar Para	Khagrachari
	AhsanUllah	UP Member	Belchari Union, Matiranga	Khagrachari
	Ashwini Kumar Tripura	Villager	Juddho Kumar Para	Khagrachari
	BirendraBikash Tripura	President	Juddho Kumar Para Non-govt Primary School	Khagrachari
	Molin Mohan Tripura	Karbari	Juddho Kumar Para	Khagrachari
	PritiRanjan Tripura	Head Teacher	Juddho Kumar Para Non-govt Primary School	Khagrachari

Traditional Leaders

Sl	Name	Position	Village/Mouza	Location
	Purna Bhushan Tripura	Karbari		Khagrachari
	Ronic Tripura	Karbari		Khagrachari
	ArunChakma	Karbari		Khagrachari
	Swadesh Priti Chakma	Headman		Khagrachari
	Denandra Chakma	Headman		Khagrachari
	Khetra Mohan Roaza	Headman	Nunchari Mouza	Khagrachari
	Ratan Bikash Chakma	Headman		Khagrachari

	Nibu ILal Roaza	Headman	Bangal Kati Mouza	<i>Khagrachari</i>
	Probhat Shanti Roaza	Headman		<i>Khagrachari</i>

ANNEX-V: DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM EU, UNDP & REVIEWED

1. Program Description Annex Phase 2005-2007
2. Contribution Agreement CHT Phase 2005-2007
3. Logical Framework Phase 2005-2007
4. EC Final report 2005-2006
5. Programme Document with signed cover page 18 Dec. 05
6. Description of Operation Phase 2007-2010
7. Contribution Agreement Phase 2007-2010
8. Logframe CHTDF Phase 2007-2010
9. Report 31 March phase 2007-2010
10. Note-Rider phase 2007-2010
11. ROM CHTFD September 12, Phase 2007-2010
12. Amendment 1, Phase 2007-2010
13. Education Contribution Agreement
14. Description of Action-EC-Education 2009
15. Logframe Education
16. MRT Education Final Report
17. Formulation Mission Report-Education
18. Volume II Annexes
19. Food Security in CHT 2
20. Health Project Completion Report-revised version-31.07.12
21. Contribution Agreement Health
22. Action Fiche Draft Food security and Livelihoods
23. *Aide Mémoire 1, Conseil Santé* May 2010
24. Description of Action
25. CHTDF Transtec Evaluation Report 2009
26. Economic opportunities Final report 08
27. Mid-term review-2006
28. Final Report LPO
29. Contribution Agreement CIDA Project
30. Contribution Agreement DANIDA AFSP I
31. Contribution Agreement DANIDA AFSP II
32. Contribution Agreement EU funded Food security Project
33. CHTDF Annual Report 2012
34. CHTDF AnnualReport2010
35. CHTDF AnnualReport2011
36. CHT Health Education Brief Sep 2013
37. CHTDF Factsheet Jan 2013
38. Review of Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in CHT 2013
39. Gender Assessment of Chittagong Hill Tracts 2013
40. Household Survey in CHT
41. Socio-Economic Baseline Survey of the small ethnic groups in the CHT
42. AIDE MEMOIRE n° 1 Conseil Santé Consortium Evaluation & Monitoring May 2010

43. AIDE MEMOIRE n° 2 Conseil Santé Consortium July 2010
44. EU ROM Mission Monitoring Report Nov 2010
45. Strengthening Basic Education in CHT Phase 2
46. EU ROM Mission Monitoring Report March 2011
47. Food Facility, EC-UNDP, Bangladesh
48. AEDES Consortium, Monitoring and Evaluation of the EC-UNDP project Health Services
49. CHTDF Final Project Review Report: Support to Basic Education, May 2011
50. CHTDF Final Project Review Report: Economic development May 2011
51. CHTDF Final Project Review Report: Community Empowerment May 2011
52. CHTDF Final Project Review Report: Confidence-Building May 2011
53. CHTDF Results Assessment Report Agriculture and Food Security Project Oct 2011
54. Monitoring Report: Supporting Local Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts October 2012
55. CHTDF Result Assessment (IFM-FFS) of Agriculture and Food Security Project (DANIDA Supported) December 2011
56. Mid-Term Review of Strengthening Basic Education in the CHT
57. MONG CIRCLE CAPACITY ASSESSMENT REPORT, December 2011
58. BOHMONG CIRCLE CAPACITY ASSESSMENT REPORT, December 2011
59. CHAKMA CIRCLE CAPACITY ASSESSMENT REPORT, December 2011.
60. Support to Preparation of an Integrated Project for the Environment Friendly Agriculture in the Chittagong Hill Tracts MoCHTA & FAO 24 March 2013
61. Agriculture Development Strategies for the Chittagong Hill Tracts – Improving livelihoods and food and nutrition security through sustainable production increases in crops, livestock and fisheries. FAO 2013.

ANNEX VI: CHTDF ET INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Questions concerning the five main criteria of evaluation

Relevance

Relevance concerns the appropriateness of the project design to the problems to be resolved at two points in time: when the project was designed, and at the time of the evaluation. Did the program correspond to a real problem? How was that problem tackled in the initial stages: Identification and planning

Questions: RELEVANCE

#	Essential questions	Where	Who
1	<p>INFORMATION BASE & NEEDS IDENTIFICATION</p> <p>How solid was the information base at the outset of the program in terms of studies and baseline data?</p> <p>Have the studies been used for designing the program? Have they been made available to the different institutions involved in implementation?</p> <p>What have been and are the most urgent needs in the CHT on the different levels – community (a), local institutions (b), regional and national bodies (c)?</p> <p>Have these needs been addressed by the program in an adequate way to impact towards peace building?</p> <p>To which extent has there been a consensus on the understanding of peace and the way to reach sustainable peace among the different stakeholders on the different levels?</p>	Dhaka & CHT	<p>Donor Agencies, Local Institutions</p> <p>Communities, HDC, RC</p>
2	<p>LOGICAL FRAMEWORK PLANNING</p> <p>In planning has the Logical framework approach been used?</p> <p>Overall design strengths and weaknesses including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clarity and internal consistency of the stated overall objectives, purpose and results; Whether the objectively-verifiable indicators of achievement (OVIs) were well chosen and widely agreed; Realism in choice and quantity of inputs; Overall degree of flexibility and adaptability to facilitate rapid responses to changes in circumstances. 	Dhaka & CHT	<p>Donor Agencies, Local Institutions</p> <p>Communities, HDC, RC</p>
3	<p>PARTICIPATION</p> <p>Have consultations been made prior to the program with beneficiaries, potential partners and allies?</p> <p>At which stage and how have they been consulted?</p> <p>Has coordination been organized on a regular basis?</p>	Dhaka & CHT	<p>Donor Agencies, Local Institutions</p> <p>Communities, HDC, RC</p>
4	<p>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</p> <p>How is the planning of the program to be evaluated?</p> <p>Which strengths and weaknesses could be identified concerning the planning process and the relevance of the program?</p> <p>Which recommendations could be derived for the future?</p>	Dhaka & CHT	<p>Donor Agencies, Local Institutions</p> <p>Communities, HDC, RC</p>

Efficiency

The efficiency criterion concerns how well the various activities transformed the available resources into the intended results (sometimes referred to as outputs), in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness.

Questions concerning Efficiency

#	Essential questions	Where	WHO
1	<p>FINANCIAL RESSOURCES</p> <p>In view of the outputs and results of the program do you think that the program has made the best use of the financial resources or would there have been alternative, more efficient ways of program implementation? (e.g. different levels of sub-contractors, costs for administration, share of budget spent at community level)</p>	Dhaka & CHT	Agencies Local Institutions Communities
2	<p>COORDINATION & MANAGEMENT</p> <p>What has been the role of the different donor agencies within the CHTDF and can this partnership strategy regarded as efficient mode of program implementation?</p> <p>Did communication, coordination and cooperation on the different levels function well?</p> <p>Has the implementation taken place according to the time plan?</p> <p>How is this perceived by the different stakeholders as of agencies, CHT institutions, government, communities?</p> <p>What kind of problems has been encountered?</p> <p>Which recommendations would you give?</p>	Dhaka & CHT	Agencies; Local Institutions Communities
3	<p>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</p> <p>How have the coordination, management & efficiency of the CHTDF to be evaluated?</p> <p>Which strengths and weaknesses could be identified?</p> <p>Which recommendations could be derived for the future?</p>	Dhaka & CHT	Agencies; Local Institutions Communities

Effectiveness

The effectiveness criterion concerns how far the program's results were used by the target groups or their potential benefits were realized - in other words, whether they achieved the project purpose. The key question is what difference the project made in practice, as measured by how far the intended beneficiaries really benefited from the products or services made available.

Effectiveness

Xx	Essential questions	EU / South	Who
1	<p>CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF CHT INSTITUTIONS</p> <p>How did you (and the institution you are in charge of) benefit from CHTDF and how would you describe the effect for the service delivery to the communities (in terms of training, staff, logistics, ICT, technical assistance)?</p> <p>According to your perception what are the three major achievements of CHTDF in this regard?</p>	CHT & Dhaka	RC, HDC, Chiefs, NGOs
2	<p>REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES</p>		

Xx	Essential questions	EU / South	Who
	<p>What have been the major changes in your village/Upazila in the last 5 years?</p> <p>In which way can these initiatives be attributed to the CHTDF?</p> <p>Do you perceive essential improvements with regard to health service, school education, income generating and environmental protection)?</p> <p>Which challenges remain and what kind of measures are necessary to improve the situation in the future?</p>	CHT	Communities / Headmen
3	COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT incl.		
	<p>In which way did your village/community (Para level) benefit from the CHTDF?</p> <p>Please elaborate in terms of Para Development Communities, QIF, implemented small scale projects, number of people involved, trainings received.</p> <p>Could permanent structures and institutions been established?</p> <p>Are these impacting towards peace?</p> <p>Which kind of problems did you encounter? What would you recommend for future programs?</p>	CHT	Villages/ Paras/Headmen
4	CONFIDENCE BUILDING/PEACE BUILDING		
	<p>How is the situation at the moment with regard to communal tension and violence (positive/negative trends)?</p> <p>What are the underlying root causes of the remaining conflicts/insecurity?</p> <p>In which way did CHTDF promote confidence building and social cohesion by dialogue and strengthening institution in conflict resolution (or any other)?</p> <p>Which challenges do you perceive? Which are the lessons learned re. peace and confidence building?</p>	CHT	Donor Agencies; Local Institutions Communities
5	UNINTENDED EFFECTS		
	<p>Have unplanned results (positive or negative) occurred? (by village and year)</p>	CHT	Donor Agencies; Local Institutions Communities
4	OVERALL ASSESSMENT	Dhaka & CHT	Donor Agencies; Local Institutions Communities
	<p>How is the success of the different components to be evaluated and in which way did they promote the implementation of the Peace Accord?</p> <p>Which strengths and weaknesses could be identified?</p> <p>Which recommendations could be derived for the future?</p>		

Impact and Sustainability

The term impact, sometimes referred to as outcome, denotes the relationship between the project's purpose and overall objectives, that is the extent to which the benefits received by the target beneficiaries had a wider overall effect on larger numbers of people in the sector or region or in the country as a whole.

The fifth and final criterion, sustainability, relates to whether the positive outcomes of the project at purpose level are likely to continue after external funding ends.

Questions concerning impact and sustainability

Xx	Essential questions	Where	Who
	IMPACT		
1	Which are the improvements in CHT in the different sectors (as of Health, Education, Community Empowerment, Confidence Building) which have wider effects on the development goals such as MDGs? Have structures or/and institutions be established having broader effects on whole region or country? Are there models of best practices, which can be multiplied in other regions?	CHT & Dhaka	Donor Agencies, Local Institutions Communities
2	SUSTAINABILITY		
4	Which kind of activities, institutions, initiatives and alliances have been created and will continue on their own after financing has discontinued? Has there been a visible strategy towards sustainability?	CHT & Dhaka	Donor Agencies, Local Institutions Communities
	BEST AND WORST PRACTICES		
5	Which are the best / worst practices in terms of capacity building, community empowerment, health, education, gender and confidence building and what are the lessons learned?	CHT & Dhaka	Donor Agencies, Local Institutions Communities
4	OVERALL ASSESSMENT How is the impact and sustainability to be evaluated? Which strengths and weaknesses could be identified? Which recommendations could be derived for the future?	Dhaka & CHT	Donor Agencies, Local Institutions Communities

ANNEX VII: CHITTAONG HILL TRACTS DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES (CHTDF) EVALUATION TEAM PROPOSED ORGANIZATION, PEOPLE/ STAKEHOLDERS TO MEET

Dhaka

- Ministry of CHT Affairs (MoCHTA) ,
- Economic Relation Division (ERD) of Ministry of Planning
- Ministry of Health
- Ministry of Education
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Task Force (For CHT)
- Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
- Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)
- Japanese Embassy
- Swedish International Development Association
- DANIDA
- Royal Netherlands Embassy
- Australian Embassy/AUSAID
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
- World Health Organization (WHO)
- United Nation's International Childrens' Emergency Found (UNICEF)
- Land commission members, (No one to meet)
- Consulting firm who conducted several studies and Individual consultants,
- Potential donors in CHT like ADB , DFID
- Inter/national Organizations/NGO's working in CHT e.g. BRAC, SaferWorld

2.1. District Level.

- CHT regional Council (CHTRC at Rangamati/Dhaka),
- Hill District councils (HDCs in three districts-chairman/members and executives),
- Traditional Circle Chiefs/or representatives (if available)
- District administration (District commissioners),
- Department of Education (District education officials)
- Department of Health (District Civil Surgeon)
- Police
- Partner NGOs Executives
- UNDP District Coordinator and technical staff
- ADB

2.2. Upazila administration

- Upazila administration (UNO Upazila Nirbahi officer- One in each district)
- Department of Education (Upazila Education Officer-One in each district)
- Department of Health (Resident Medical Officer –One in each district
- Upazila Chairman (One in each district)

2.3. Union

- PDC (Para Development Committee at the Para level and beneficiaries of different project)
- PNDG (Para Women Development Group)
- School Teachers (Working under CHTDF supported School)
- Union Parishad Chairman and members
- Union Task force
- Upazila Taskforce
- Leaders of traditional administrative system (Headman and Karbari),
- Community Health Service Worker (CHSW)
- Community Skill Birth Attendant (CSBA).

Communities

- PDC Members
- PNDG Members
- Headmen
- Kanbaris
- Children



